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THE NON-DUALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF KASHMIR ŚAIVISM :
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ SCHOOL

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

By
Steven Jeffrey Kupetz

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
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ABBREVIATIONS

AK	<u>Ādhāarakārikā</u> -s of Ādi Śeṣa
BSB	<u>Brahmasūtrabhāṣya</u> of Śaṅkara
IPK	<u>Īśvarapratyabhiññākārikā</u> -s of Utpala
IPV	<u>Īśvarapratyabhiññāvimarśinī</u> of Abhinava
IPVV	<u>Īśvarapratyabhiññāvivṛtivimarśinī</u> of Abhinava
KSTS	Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies
MKB	<u>Māṇḍūkya-kārikābhāṣya</u> of Śaṅkara
PD	<u>Pañcaśī</u> of Vidyāraṇya
PH	<u>Pratyabhiññāhṛdayam</u> of Kṣemarāja
PS	<u>Paramārthasāra</u> of Abhinava
PTV	<u>Parātrimśikāvivarāṇa</u> of Abhinava
SD	<u>Śivadṛṣṭi</u> of Somānanda
TA	<u>Tantrāloka</u> of Abhinava
TS	<u>Tantrasāra</u> of Abhinava
Up.	Upaniṣads
Up.Ś	<u>Upaniṣadbhāṣya</u> of Śaṅkara
VP	<u>Vākyapadīya</u> of Bhartṛhari

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INTRODUCTION

According to Indian tradition there are six basic systems of Hindu philosophy: Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Yoga, Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. These six systems or darśana-s¹ (literally, "views") all developed from the ideas of the Vedas and Upaniṣads, which they accept as supreme scriptural authority. Most surveys of Indian philosophy present variously organized summaries of these six "orthodox" schools, along with separate treatments of the Buddhist and Jain philosophies. No account of the philosophical systems of India may be considered complete, however, without a discussion of the Pratyabhijñā branch of Kashmir Śaivism.

Śaivism is the general term for all those schools which are based on the scriptural authority of the Śaiva Āgama-s, rather than the Vedas and Upaniṣads. Āgama (Sanskrit gam + ā, to come) means that which has "come down" from preceptor to student through the ages. These Śaiva scriptures generally consist of dialogues between Śiva and his consort Pārvatī, personifications of Supreme Being and Supreme Power.² Little is known of the historical development of these works, or of their relationship with the earliest forms of Śaiva worship, which has been dated (on the basis of very scanty evidence, one might add) as far back as the pre-Aryan Indus Valley civilization (ca. 2500 B.C.). "Amongst the many revelations that

Mohenjo-daro and Harappa have had in store for us, none is perhaps more remarkable than the discovery that Śaivism takes its place as the most ancient living faith in the world."³

Kashmir has long been a center of Śaiva beliefs. According to the Nīlamata Purāṇa (ca. 6-7th cent. A.D.), there existed in Kashmir "from the dawn of history" a polytheistic religion which included the worship of aboriginal deities such as birds and serpents and ghosts, the liṅga of Śiva, various Vedic and Purāṇic deities, and even of the Buddha as an incarnation of Viṣṇu.⁴ It is certain that Buddhism was well established in Kashmir by the time of Aśoka (272-232 B.C.), if not earlier. Śaiva worship probably antedated the entrance of Buddhism, and Hinduism of a Śaiva character co-existed with Buddhism as the dominant religions of Kashmir through the following thousand years.⁵

The eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian era witnessed a religious upheaval in Kashmir, which resulted in the waning of Buddhism and the emergence (or, as Śaivas believe, the "re-emergence") of Śaivism as the predominant religion of the area. Kashmir at that time represented the meeting ground of a wide variety of religious currents then flourishing in India. Drawing upon the prevailing ideas of Buddhists, Vaiyākaraṇas (Grammarians), Naiyāyikas (Logicians), Sāṃkhyas and Vedāntins, as well as its own Āgama heritage, a Śaiva philosophy of pure monism was developed in the valley of Kashmir.

Kashmir Śaivism is distinguished by its pure monism--its belief in Śiva as the one sole principle of reality--from the dualistic and the dualistic-cum-non-dualistic outlooks of other Śaiva systems. According to Śaiva tradition, the teachings or śāstra-s which issued from the divine mouths of the Deity originally consisted of 64 systems, representing as many different aspects of thought. Most of these śāstras disappeared with the growing influence of the present Kali age. Then Śiva, taking pity on the spiritual darkness of the world, appeared on Kailāsa Mountain and commanded the sage Durvāsas to spread in the world again the knowledge of these teachings. Durvāsas created by the power of his mind three sons to teach men the Śaiva doctrine in its three aspects of diversity, diversity-in-unity and unity.⁶

1. The doctrine of diversity (bheda) or duality (dvaita) teaches that there are many principles which constitute the essence of all things. This doctrine is today associated with the Śaiva Siddhānta system, which is prevalent in South India. Śaiva Siddhānta believes in three eternally distinct categories: the individual soul (paśu), the world (pāśa) and the Lord (pati). The Sanskrit terms for these categories are derived from the allegory of a beast, its fetters and its owner.
2. The doctrine of diversity-in-unity (bhedābheda) or dualism-cum-non-dualism (dvaitādvaita) teaches a diversity of principles from one point of view, and

a non-diversity from another. The Vīra Śaiva school maintains this doctrine, and it contends that Śiva and Śakti are respectively and separately sat and cit: the static and the dynamic, the transcendent and the immanent, the impersonal and personal aspects of reality.

3. The doctrine of unity (abheda) or non-dualism (advaita) represents the philosophy of Kashmir Śaivism, which expounds the essential identity of all that appears as many.

Within Kashmir Śaivism, the Pratyabhijñā branch may be regarded as the philosophy proper of the school. Other Kashmir Śaiva writings deal extensively with yogic and tantric methodology and present the monistic Śaiva position as doctrines of faith with little concern for philosophical reasonings. Pratyabhijñā philosophy provides constructive arguments in support of the school's beliefs and critical refutations of other systems, both vedic and non-vedic.

The Pratyabhijñā branch of Kashmir Śaivism is named after the school's theory of "recognition" of the Self. Though the term had been used earlier by Buddhists,⁷ the Kashmir Śaiva idea of pratyabhijñā is presented for the first time by Somānanda and his disciple, Utpala (ca. 9th cent. A.D.). Somānanda's Śiva-drṣṭi marks the beginnings of speculative philosophy in Kashmir Śaivism. In it he defines pratyabhijñā as the realization of

the immanence of Supreme Reality (Śiva) in this world consisting of multiple objects, sentient and insentient. This realization occurs by means of the perception and direct experience (dr̥ṣṭa) of one of reality's aspects and the simultaneous remembrance (smaraṇa) of its other aspects.⁸ The process of recognition is illustrated by a charming analogy:

Suppose that the passion of love is aroused in a young lady by mere hearing of the excellences of a hero and that she--intensely desiring day and night to see him and with her heart completely out of control--sends messengers, writes love-letters, and has her already slim body made slimmer still by pangs of separation. Now the hero unexpectedly turns up in response to her entreaties and stands before her. But she is not able to apprehend clearly his distinctive great qualities and consequently to her he is nothing more than an ordinary man. . . .

But when she distinctly cognizes those excellences in him, through a word from the messenger or recognition of a characteristic, her heart immediately blooms fully like a wonderful bud. And in consequence of repeated enjoyment of union, she experiences the rest of the heart in other forms also.⁹

In a like manner, all the characteristics of Śiva are previously cognized (anubhūta-pūrvah)¹⁰ in their totality by our Supreme Self. They remain hidden from awareness owing to the veiling power of the individual self. Thus the system holds that the means to realization of reality is not knowledge of the unknown, but recognition of that which is already known--namely, that "I am Śiva, the omnipotent and omniscient Lord."¹¹

Somānanda and Utpala believe Self-recognition to be the means and the end to attainment of perfection. They approach this spiritual goal as one which does not require any of the

rituals of yogic practices or the Āgamas. Utpala describes the system as "a new and easy path."¹² In contrast to the various methods (upāya-s) prescribed in the ancient Śaiva texts, Pratyabhijñā is anupāya-mārga¹³—a path which needs no performances of any kind.

Unfortunately, very few of the writings of these earliest two Pratyabhijñāvādins are extant. Today the system is mainly known through the works of their famous disciple, Abhinava Gupta (ca. 950-1015 A.D.). Abhinava's extensive treatises on Pratyabhijñā philosophy far outnumber his works on poetics. Nevertheless, Abhinava's pre-eminent position in the field of poetics has long been acknowledged, while his contributions to speculative philosophy have not as yet been fully appreciated.

Pratyabhijñā has come to the attention of modern scholars only in comparatively recent times. Bühler, in reporting on his search for Sanskrit manuscripts in 1877, provided the impetus for Pratyabhijñā study with his discovery of a number of manuscripts belonging to the school.¹⁴ The first Western translation of a Pratyabhijñā text did not appear until 1905, with Barnett's presentation of Abhinava's Paramārthasāra.¹⁵ In the same year the editing of Kashmir Śaiva literature was begun by the Kashmir Research Department in Śrinagar, and almost 100 volumes of the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies have since been published. This includes almost all the major Pratyabhijñā works for which satisfactory manuscripts are available, and a

great many of these texts are now found in translation.

Pratyabhijñā scholarship, though, is still at a very early stage of development. Not only have published Pratyabhijñā texts been only partially translated, but those texts and translations have, for the most part, been ignored by students of Indian philosophy.

Too often previous studies have treated Pratyabhijñā merely in the general context of Kashmir Śaivism as a whole; they have failed to distinguish the metaphysics of Pratyabhijñā from the religious doctrines and yogic methodology common to all of Kashmir Śaivism. Any separation of Pratyabhijñā philosophy from the yogic and tantric thoughts which form the background and basis of Kashmir monism is, to a certain extent, artificial--all Pratyabhijñā teachers discuss at great length the yogic and tantric methods to realization of Self. However, such a separation is necessary if we are to obtain an assessment of Pratyabhijñā as an integral system of speculative philosophy which may be compared to the better-known Indian systems of thought.

By far the most famous Indian system is Śaṅkara's non-dualistic (advaita) school of Vedānta. Although there is an oft-cited maxim among students of Indian thought that Indian philosophy and religion are inseparable, in discussing Śaṅkara's theories scholars have quite clearly dissociated his metaphysics and epistemology from the yogic and devotional material found

in his writings.¹⁶ Śāṅkara's philosophy has been subject to intensive scrutiny over the past 100 years, by Indians and Westerners alike. It has been universally acclaimed as the quintessence of philosophical Hinduism and as the highest form of Indian Idealism. Pratyabhijñā, by way of contrast, has been dismissed in most accounts of Indian philosophy as a "popular," "theistic" or "minor religious" system.¹⁷

Since Advaita Vedānta has become the standard of philosophical Hinduism to which all other systems are to be compared, it is not surprising that Bühler did in fact compare Pratyabhijñā to Advaita Vedānta in the first presentation of the Kashmiri school to the Western world. Bühler noted in his report that the Pratyabhijñā system "appears to be pure idealism and an application of Śāṅkarācārya's principles to the Śaiva philosophy."¹⁸ Later scholars have followed Bühler's lead and have described Pratyabhijñā as "approaching Śāṅkara's idealism,"¹⁹ "greatly influenced by Śāṅkara's Vedāntic doctrines,"²⁰ and "definitely influenced by Śāṅkara."²¹

There are a number of basic premises common to both Pratyabhijñā and Advaita Vedānta, including:

1. The Supreme as undivided consciousness, there being no separate material cause of the world.
2. Identity of limited self (jīva) and Supreme Self (ātman), not jīva as a part of or dependent upon ātman.

3. Bondage being the jīva's non-recognition of his own true nature, and knowledge (jñāna) being the path to liberation rather than devotion (bhakti).

At the same time, there is one major point of difference whereby scholars have distinguished the two systems. Pratyabhijñā, it is said, contends that the world is a real extension of the freedom (svātantrya) of Śiva-consciousness. This is contrasted with the Advaita Vedānta notion that the world is an illusory manifestation (vivarta) which is superimposed upon the quality-less Brahman.

This latter point represents a significant area of disagreement between the two schools. The unreality or mere phenomenality of the manifest world is perhaps the most characteristic notion of Advaita Vedānta (and one which has often been improperly applied to Indian philosophy as a whole). If Pratyabhijñā agrees with Śaṅkara as to the existence of one undifferentiated principle of consciousness, how can it disagree with Śaṅkara as to the illusory nature of the manifest world? Or, if Pratyabhijñā truly professes non-duality, then how can the world of diverse objects and subject-object differentiation be considered real? Pratyabhijñā studies have contented themselves with listing points of similarity such as the above, along with this one major point of difference between the two schools, without explaining how such an alignment of views is possible. Furthermore, that Śaṅkara's "influence" may be used as an explana-

tion of similarities between the two schools is a hypothesis as yet unproven; it is based only on the earlier date of Śaṅkara (he is generally thought to have lived at about the eighth century A.D., or about a century before Somānanda), the greater fame of the Vedānta system, and on a very doubtful legend of Śaṅkara himself having traveled to Kashmir.²²

I began the research for this dissertation with a view towards a general analysis of Pratyabhijñā philosophy and a subsequent comparison with Advaita Vedānta. Surprisingly, the assumed homogeneity of the Pratyabhijñā system was sharply brought into question by Abhinava's numerous divergences from the theories of his predecessors, Somānanda and Utpala. These divergences are serious enough to cast doubt upon the value of any generalizations which treat Pratyabhijñā as a single school. What is required is a specification of Pratyabhijñā research into consideration of differences among members of the school.

Modern scholars now acknowledge the fact that Advaita Vedānta is not a monolithic system but consists of a fascinating variety of important and individualistic philosophers.²³ Such disparate Advaita Vedāntins as Vācaspati Miśra, Prakāśātman and Sureśvara, all base their views on the authority and writings of Śaṅkara. Abhinava's dominant status in Pratyabhijñā parallels Śaṅkara's position in Advaita Vedānta. The scope and complexity of Pratyabhijñā as developed by Abhinava makes it, like Śaṅkara's Advaita, liable to a wide variety of interpreta-

tions. Had there been a more active succession of philosophers to approach Abhinava's work critically, then there probably would have arisen within Pratyabhijñā the same diversity of views found in Advaita Vedānta.

Previous studies of Pratyabhijñā have failed to recognize the complexity of the system. Accepting Abhinava's ostensible role as faithful commentator on his predecessor's works, differences of opinion within the Kashmiri school have been generally ignored and always minimized. Abhinava adopts a number of theories which are prominent also in the philosophy of Śaṅkara: reflectionism, superimposition, distinction between levels of reality, and sublation. There has been no attempt made to isolate these theories common to both Abhinava and Śaṅkara. Consequently, there has been no discussion of the problems generated by this material of Abhinava's--namely, that it conflicts with:

1. positions taken in the earlier works of Somānanda and Utpala,
2. other portions of Abhinava's own works, and
3. the generally accepted synopsis of the school as "realistic," rather than illusionistic in the manner of Śaṅkara's Vedānta.

Part I of this study (chapters 1,2) will begin by surveying Kashmir Śaiva literature and identifying Pratyabhijñā's place within that literature. It then introduces some of the precepts and terminology of Pratyabhijñā, including the system's

categories of manifestation (tattva-s). To a large extent the school does adopt the common language of Indian philosophy; it retains, though, much terminology which is unique to Kashmir Śaivism and which often proves an obstacle in comparing Pratyabhijñā to other Indian systems of thought.

Part II (chapters 3-5) will be directed to an exposition of differences between Somānanda and Utpala's views and those of Abhinava. Since most of our understanding of Somānanda's single extant work, Śivadr̥ṣṭi, is based upon Utpala's commentary on it, no effort will be made to distinguish between the views of these two Pratyabhijñāvādins. Thus, Abhinava will be contrasted with Utpala alone, even when Sivadr̥ṣṭi is being considered. Although other divergences between Abhinava and Utpala could be shown, the particular areas of contrast selected all deal with instances where Abhinava adopts an Advaita Vedānta-like stance that is nowhere found in the Pratyabhijñā treatises which preceded him. Utpala and Abhinava will be seen to conflict on such basic questions as whether the world is a real manifestation or illusory superimposition, whether there is but the one reality of Śiva-consciousness or distinct levels of reality.

The implications of Abhinava's departure from the philosophical tradition of his predecessors will be explored in Part III (chapters 6-9). Any assessment of Abhinava which does not take into account his illusionistic theories is clearly invalid.

At the same time, Abhinava himself clearly dissociates his philosophy from that of Advaita Vedānta. Differences between Abhinava and Utpala will be approached in terms of a development from the Sāṃkhya theory that the effect is a real transformation of the cause (pariṇāmavāda) to the Vedānta theory that the effect is merely an illusory manifestation of an unchanging cause (vivartavāda). The far more significant differences between Abhinava and Śaṅkara will be seen to stem from the former's reluctance to describe Supreme Consciousness as "completely pure and unqualified"--a notion which is central to Advaita Vedānta philosophy.

With respect to his use of the metaphysics and epistemology of illusionism, Abhinava appears to be in accord with Śaṅkara. Abhinava remains within the Kashmir Śaiva tradition, though, insofar as he relates the world-process to, and identifies the world-process with Supreme Consciousness. It is this unique synthesis of Kashmir Śaiva beliefs concerning the equal reality of everything and Advaita Vedānta techniques demonstrating the mere conditional reality of the world which makes Abhinava's philosophy so intriguing and, very often, so puzzling.

Reserved for the appendix are these items:

- A. A chart of the Kashmir Śaiva categories of manifestation.
- B. Text and translation excerpts from Somānanda's Śivadrṣṭi with Utpala's commentary on it.

C. An examination of a possible instance of Vedānta historical influence upon Pratyabhijñā. Abhinava's Paramārthasāra is based on an earlier treatise of the same name by Ādi Śeṣa. Other Pratyabhijñā studies have interpreted Ādi Śeṣa's text as espousing Sāṃkhya dualism which Abhinava rewrites to suit the non-dualism of Pratyabhijñā. Ādi Śeṣa's work, though, is more properly seen as an early Vedānta text and as a case of pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta influence upon Abhinava.

Studies such as the present one are necessarily preliminary to other equally important ones. For example: A particularly fertile, and as yet unexplored, field for research is the interaction of Buddhism and Pratyabhijñā. Study of Pratyabhijñā's Āgama sources is needed in order to achieve a better understanding of the non-Vedic currents of thought which may well have provided the inspiration for many of the ideas of the Upaniṣads and Buddhism. It might also be shown that many modern philosophers, in proclaiming the contemporary relevance of Advaita Vedānta philosophy, have re-interpreted Śaṅkara's position along lines remarkably similar to Abhinava's. It is hoped that the present study, by clarifying some of the misapprehensions which have clouded previous Pratyabhijñā scholarship, may serve as a starting point for research of these and other problems.

PART I

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

Kashmir Saivism or Trika

Kashmir Śaivism is known outside Kashmir as trika (literally, "three-fold"), a name for which various explanations are offered. The name is often derived from the division of Kashmir Śaiva literature into three broad categories: Āgama, Spanda and Pratyabhijñā.¹

Since the Āgamas are thought to be eternally existent, there can be no origin to them, but only their appearance or disappearance at the divine will. In accordance with the Indian penchant for attributing great antiquity to a system, there exist a great many enumerations of the Āgamas' transmission through long successions of preceptors. Śaiva tradition holds that the Āgamas once consisted of 900,000 verses, all of which were known only to Śiva. The greater part of this Āgama lore was lost as it was handed down from one divine being to another, and then from one generation of human seers to the next. Kashmir Śaivites usually refer to sixty-four texts, all of which are called tantra-s, as the small portion of the original scriptural heritage allotted to our present age, the Kali-yuga.²

Most of these sixty-four Tantras are known to us today only through references in later Kashmir Śaiva texts. The few Śaiva Tantra texts which are extant seem to be incomplete and of fairly late composition (ca. 4-8th centuries A.D.). These Tantras are primarily expositions of Śaiva mythology and theology. They also deal with yogic and ritualistic matters, which are couched in the "mysterious language" (sandhā or sandhyā-bhāṣā) of tantraism—"a whole system of elaborately worked-out ciphers, which the incommunicability of yogico-tantric experiences does not suffice to explain."³ With respect to their metaphysics, these Śaiva scriptures are, for the most part, dualistic or pluralistic. Certain ones of monist tendencies are especially venerated in Kashmir Śaivism: the Svacchanda, Rudrayāmala, Viṣṇūnabhairava and Mālinīvijaya Tantras. These same Tantras, though, are shared by all Śaiva schools and have been adopted to serve the purposes of Śaiva Siddhānta and Vīra Śaivism as well.

The Śivasūtra-s are by far the most important Āgama of Kashmir Śaivism. Though their historical appearance may be definitely linked to the time of Vasugupta, the earliest known teacher of Kashmir Śaivism (ca. early 9th cent. A.D.), they are nevertheless regarded as Āgama, since their authorship is ascribed to Śiva Himself. In one version of the story, the Sūtra-s were revealed to Vasugupta in a dream. In another version, Vasugupta is told by Śiva to climb the Mahādeva mountain

in Kashmir, where the Sūtra-s were found engraved on a rock in Old Testament-fashion.⁴ Whatever their inspiration may have been, the Sūtra-s mark the beginning of the resurgence of Śaivism in Kashmir.

Both in language and intent the Śivasūtra-s represent a continuation of the Agama tradition. The work is primarily meant to be a guideline to practices (sādhana-s) which will enable the aspirant (sādhaka) to achieve enlightenment, and its seventy-nine short aphorisms are organized according to the different methods (upāya-s) of yogic concentration.⁵ In its uncompromisingly monistic stance, however, the Sūtra-s depart from the dualist doctrines of the earlier Āgamas. Although the Sūtra-s do not contain a metaphysical system as such, they emphasize that the Supreme Self is unitary consciousness⁶--the single principle which presupposes and constitutes all knowledge and experience.

The second division of Kashmir Śaiva literature, Spanda, begins with Kallaṭa, the pupil of Vasugupta and author of the Spandakārikā-s. The Kārikā-s are named after the Kashmir theory that the freedom (svātantrya) of unitary consciousness constantly creates and dissolves, reveals and conceals itself through pulsation (spanda) or vibration (ghūrṇana). The Spandakārikā-s form a commentary on Vasugupta's Śivasūtra-s and elaborate upon the doctrines contained therein, without giving metaphysical arguments in their support.

The Spandakārikā-s explain spanda as being the essential nature of Śiva, as the indestructible principle whereby the destructible world of objects is brought into play.⁷ The universe is described in the form of mantra-s, which emanate from reality and become the means through which yoga practitioners achieve realization of the spanda principle.⁸ The work outlines progressive stages of the yogin's progress towards enlightenment and his attainment of various powers (siddhi-s) which stand in the way of superior meditation. The Spandakārikā-s end with praise of the power of the guru and with a description of the bliss attending those who reach the supreme state of spanda. Just as in the Śivasūtra-s, many of the doctrines of the Kārikā-s are concealed from the non-initiate, the language itself being a mental exercise, an integral part of the sādhanā.

At the same time that the Pratyabhijñā branch of Kashmir Śaivism was being developed by Somānanda, Utpala and Abhinava, other Kashmir Śaivites continued the Spanda tradition of Kallata. All later Spanda texts are commentaries on the Spandakārikā-s, and they elaborate upon the yogic and tantric methods of Kallata's work. Major Spanda commentaries, dating from the 9th to 11th centuries A.D., include: The Vivṛti by Rāmakaṇṭha, the Pradīpikā by Utpala Vaiṣṇava (different than Somānanda's disciple, Utpala), and Kṣemarāja's Spandasandoha and Spandanirṇaya.

Pratyabhijñā Authors and Texts

The Pratyabhijna division of Kashmir Śaiva literature begins with the Śivadr̥ṣṭi of Somānanda, who is called Kashmir Śaivism's "originator of reasoning."⁹ Somānanda lived at approximately the same time as Kallaṭa (the end of the 9th cent. A.D.) and may also have been a pupil of Vasugupta. Somānanda himself traces his ancestry back to Durvāsas, the sage who was chosen by Śiva to be the propagator of Śaiva doctrines.

Somānanda provides logical arguments in support of the metaphysical suppositions of Kashmir monism; in doing so, he distinctly refers to and criticizes other schools of thought, such as Sāṃkhya, Vedānta, the Grammarians and Buddhism. In Śivadr̥ṣṭi the obscure symbolism of the Āgamas is replaced by the devices of metaphysics. Knowledge is espoused as a goal which is realizable outside the framework of mystical yogic practices and which is transmittible outside the traditional student-preceptor relationship. Āgama and Spanda literature are limited in their metaphysics to a few simple monistic pronouncements, which serve as a prelude to discussions of the experiential aspects of Śiva-consciousness. While the arguments of Somānanda's work very often seem unclear, its language is philosophical, rather than mystical, and its orientation is more speculative than experiential.

Śivadr̥ṣṭi was commented upon by Utpala, Somānanda's direct disciple. Unfortunately, Utpala's commentary has come

down to us only in the form of a single manuscript, which does not go beyond the first half of the fourth chapter. Without the help of a commentary, the reading of SD's last three chapters is an extremely difficult undertaking.

Utpala reformulated the contents of Śivadr̥ṣṭi's 307 verses into the 190 verses of his Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikā-s, after which the system became known outside Kashmir. IPK is usually regarded as the main treatise of the Pratyabhijñā system. Utpala's shorter and more lucid work met with much greater success than did Somānanda's Śivadr̥ṣṭi, at least insofar as we can judge on the basis of the greater number of IPK manuscripts found throughout India.¹⁰ Utpala is also the author of a brief commentary on his own IPK and of three short treatises called Siddhitrayī. In his works he systemizes the arguments of Somānanda and, in the process, demonstrates much more philosophical acumen in his refutation of other schools of thought.

Apart from some devotional hymns ascribed to them, these are the only extant works of Somānanda and Utpala. Even these provide a unique and outstanding contribution to Indian philosophy. But it is doubtful that the Pratyabhijñā system would have been known to the world were it not for Abhinava Gupta.

Abhinava is separated from Somānanda by one master, Lakṣmaṇa Gupta, none of whose works are extant. Abhinava gives the dates of composition for many of his works, which show that the period of his literary activity extended from about 990-1015

A.D. All Sanskrit scholars are familiar with Abhinava's works on poetics; very few know that he was as great a philosopher as a literary critic, and that in Kashmiri tradition he is regarded more as a saint than a philosopher. A multitude of Kashmiri legends attests to Abhinava's lengthy periods of asceticism, his perfection of various yogic practices and his miraculous powers; even Abhinava's immediate disciples looked upon him as Śiva incarnate.¹¹ K. C. Pandey has gathered together many of these legends, often presenting them as historical fact, in his mammoth (1014-page) tribute to Abhinava's genius. In a manner not atypical of either Pandey's work or the legends, he summarizes the life of Abhinava as follows:

He tried innumerable experiments personally to ascertain the truth of what he had heard about spiritual matters, and unchallengeable is, therefore, the correctness and precision of his conclusions. Great was his spiritual power and his contemporaries had occasions to see its greatness in deeds. Clear was his head, powerful his memory, marvelous his intellectual capacity, wonderful his command over the language, shrewd his eye to see the real nature of a thing from different angles of vision . . . and glorious was the last scene of his earthly existence when like Tennyson's legendary King Arthur, he parted from his followers never to be seen again.¹²

Pandey lists no less than forty-four known works of Abhinava,¹³ of which these are the ones most important to Pratyabhijñā philosophy: Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vimarsinī and Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vivṛti-vimarsinī (IPV) and (IPVV)--Two commentaries on Utpala's Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikā-s. IPV, the shorter of the two (laghvī vimarsinī), has been translated along

with Utpala's Kārikā-s by Pandey. These treatises are Abhinava's best-known philosophical works, and they present a comprehensive treatment of Pratyabhijñā.

Tantrāloka (TA)--A vast compendium of Śaiva thought, consisting of thirty-seven long chapters which have been published in twelve volumes by KSTS. Both ritualistic and philosophic matters are discussed, and there is an exhaustive treatment of Āgamic materials.

Tantrasāra (TS)--A small prose summary of TA, translated into Italian by Gnoli.

Paramārthasāra (PS)--This 100-verse work is based on Ādi Śeṣa's text of the same name (see the Appendix) and has been translated into English by Barnett and into French by Silburn.

Mālinī-vijaya-vārttika (MV)--An exposition of parts of the Mālinī-vijaya-tantra. Only a portion of this treatise has been found, and the available portion contains a refutation of various theories of the Naiyāyikas.

Parātriṃśikā-vivaraṇa (PTV)--A commentary on the Parātriṃśikā, which is part of the Rudrayāmala-tantra. It presents the Śaiva conception of the Grammarian school. A shorter commentary or vṛtti (PTVV) which summarizes the longer one has been translated by Gnoli.

Bhagavadgītā-tārtha-saṅgraha (BGS)--This is not a verse-by-verse commentary, but a discussion of the subject matter of the Gītā, whose Kashmiri rescension differs not greatly from the standard text. ¹⁴

The specific contributions of Abhinava to Pratyabhijñā philosophy--the material introduced by him which is original and not merely a clarification or amplification of Somānanda and Utpala's views--will be discussed below in Part II (chapters 3-5). The system may be said to have completed its development under Abhinava, since later teachers of the school made little in the way of original contributions to Pratyabhijñā thought, devoting themselves mainly to exegeses of Abhinava's vast corpus of works.

Kṣemarāja, the pupil of Abhinava, wrote some commentaries interpreting the Spandakārikā-s from a Pratyabhijñā viewpoint. He is also the author of Pratyabhijñā-hṛdayam (PH), a summary of Kashmir Śaivism which has been translated by both Kurt Leidecker and Jaideva Singh. PH is a very readable and concise work, with most of the text consisting of Kṣemarāja's prose commentary on his own verses, and it is often cited in Pratyabhijñā studies. However, Kṣemarāja does not discuss the arguments supporting Pratyabhijñā theories, and the work is dedicated to "those undeveloped minds who have not made great effort in difficult logic texts"¹⁵ and hence are unable to study the works of Utpala and Abhinava in the original.

Among other post-Abhinava Pratyabhijñāvādins there is Yogarāja, who came next after Kṣemarāja and who wrote a commentary on Paramārthasāra; Jayaratha (ca. 1200 A.D.), author of the Viveka commentary on Tantrāloka; and Bhāskara, eighteenth-cen-

tury author of the Bhāskari commentary on Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vimarśinī, which is an invaluable aid in understanding Abhinava's difficult text.

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Here is a summary of major Pratyabhijñā authors and texts:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Works</u>
Somānanda	ca. end 9th cent. A.D.	<u>Śivadr̥ṣṭi</u> (SD)
Utpala	ca. end of 9th, beginning of 10th cent. A.D.	<u>Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikā-s</u> (IPK) <u>Vṛtti</u> on IPK (IPKV) comm. on SD <u>Siddhitrayī</u>
Abhinava Gupta	ca. 960-1015 A.D.	<u>Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vimarśinī</u> and <u>Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vivṛti - vimarśinī</u> (IPV and IPVV, two comms. on IPK) <u>Tantrāloka</u> (TA) and its summary, <u>Tantrasāra</u> (TS) <u>Paramārthasāra</u> (PS) <u>Parātriṃśika-vivarapa</u> (PTV) and its <u>vṛtti</u> (PTVV) <u>Mālinīvijaya-vārttika</u> (MVV) <u>Bhagavadgītārtha-saṅgraha</u> (BGS)
Kṣemarāja	pupil of Abhinava	<u>Pratyabhijñā-hṛdayam</u> (PH)
Yogarāja	pupil of Kṣemarāja	Comm. on PS
Jayaratha	ca. 12th cent. A.D.	Comm. on TA
Bhāskara	ca. 18th cent. A.D.	Comm. on IPV

Pratyabhijñā Studies

The first important study relating to Pratyabhijñā is J. C. Chatterji's Kashmir Śaivism (1914). Chatterji presents the main doctrines of the non-dualistic system of Kashmir, "without," he admits, "entering into an exposition of the reasons which can be adduced in their support."¹⁷ Most of the book consists of a discussion of the thirty-six categories of world manifestations (tattva-s). Although these categories form an important part of Kashmir Śaivism's Āgama heritage and will be discussed in the next chapter, they play only a minor role in the philosophical speculations unique to the Pratyabhijñā branch. Chatterji acknowledges that Pratyabhijñā and Spanda are separate branches of Kashmir Śaivism.¹⁸ But since he avoids a presentation of the arguments of Pratyabhijñā in his work, it is not of direct concern to the issues of this dissertation.

K. C. Pandey's Abhinava Gupta (1936) has already been mentioned above. The work contains the most complete listing and summary available of Kashmir Śaiva texts and an extensive analysis of other Śaiva systems as compared to Kashmir Śaivism. Throughout the book, Pandey makes no philosophical distinction between the works of Somānanda, Utpala and Abhinava and those of Kashmir Śaivism as a whole:

It is, therefore, not possible for us to attribute the authorship of any particular theory to Abhinava as we can do to Kant or Hegel. This, however, does not mean that he did not contribute anything to the Realistic Idealism of Kashmir. The fact, on the contrary, is that the philosophical system of Kashmir, with Abhinava's contribution to it left out of consideration, loses most of its importance.¹⁹

Although Pandey's historical and philosophical analyses must be approached with a critical eye, he does provide an abundance of valuable background material—particularly in reference to the influence of Agama doctrines on the formulation of Pratyabhijñā theories.

For our purposes here, by far the most important Pratyabhijñā study to date is The Doctrine of Recognition by R. K. Kaw (1967). It is an attempt at a comprehensive survey of the philosophical content of Pratyabhijñā apart from the theological doctrines of the school. Kaw traces the origins of Pratyabhijñā theories to the Vedic hymns, the Upaniṣads and the Buddhist sources. Although he clearly distinguishes Pratyabhijñā from the Agama and Spanda branches of the school, Kaw is of little assistance in delineating differences between Abhinava and Utpala. Abhinava, says Kaw, "faithfully follows the original doctrines of Utpala throughout and did not attempt to add any new theory of his own."²⁰

Kaw compares Pratyabhijñā with other Indian and Western philosophical systems. Most frequently it is Advaita Vedānta which catches his attention. The two systems are not fundamentally different, according to Kaw, but the "concrete monism" of Pratyabhijñā is primarily realistic and thus opposed to the illusionism of Śaṅkara's "absolute idealism":

World objects as manifestations or ābhāsa-sin the Pratyabhijñā system are real in nature, whereas those in Śaṅkara's system are fictitious and illusive (dreamlike) and hence unreal.²¹

Specialists in the study of Vedānta would doubtless object that Kaw's assessment of the school is simplistic. The incompleteness and inadequacies of Kaw's work as it bears on the issues discussed below will be seen in Part III. Suffice it to note that his comparisons of Pratyabhijñā and Advaita Vedānta are based on serious misrepresentations of both systems.

I am contending that generalizations concerning Pratyabhijñā leave much to be desired. Before documenting this, I have some generalizations of my own to present in the next chapter. Basic precepts and terminology common to all Pratyabhijñā works will be introduced, and some relevant concepts of Indian philosophy will be presented as a context in which to approach Pratyabhijñā theories.

CHAPTER II
PRESUPPOSITIONS OF PRATYABHIJÑĀ

The Supreme

Śiva, Paramaśiva, Parameśvara and Maheśvara are only a few of the names denoting the Supreme in Pratyabhijñā. These terms are used interchangeably, and Śiva, like the Brahman of Vedānta, is a non-sectarian designation of the principle of consciousness. Unfortunately for Pratyabhijñā, the name Śiva, with its masculine associations, is linked to the dualist notions of theology and mythology. As the name will be often used below, it must be remembered that in Pratyabhijñā Śiva refers to the principle of supreme consciousness, and not to a male deity. In accordance with tradition, we will sometimes retain the masculine pronoun in referring to the Supreme. That Supreme Principle is better indicated, though, by a neuter "it," and Pratyabhijñāvadins often use such impersonal designations as śivatvam, ("Śivaness"), ātman, (the Self) , or caitanyam, (consciousness).

Śiva is specifically referred to in his transcendent aspect as "the formless all-surpassing" (nirākṛti-viśvottīrṇa)¹ or "the unsurpassed" (anuttara),² consisting of the absolute unity of consciousness alone (cidrūpamātra).³ Anuttara, although discussed at great length by other Śaiva systems,⁴ is given scant attention by Pratyabhijñāvadins. Since the transcendent

is beyond all worldly relations and concepts, it is inexplicable: "here, all talk of object ceases . . . all words fail."⁵

Most of Pratyabhijñā's discussion of the Supreme is directed to its immanent aspect as the all-forming Self of the world (sarvākṛti viśvamaya).⁶ The world-Self, viśvamaya, is in turn defined as prakāśavimarśa.⁷ By prakāśa (literally, "light") is meant the self-luminous shining of Śiva-consciousness, compared to a mirror which shines independent of any external sources.⁸ Vimarśa (from the root mṛś: to touch, feel) is used in a wide range of contexts; it encompasses the freedom (svātantrya) and power (śakti) which constitute the distinctive capacity of the Self to know itself and to control that which it contains within. According to Pratyabhijñā, these two properties of consciousness are inevitably conjoined, vimarśa being the very nature of the shining out of prakāśa.⁹

Vimarśa is said to be "independence"¹⁰ and "resting within oneself."¹¹ At the same time, it is also said to be "freedom with respect to withdrawing in and spreading out,"¹² "freedom in joining, separating and rejoining"¹³—namely, "not resting within oneself alone like an inert object."¹⁴ This paradoxical power of the Supreme to both rest within itself and yet not rest within itself will be taken up at later points below; it is the basis of Pratyabhijñā's contention that unitary Śiva-consciousness gives rise to the world of multiplicity without resorting to a separate material cause and without any change in its essential nature.

The potentiality of conscious expression, represented by vimarśa, becomes actualized in world-manifestations and world-experience. Kashmir Śaivism classifies the manifestations (ābhāsa-s) of Śiva into thirty-six tattva-s, which are the fundamental categories in the evolution of Śiva-consciousness. The highest or subtlest of these is śivatattva; the lowest or grossest is the earth. This doctrine of tattvas is, of course, not unique to Kashmir Śaivism, as it incorporates the twenty-five categories of Sāṅkhya. Other Śaiva systems, with only slight alterations, also enumerate the same thirty-six categories.¹⁵

Perfect-Imperfect

Āgama texts begin with two separate categories, śivatattva and śaktitattva, emphasizing Śiva's dual nature of knowledge and action (jñāna and kriyā).¹⁶ Jñāna is mere consciousness (cinmātra)-- the passive consciousness of prakāśa. Kriyā is the means whereby Śiva appears as the countless manifestations of the light of consciousness; it is the active consciousness of vimarśa.¹⁷ Utpala and Abhinava present these two categories as a single category, śivatattva, in which śaktitattva is also included. Utpala separates śivatattva, which is ever-present, from the other categories that come into being only during world manifestation.¹⁸ Abhinava even more clearly associates śivatattva with the transcendent by saying that it is really not a manifestation, even though traditionally taught to be so.¹⁹

The next tattva, logically, but not temporally subsequent,²⁰ is sadāśiva. This first manifestation of the internal aspect of Self as "I" is called "perfect I-ness," or paratāhantā,²¹ to distinguish it from the personal ego (ahāmkāra) of the limited self. Sadāśivatattva is the state of self-realization as being or force, the beginning of the will (icchā) which precedes knowledge and activity. The experience "I-am-this" (aham-idam-vimarśa) predominates as the Self closes within (nimeṣa 'ntah).²² The world of experience, even as pure ideation, is unclear (asphuṭa)²³ at this stage, like the extremely dim outline of a picture in the artist's mind.

Knowledge prevails in īśvaratattva, which is the fourth category in Kashmir Śaivism and the second principle of actual manifestation. The Self here makes a survey of, and identification with, that which constitutes the state of experience. Śiva unfolds out (bahir-unmeṣa), and the experience is of "this-is-I" (idam-aham-vimarśa)²⁴ with the "this" being the more dominant element. Both the experiencer and experienced are clear (sphuṭa)²⁵ in īśvaratattva, but they are not distinct from one another. The "this" is not yet distinguished as separate from the "I."

The subsequent experience of sadvidyātattva, also called śuddhavidyātattva, is of "I am I--this is this" (aham-aham-idam-idam-vimarśa).²⁶ The two sides of experience are equally weighted like the two pans of an evenly held balance. The "this"

is distinguished from the "I" in sadvidyā, but both still refer to the same thing (samānādhikara), and the experience is of diversity in unity (bhedābhedavimarśa).²⁷ In the lower categories the "I" quite distinctly refers to the limited subject and the "this" to the limited object.

The three tattvas of sadāśiva, īśvara and sadvidyā together form the stages of ideal universal experience. Because there is in them no limitation with respect to the powers of Śiva-consciousness, Chatterji refers to these three categories by their Āgama title as "The Pure and Perfect Order" (śuddhādhvan).²⁸ Utpala and Abhinava, though, do not regard these tattvas as either pure or perfect.

The very appearance of "I" in sadāśiva constitutes the initial manifestation of imperfection. An "I," perfect though it may be, is experienced as such only by way of contrast with that which is non-I or non-Self.²⁹ The differentiation of consciousness in sadāśiva, etc., foreshadows the further differentiations and limitations of the lower (apara) order of tattvas which follow.³⁰ Śiva-consciousness must be recognized in its fullest and highest (para) sense as an all-inclusive unity. Thus, Utpala says of these tattvas:

In the two categories [sadāśiva and īśvara] the objects are not only in the state of imperfection, because they shine as not-Self: but they are also in the state of perfection because they are covered by I-consciousness, i.e., because they shine as identical with the self. For, the Sadvidyā, which is common to the categories of the Sadāśiva and the īśvara, is the "perfect-imperfect state."³¹

The Lower Order

The thirty-one remaining Śaiva categories make up the impure path (aśuddhadhvan) or path of maya (māyādhvan).³² The first tattva of this impure path is māyā itself--"that which obscures, obstructs, conceals and deludes."³³ Along with its five sheaths (kañcuka-s), each of which is a separate category, māyā narrows the powers of the Supreme Self to the limited or contracted (saṃkucita) powers of the lower order. The experiencers of the māyā-world have no true knowledge of Self and are conscious only of diversity. Limited selves are each differentiated from everything else³⁴ by the collective action of māyā's five sheaths:

1. kalā--limited authorship and efficacy,
2. vidyā--limited knowledge,
3. rāga--desire, incompleteness,
4. kāla--limitation of time,
5. niyati--limitation of space and causality.³⁵

The first effects of māyā and its sheaths appear in the categories of puruṣa and prakṛti. These two tattvas respectively encompass all the subjective and objective experiences of the māyā-world. They are limited (in efficacy, knowledge, etc.) representations of the "I" and "this" of sadvidyātattva, and they are mutually exclusive in a sense that was impossible in spaceless and timeless sadvidyā. The subjective aspect of world experience, puruṣa, develops as: intellect, ego, mind, the five powers of sense-perception and the five capacities of action.

The objective aspect, prakṛti, appears as the five subtle elements, and then the five gross ones.

Puruṣa and prakṛti, together with these twenty-three other categories, form the total twenty-five tattvas of the Sāṃkhya system. The twenty-three categories, beginning with intelligence and ending with earth, are not only common to both Sāṃkhya and Kashmir Śaivism, but are defined by the two schools in essentially the same manner.

Sāṃkhya, however, begins its evolutionary scheme with the radical opposition of puruṣa and prakṛti as universal spirit and universal causal agent, between which no real union is ever possible. In contrast, Kashmir Śaivism views puruṣa and prakṛti, not as universals, but as the constantly produced streams of subject and object whose intermeshed matrices form the loci of individual subjective and objective experiences.

Many summaries of Pratyabhijñā discuss the school almost exclusively within the framework of the categories of manifestation. But the tattva system is part of Pratyabhijñā's Āgama heritage, and it is not of central importance to the arguments of school. Very little of Pratyabhijñā's discussion of world manifestation and the resulting limitations of consciousness makes use of the terminology of the tattvas. Utpala, for example, mentions them only briefly in IPK³⁶ at the very end of the work in a chapter (āgamādhikāra) which is rather like an appendix of Āgama lore.

In both Āgama and Spanda literature, the tattvas are comprehensively analyzed as descriptions of the descending macrocosm and ascending microcosm. The same route taken by the Supreme in its assumption of multiplicity and limitation is taken in the opposite direction by the aspirant in his ascent to realization of Self. In practice, yogic and tantric methods probably provided the first descriptions of these states of experience, which were then ascribed in reverse order to the manifestation of the Supreme. The close associations of this step-ladder theory of consciousness with yogic methodology³⁷ may be one reason why the tattvas play a much less important role in the metaphysical reasoning of Pratyabhijñā than in the practical theology of Āgama and Spanda.

Bondage

There is another possible reason for Pratyabhijñā's relatively minimal use of the tattva scheme--namely, the difficulty of explaining how the jīva attains release (mokṣa) from the bondage (bandha) of māyā, when māyā is an ontological category of the Supreme. If it is assumed that the tattvas represent real limitations of power brought about by the will of the Supreme, then the jīva becomes tightly swathed in the sheaths of absolute māyā and very much bound in the form of jīva-hood. So much so, in fact, that the jīva himself can do little to alter his condition of bondage.

This appears to be the assumption of Kṣemarāja in Pratyabhijñāhrdayam, a treatise which is devoted mainly to an exposition of the tattvas and to a corresponding summary of Śaiva yoga. In trying to show that the jīva is identical with the Supreme, Kṣemarāja says of world-limitation:

Contraction also, on close consideration, consists of consciousness only, since it is manifested only as of the nature of consciousness. Otherwise (i.e., in the absence of its being manifested, and it can be manifested only when it is of the nature of consciousness), it becomes mere nothing.³⁸ - PH, p. 45, trans. J. Singh

Kṣemarāja seems to argue not only for the identity of limited and Supreme Self, but also the identity of bondage and the Supreme. But if the limitations themselves are real manifestations of Śiva-consciousness and bondage is a real product of Śiva's evolution, then the jīva's delusions with respect to his limitations are not at all of his own making. This presents serious problems to Pratyabhijñā as a metaphysical system which does not regard yogic and tantric practices or God's grace as necessary prerequisites to realization.

Utpala and Abhinava generally avoid the problems incumbent upon treating nescience as an ontological category. They both regard the limitations of the jīva as the result of subjective ignorance, i.e., a false judgment or misapprehension on the part of the jīva. Utpala declares liberation and bondage and the difference between the two to be merely a matter of understanding—liberation being the realization of the non-multiplicity of Śiva and bondage being a lack of any such realization. Mokṣa

and bandha, he says, are not really contradictory.³⁹ Abhinava similarly says that bondage is a state of mind or matter of viewpoint which is brought about by dualistic perception. The cause of world-bondage is man's imagining himself to be bound.⁴⁰

Pratyabhijñā's conception of bondage as a false judgment on the part of the jīva very naturally raises the question--in what sense is the jīva's perception of the world as differentiated into isolated subjects and objects actually false? The Sāṃkhya school presumes the radical opposition of a mutually exclusive absolute subject and absolute object. Sāṃkhya thus finds it difficult to explain the basic unity of our everyday experiences, viz., the possibility of even fictitious interaction between limited subjects and objects. In contrast, Pratyabhijñā begins with the radical unity of Śiva-consciousness. Pratyabhijñā must then show the essential relatedness of limited subject to limited object and, in turn, the relatedness of the entire manifest world of multiplicity to the unitary absolute of consciousness.

Cause and Effect

In trying to explain how, given the unity of Śiva, a variety of manifestations arises,⁴¹ Abhinava says that niyati, the causal law that an effect has as its cause something of its own nature, does not apply to world creation, which is not limited to time and space, universal and particular:

Śiva's great artistry [mahākālā] is such that he paints the world-picture on no surface [abhittau]. . . like a yogin, without any material cause, the Conscious Self shines forth as the collection of objects through His Will [īcchā] alone.

- IPV II, p. 150, trans. Pandey

Śaṅkara, when forced to discuss world creation (as he so often is in the Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya), agrees that it is beyond ordinary causal law. Śaṅkara also uses the example of creation through special yogic power, contending that it is not a rule (ekānta) that what is seen to be a particular capability (sāmarthyā) in one being is found in all.⁴² He further adds his own supporting evidence as well:

. . . just as a crane conceives without insemination, or just as an assemblage of lotuses proceeds from one lake to another without any extraneous means of movement.

- BSB 2.1.25, trans. Apte.

The purpose of Abhinava's and Śaṅkara's remarks is to show that consciousness itself is capable of world manifestation, without need of a separate material cause. The concept of spontaneous creative activity, or effect as a natural outgrowth of cause, is also found in Sāṅkhya's treatment of the evolution of prakṛti, which is both causal agent and material cause in one. Pratyabhijñā clearly shares Sāṅkhya and Advaita Vedānta's classification as satkāryavāda—the view that the effect (kārya) pre-exists in the cause and that the cause of itself is sufficient for production of the effect, without any need for a multiplicity of conditions or a causal aggregate.

Asatkāryavāda, the theory that the effect is not pre-existent in the cause, is held by the Nyāya school among others. If the effect is not distinct from the cause, ask the Naiyāyikas, then how may we distinguish the two as cause and effect? Furthermore, each specific effect is seen to have a specific set of causes necessary for its production. Naiyāyikas illustrate this with the example of a cloth: To make cloth, one first needs threads (the "inherence-cause") and contact between the threads (the "non-inherence cause"). A number of instrumental causes are also required--including general instrumental causes, such as time and space, and the specific ones, such as a spinning wheel and weaver. Asatkāryavāda tends to multiply the number of conditions and entities entering into a causal relation. On the other hand, the general tendency of satkāryavāda is to unify the ultimate stuff in the universe.⁴³

Sāṅkhya's particular version of satkāryavāda is called pariṇāmavāda--the theory that the effect is an actual transformation (pariṇāma) of the cause. The example most often given to illustrate pariṇāmavāda is the transformation of milk into curds. Milk, according to Sāṅkhya, is the cause of curds, which is the effect. Liquid milk is merely transformed into solid curds, and it is the same material which appears in the two different states. The effect is not only already pre-existent in the cause, but the effect is made of the very same stuff as the cause.

Advaita Vedanta's differing version of satkāryavāda is named vivartavāda. According to Advaita, effects are not transformations of causes, but are illusory appearances (vivarta-s). The familiar metaphor used by Śaṅkara is that of the rope and the snake. When misperceived, a rope may appear to a viewer as a snake. The rope does not really become a snake, of course, and the snake is only a transitory superimposition (adhyāsa). When the rope is correctly perceived as such, it serves to deny or sublate (bādhitum) the snake. Similarly, Śaṅkara contends, the appearances of the māyā-world are to be distinguished from the reality of the underlying substratum of Brahman.

Kaw refers to Pratyabhijñā's theory of manifestation as ābhāsavāda. Kaw says that ābhāsavāda "maintains the pariṇāma theory with some modification."⁴⁴ He further says, "Pariṇāmavāda is systematically rejected by the Pratyabhijñā school, while vivartavāda is accepted in a slightly altered form."⁴⁵ The first difficulty in determining which of the two models, pariṇāma or vivarta, most closely approximates the position of Pratyabhijñā lies in the assumption of the existence of a single Pratyabhijñā position. In the writings of Utpala, world manifestation is sometimes presented in the pariṇāma manner as Śiva transforming Himself into the māyā-world. In the writings of Abhinava, the māyā-world of appearances is distinguished from reality (ābhāsa from anābhāsa) in very vivartavāda-like terms. After having examined the specifics of Utpala's and Abhinava's

differing theories of manifestation, we will return to the problem of classifying them with respect to pariṇāmavāda and vivartavāda.

PART II

CHAPTER III

ABHINAVA'S REFLECTIONISM

Utpala: Water, Water Everywhere

Somānanda and Utpala, in Śivadr̥ṣṭi and commentary, devote most of their efforts to demonstrating that the manifest world is identical with the unitary Supreme. This basic theme of SD can be traced back to such Upaniṣad sayings as ātma eva idaṃ sarvaṃ, "the Self is everything" (literally, "all of this").¹ Perhaps even more famous, though, are the Upaniṣad sayings which attest to the Self's being "none of this" (neti neti).² The latter sentiments have no place in SD which begins with the premise that Śiva is everything and argues that everything is really Śiva and equally real:

All objects, from Paramaśiva to a pot, because of their identity with perfect consciousness, are indistinguishably of the nature of Śiva.³ -SD 1.48 comm.

Utpala provides various metaphors to describe the manifestation of the differentiated everyday-world: the yogin and his creations, gold being formed into different ornaments or utensils, and water appearing as either still or turbulent. In each of these cases, Utpala contends, there is no modification (vikāra) in the essential nature of the cause or substratum. When the yogin creates, he neither divides nor changes himself.⁴ Gold never changes and is no different whether fashioned into a spittoon or a crown.⁵ Water is also never divided or destroyed,

being the same water whether still or in waves. According to Utpala, Śiva brings about the manifest world in a similar manner, without being destroyed or divided and without any change in his essential nature.⁶

Nothing could appear if it were devoid of power (aśakta), says Utpala, and everything which appears is identical with the light of consciousness and experienced through the power of consciousness. Vimarśa is not only the chief power of the Supreme Self, but it is the freedom of vimarśa which constitutes the sentiency (caitanyam) common to all selves.⁷

Utpala contrasts the active nature of Śiva-consciousness (prakāśavimarśa) with the Vedānta view that consciousness is totally passive or, in Pratyabhijñā terms, prakāśa alone.⁸

Freedom is the very nature of the lights of consciousness. For, otherwise, though reflection of the external objects be falling upon it, yet it could be no better than insentient crystal, etc.⁹ - IPK 1.5.11, trans. Pandey

The crystal to which Utpala refers is part of the familiar Indian metaphor that poses a pure, colorless crystal which takes on the color of juxtaposed objects, e.g., appears as if red when placed in front of a red flower. A related metaphor is that of the moon reflected in a pool of water. The moon's reflection appears to move when a stone is thrown in the pool, but the moon itself remains unaffected. In both cases there is the appearance of a reflection whose nature (red and moving, respectively) differs from the nature of the real object (colorless and unmoving).

Śaṅkara uses reflectionist metaphors such as these to illustrate his distinction between the reality of the qualitless substratum, Brahman, and the appearance of diversification and multiplicity in the everyday-world. The implications of Śaṅkara's use of these metaphors and their relationship with vivartavāda will be seen below.¹⁰

In chapter six of SD (which has no commentary) a long list of erroneous theories is presented without refutation. Included in the list are the views of the "foolish" Vedantins who believe that Brahman projects itself as a reflection in creation, or that the world is an illusion (bhrānti) and not real (na satyarūpatva).¹¹ Utpala clearly believes that the Supreme in no way manifests itself as a reflection and that the world is very much real.

The conscious Self does not increase by means such as reflections. Nor is the manifestation of its nature an illusion.¹²

- SD 1.17, comm.

Utpala objects to reflectionist theories on the grounds that they fail to take into account the active aspect of consciousness—namely, svātantrya or vimarśa. He also claims that any comparison of the manifest world to a reflection is tantamount to declaring the world to be unreal or illusory. In refuting a prima facie view that the Supreme becomes divided by its connection with many bodies like reflections in a crystal, Utpala replies that those reflections are unreal (asatya).¹³ That which is unreal, he adds, has no form and serves no purpose.

Abhinava: Mirror Images

Abhinava, like Utpala, never diverges from the non-dualism basic to Pratyabhijñā's theory of the unitary reality of Śiva-consciousness. Unexpectedly, though, Abhinava explains world manifestations (ābhāsa-s) by means of the very same reflectionist theories which Utpala categorically rejects. Abhinava not only treats Śiva's manifestations as reflections, but he further distinguishes the Supreme as the substratum of reflections from the reflections themselves.

Even though Śivatattva is a unity, its absolute freedom ¹⁴ shows itself as a multiplicity of form, like reflections.
 --IPV II, p. 191, trans. Pandey

Different reflectionist metaphors are found in Abhinava's works. In Paramārthasāra the appearance of diversity in the world is compared to reflections in a pure crystal:

As the limpid crystal assumes the semblance of divers colors, so likewise the Lord assumes the semblance of gods, men, cattle and trees. --PS 6, trans. Barnett

Utpala, as has already been seen, associates the crystal with the Vedānta view of passive consciousness and denounces crystal-reflections as being unreal and useless.

Another example of reflectionism in PS is that of the moon shining in water:

As in moving water, the moon's image moves and in still water is still, so it is with the Self, the Great Lord, in series of bodies, organs and worlds.

-- PS 7, trans. Barnett

The appearance of the moon's reflection moving in the water is, of course, far different from water's appearing as moving when turbulent. Utpala compares the Self to water as the reality of the world of waves. Water is used in Abhinava's remarks above as a passive medium of reflection, like the crystal.

Abhinava's favorite reflectionist metaphor is that of the clear mirror which assumes various forms in reflecting different objects:

When reflected in a mirror, the various objects of a town or village are free of distinctions; yet they also appear as distinct from one another and from the mirror as well. In the same way, this universe which proceeds from the absolutely pure consciousness of Bhairava [another name for Śiva], even though void of distinction, appears as mutually distinct objects and also as distinct from that consciousness.¹⁵

-- PS 12-13

The confusing proliferation of distinctions which Abhinava includes in his mirror-analogy contrasts sharply with the simple unity of Utpala's "water is water." To understand the analogy one must imagine a mirror in which various objects are reflected. In his lengthy IPV presentation of reflectionism, Abhinava gives a mountain and an elephant as examples of objects reflected. Consequently, one must imagine a very large mirror, which takes the forms of mountains and elephants without its own nature being affected (akhandita-svabhāva):

The mirroriness [darpanatā] of the mirror, even when it appears in various forms is not concealed, because even then there is the thought, "this mirror is clear". . . . It is due only to the glory of purity that there is the mixing up with various ābhāsa-s and still there is oneness.

--IPV II, p. 177-8, trans. Pandey.

Abhinava thus claims that there is both the oneness (ekatā) of unbroken mirrorness and the diversity (sambheda) of mountain-manifestations and elephant-manifestations in the same thing, the mirror, at the same time. This aspect of Abhinava's mirror analogy, the relationship between the mirror and its reflections, is similar in form to the crystal metaphor presented earlier. In the juxtaposition of the crystal and the flower, though, the inherent colorlessness of the crystal (comparable to a qualitiless substratum) is contrasted with its appearance as red. If Abhinava's analogy is based on the ever-present unity of mirrorness, then it doesn't depend on any "glory of purity" (nirmalatā-māhātmya). In fact, mirrorness is less likely to be concealed if there is the thought, "this is a dirty mirror," simultaneous with the appearance of the mirror as various forms.

The second distinction found in PS 12-13 is between the real (vastu) mountain and its reflection. The mountain-ābhāsa we perceive in the mirror cannot be the mountain itself, since the mountain does not leave its place and enter the mirror. And since both the reflected and the reflection may be seen at once when the mirror is placed near the mountain, we are not perceiving the mountain itself as the object of perception through the rays of the eyes being turned back from the mirror to the mountain. The relationship between mountain and mountain-reflection is the same as that found in the metaphor of the moon and its reflection in the water. In both cases we

perceive multiplicity (object and object-reflection) when there is only one real object.

The third and final distinction incorporated into Abhinava's mirror-analogy is the appearance of objects as mutually distinct, one from another (anyonyaṃ vibhaktam), e.g., mountains as different from elephants. According to Abhinava, our perceiving various different objects in one single perception is another example of the relationship between unity and multiplicity. However, Abhinava fails to explain how the mirror analogy serves to demonstrate the unitary aspect of the relationship between mountain and elephant. Even though the mountain-reflection and the elephant-reflection are substantially similar, both being reflections and reflections in the same mirror, one perceives them as different from each other as reflections in a mirror just as in the everyday-world. A limitationist metaphor (i.e., space circumscribed by mountain-spaces and elephant-spaces) would serve Abhinava's purposes better in demonstrating the actual unity of apparently distinct objects.

Abhinava summarizes the meaning of his reflectionist distinctions in Tantrasāra. In chapter four of TS he declares the whole world (bhāvajāta) to be mere reflection (pratibimbamātra) and defines pratibimba as follows:

Pratibimba is defined as that which appears as multiplicity, dependent on (literally, mixing with) another, and devoid of power.¹⁶ —TS, p. 10

The rest of the passage gives as examples of pratibimba, not only the reflection of a face in a mirror, but all sensory experiences--including flavor in the taste-buds, smell in the nose, and the feel of love-making in the organ of pleasure. All these, says Abhinava, are not independent (na mukhya); they are attributes (guṇa-s) which cease to exist in the absence of the substance or thing (guṇin) that provides the impetus for the causal chain to which they belong.¹⁷

Utpala contended that nothing could appear if it were devoid of power (aśakta). Abhinava here claims that the entire manifest world is powerless and thus "merely" a reflection. In his remarks above Abhinava does not specifically equate, as does Utpala, powerlessness with unreality. He does, however, distinguish the reality of supreme power as the substratum of reflections from the powerlessness of the manifest reflections themselves.

That Abhinava's reflectionism leads to a world-view very much different from Utpala's may be seen in IPK 1.7.14 and Abhinava's commentary on it.

Thus, experience shows that all transactions, whether pure or impure, depend on the omnipresent Lord, in whom all the objective manifestations, so very different from one another, are reflected.¹⁸ --IPK 1.7.14, trans. Pandey

Pandey interprets Utpala's kārikā along the lines of Abhinava's commentary. Actually, Utpala's verse makes no mention of reflection, but it says instead that the experiences of the everyday-world are embedded or inlaid (khacita) in the Supreme. The purity

or impurity of objective experience refers back to the previous kārikā-s' (IPK 1.7.11-13) discussion of empirical error and illusion. Utpala's verse would be better translated as follows:

Everyday-reality, whether pure or impure, is experienced in the Lord, in whom is embedded all the diverse manifestations of objectivity.

Reflectionism only enters with Abhinava's commentary, which reads:

Practical life is experienced as resting on the omnipresent Lord, who is beyond temporal and spacial limitations and who is affected [uparakta], without undergoing a change in his essential nature, by objects, such as blue and pleasure, etc., which are extremely different from one another, i.e., whose very life is diversity, because they are the creations of Māyā, and which are very much like shadows [pratibimbakal-paiḥ] and, therefore, have no existence independently of Him.

- IPV I, p. 313, trans. Pandey

Abhinava's reflectionist theories demonstrate a lack of any real change in the substratum much more clearly than Utpala's water and gold illustrations. The colorless crystal and the relatively stationary moon in the sky can be easily distinguished as different from their respective appearances as red and moving in the water. Such a distinction is indeed part of our everyday-experience.

In some ways, e.g., as H₂O, water does always remain water; otherwise we would be even unable to recognize it as water in its various changing states. In no obvious manner, though, can water be construed as distinct from the various forms which it assumes, and Utpala makes no attempt to do so. Utpala's claim that water remains unchanged is not based on any separation

of water as such from waves as such; it is based on the all-inclusiveness of the unity of water which is consistently and constantly present even amidst the changes of waves.

While Utpala and Abhinava each view the Supreme as being both immanent and transcendent, the former would emphasize the immanence of the Supreme, and the latter its transcendence. Abhinava never implies that the world is "outside" Śiva; his reflectionist metaphors stress the reflection's dependence on that which is reflected. At the same time, though, Abhinava is suggesting that Śiva, as the substratum of reflections, is something more than, something other than the manifest world. After further differences between the two Pratyabhijñāvādins are presented, Utpala's notion of the all-inclusiveness of reality--i.e., everything real and equally real--will be even more directly contrasted with Abhinava's distinctions between reality and appearance.

CHAPTER IV
SUPERIMPOSITION

Utpala: Direct Identity

Utpala never treats limited consciousness as anything other than supreme consciousness which is seen from a different viewpoint. The limited perceiver who perceives everything from the viewpoint of multiplicity, i.e., objects as if they were separate from supreme consciousness and from each other, is obviously not perceiving the world as Utpala thinks it really is. He characterizes the limited perceptions of the everyday-world as determinate (vikalpa), and thus different from the indeterminate (avikalpa) nature of supreme consciousness:

The universal I-consciousness, though it is the very light of consciousness and is embodied in the transcendental speech, is not determinacy, because determinacy is certainty, which implies two.¹ -- IPK 1.6.1, trans. Pandey

In saying that everyday-perceptions are "certain" or "definite" (niścaya), Utpala is not referring to the credibility of those perceptions. If that were the case, then the Supreme would be uncertain or indefinite in the sense of open to doubt. The certainty to which Utpala alludes is the clarity or preciseness² found when one thing is distinguished from another. All determinate perceptions, says Utpala, are based on differentiation (apohana), as when one distinguishes that which is a jar from that which is not a jar, or a cloth. No such distinctions are possible with respect to supreme consciousness, though,

since prakāśa is indeterminate and incapable of being contrasted with something not of its own nature (aparakāśa).

There is the possibility of appearance (at the same place) of both jar and not-jar, which are essentially different from each other. But there is nothing which has similarity with the light of consciousness and which, though different from it, yet shines. - IPK 1.6.2, trans. Pandey

The appearance of a variety of limited objects is explained by Utpala as due to the Supreme's powers of knowledge (jñānaśakti) and differentiation (apohanaśakti).³ The power of knowledge functions in making objects manifest externally in the form of perceptions which, in their real nature, exist within the Self. From the Self, limited objects of perception are projected outward in a concrete form. The power of differentiation is the power of the Self by which one object is manifested as different from any other object, e.g., a jar from a non-jar. This process of differentiation through negation is a necessary prerequisite to all vikalpa perceptions:

The certainty about "this" that the subject, in whom both "this" and "not-this" shine, feels, because he rejects apohanāt not-this, is spoken of as the determinate cognition "this is a jar". . . Determinacy owes its being to the awareness of another thing which is of opposite nature.⁴

IPK 1.6.3-5, trans. Pandey

As already noted, Utpala denies that differentiation and determinacy apply to the Supreme Self. Just as the unity of water is unaffected by its appearance as waves, he contends that the Supreme ever remains avikalpa despite the determinacy of the everyday-world. And just as waves are nothing but water, Utpala also argues that all worldly perceptions are but manifestations

of the will of supreme consciousness and are essentially identical with supreme consciousness:

And thus consciousness of the object, i.e., the consciousness which shines affected by a succession of variety of objects, is nothing but the great Lord, the Subject, who is essentially the eternal and unchanging light of consciousness. — IPK 1.7.1, trans. Pandey

Like Utpala, Śāṅkara also declares the world to be vikalpa. Śāṅkara, though, uses the word as an expression of the illusory nature of the world. In Advaita Vedānta differentiation is regarded as resulting from superimposition (adhyāsa, adhyāropa), which is "the unreal assumption about the attributes of one thing as being the attributes of some other thing," "the notion of 'that' in something 'not-that.'"⁵ In the familiar example of the rope and the snake, the attributes of the snake are superimposed upon the rope, the result being that the rope is thought to be capable of moving, biting, etc. According to Śāṅkara, there is a similar reciprocal superimposition of the qualities of the manifest world or non-self (diversity, change, etc.) onto the Supreme Self, and also of the qualities of the Supreme Self (unity, eternity, etc.) onto the non-self.

The rope, the one real thing, is imagined [kalpita] to be such unreal things as a snake, a streak of water, etc. . . Similarly, the Self is imagined to be such multifarious unreal things as breath, etc., which do not exist.
- MKB 2.33, trans. Gambhirananda

Utpala repeatedly attacks the Vedānta position that diversification is an illusion and that the diverse objects of the world are unreal.⁶ Śiva is found in the form of multiplicity

through his willpower, he says, and even that multiplicity is of the nature of Śiva.⁷

Paramaśiva is of the nature of diversity and is not separate from the diverse things of the world. Because it is his nature to establish himself as the diverse things of the world, this world, even in all its diversity, is real.⁸
- SD 1.49 comm.

In chapter three of SD the theory that the world is a real form (klrpta) of Śiva is contrasted with the Vedānta theory that the world is imaginary (kalpanā):

Something is imaginary, in the realm of fancy, when it is thought to be of a certain form and actually isn't of any such form. Since Śiva himself /śakṣāt/ is actually all of this world and, in reality, all of this world is Śiva, then there can be nothing imaginary about this world.⁹
- SD 3.83 comm.

In support of his remarks above Utpala returns to his gold-metaphor. Declaring the world to be illusory, he argues, is the same as saying that gold is real only when melted in a crucible and is imaginary when in the form of various ornaments.¹⁰

If this were indeed Śaṅkara's position--gold being real and gold rings unreal--then it would deserve the abrupt refutation accorded it by Utpala. However, Śaṅkara uses the gold-metaphor in a very different manner:

A rucaka (a kind of golden utensil) and a svastika (another kind of golden utensil) are not the self of each other (are not identical); they are identical only as gold. . . . It is only after the nature of the diverse effects such as name, etc., qua effects is destroyed, that it is possible to accept them as being of the nature of Brahman.
- BSB 4.1.14, trans. Apte

Śaṅkara's theory of superimposition is clearly opposed to Utpala's position. Utpala seems to believe that various gold

ornaments are identical as such; at least he never denies the reality of their respectively distinct forms. The manifestations of the everyday-world are identical with supreme consciousness, he claims, even in their distinctive forms as mutually isolated subjects and objects.¹¹ Although Utpala asserts that determinacy is not applicable to supreme consciousness, the objects of determinate perception are themselves regarded as identical with the Supreme. If everything in the world shines (prakāśate) through the light of consciousness, argues Utpala, then the nature of the everyday-world cannot be contrary to the nature of the Supreme--there is no perceiving "that" in something "not-that."

Although never made explicit, there is an implicit superimposition of sorts found in Utpala's theories. It is based on the false attribution of the determinate nature of the everyday-world to the indeterminate Supreme--as in thinking that water becomes divided when waves appear. The waves in Utpala's metaphor are identical with water, even though differentiated and changing. But if one were to fail to perceive the continuity and unity of water and were to attribute the changing nature of waves to unchanging water, then this would constitute an erroneous attribution. This is the viewpoint of multiplicity (bhedapratīti)¹² which Utpala equates with bondage and which is somewhat analogous to the superimposition of non-Self on Self.

Utpala thus both defends the unitary Supreme against charges that it is affected by the diversity of the everyday-

world and, at the same time, defends the everyday-world against theories which declare it to be illusory. In other words, he refutes the ultimacy of differentiations made within the framework of limited perceptions, but he supports the ultimate reality of those differentiated perceptions, which are identical with the Supreme. It is unclear whether Utpala contends that we perceive the world from the viewpoint of multiplicity because we are bound, or whether bondage is the result of such a viewpoint. Whichever may be the case, the remedy propounded by him is direct and simple: release is merely the viewpoint of non-differentiation (abhedapratīti).

Abhinava: Imagined Multiplicity

While Utpala vigorously attacks Vedānta theories that the diversity of the world is imaginary or unreal, Abhinava describes the determinate world in those very terms. "The Self remains non-dual," says Abhinava, "even when imagined (parikalpita) to be endowed with power."¹³ In commenting on IPK 1.3.7, Abhinava explains that the power of differentiation, apohanaśakti, is that which causes one thing to be manifest as separate from another, such as one consciousness from another or one object of knowledge from another. This is in accord with Utpala's theories, but Abhinava's further remarks concerning the power of differentiation are not.

Division is not really possible, and thus it is called "mere appearance" [avabhāsamātram].¹⁴ - IPV I, p. 110.

Since there is no real possibility of division, the appearance of diversity (or the masking of unity) is declared by Abhinava to be illusory:

And the cause of obscuration of that pure consciousness is that power which is called māyā. It is the freedom to bring about the obscuration of unity, which is of the nature of illusion [bhrānti]. - IPV I, p. 249, trans. Pandey

If the diversity of the world is an illusion, then the multiple subjects and objects of the everyday-world cannot be identical with the Supreme in any direct sense. Utpala allowed no alternatives in evaluating the perceptions of the manifest world, arguing that whatever appears must be of the nature of prakāśa, since there is nothing similar to prakāśa and yet different from it. Abhinava, at obvious variance with Utpala, contends that the limited manifestations of the māyā-world are neither identical with nor different from the light of supreme consciousness:

The object of cognition is not outside the light of subject, otherwise it would not be manifest. But this object also is to be admitted as separate from the light. For otherwise, how can it be called the object? . . . If they [objects] be non-different from the true light, how can the mutual differences among them be possible?

- IPV I, p. 148, trans. Pandey

Utpala explains differentiation within the light of consciousness by means of the Supreme's power of differentiation which sets the stage for determinate perceptions. Abhinava adds a new step in the formulation of determinate perceptions. Within the limited sphere of the māyā-world, Abhinava argues, there

is the possibility of perceiving many different objects at any given time or place. One perceives, for example, sense-impressions of a jar on the floor. By the superimposition (samāropa) and subsequent negation (niṣeddha) of the possibility of non-jar, there results the determinate cognition, "this is a jar."

Therefore, there being the possibility of appearance of both jar and cloth (at the place where jar is present) there is room for superimposition. When there is superimposition of a thing of a different nature (on jar) then alone there is room for the power of differentiation to function in refuting what is superimposed. Therefore the ascertainment "this is a jar" has the distinctive feature of determinacy, which depends upon the operation of differentiation.

- IPV I, p. 239, trans. Pandey.

Abhinava's use of superimposition is unprecedented in the writings of Utpala, where neither samāropa nor any of its Sanskrit equivalents is found. Although the superimposition of jar and non-jar differs from the Vedānta example of rope and snake, it also is an illusory superimposition. For if division is not really possible and if determinateness is illusory, then superimposition is the error which results in illusion. As will be seen immediately below, Abhinava also discusses superimposition in a more specifically Advaita Vedānta manner.

Utpala contended that bondage lay in adopting the viewpoint of multiplicity and failing to realize the unity of Śiva-consciousness. In alluding to the illusory nature of multiplicity, Abhinava also is confirming the unitary reality of the Supreme. In Abhinava's scheme, however, the erroneousness of the

māyā-world does not consist only of the viewpoint of multiplicity; there is also a false unification of Self and non-self, whereby the limited self thinks itself identical with that which is non-self:

And the obscuration of the real nature of consciousness consists in wrongly considering body, etc., which are still of the nature of object and, therefore, different from the subject, to be the subject without any reason for it.

- IPV I, p. 249, trans. Pandey, p. 90

The power of māyā reveals itself when the not-self, such as the intellect and body, are identified with the Self . . . How are these things not-self? All of these are in reality essentially consciousness alone, but they are manifested as non-consciousness through māyā . . . the identification is made, they are assumed to be identical with the principle of consciousness, even while they are inert and limited by the five kañcukas [the sheaths of māyā]. . . Thus the experiencer [pramātr] himself becomes as the meya, the limited object of perception.

- IPV II, pp. 204-207, trans. Pandey

Abhinava is expounding superimposition in the explicitly Advaita Vedānta manner as the notion of something "that" in "not-that." Furthermore, Abhinava supports both aspects of Śaṅkara's reciprocal superimposition and distinguishes two different types of errors. The first type is the superimposition of non-self on Self--taking that which is really consciousness and cognizing it as different from the Self, as limited and inert. The second superimposition is of Self on non-self--falsely identifying those limited objects as identical with the Self. Utpala at least tacitly concurs with the notion of superimposition of non-self on Self, since his theories center upon our perceiving diversity where there is really only unity of Self.

But the superimposition of Self on non-self constitutes a defilement of a different sort, i.e., a false identification rather than a false distinction, which is not acknowledged by Utpala.

The jīva's perception of Self as identical with the bodily adjuncts and limited objects of the everyday-world demands a remedy akin to distinguishing Self from non-self, realizing the differences between Self as ātman and limited objects as anātman. From the viewpoint of world manifestation, this is a secondary manifestation; from the perspective of the sādhaka or aspirant, this is the first error that must be overcome. Abhinava makes this point eminently clear in Paramārthasāra:

It is blindness when there arises the error that modes of being, which are non-different from the Self as Shining Consciousness, are thought to be non-self.¹⁵

- PS 30, trans. Barnett

This describes the first kind of superimposition, non-self on Self. Similar statements are often made by Utpala.¹⁶ But Abhinava further says:

It is darkness from darkness, a great pustule upon a boil, when that which is not the Self, such as body and breath, is imagined to be the Self.¹⁷

- PS 31, trans. Barnett

This is the second type of superimposition, Self on non-self, where the limited subject identifies with the limited object of perception. Abhinava doesn't hesitate to refer to these limited manifestations as anātman, as sufficiently different from the Self so that any identification with them in their limited forms would be erroneous. Utpala ignores this secondary superimposi-

tion even in his treatment of everyday-perception, and he always supports the identity of limited manifestations and the Supreme. Abhinava agrees that the ultimate identity of both limited subject and limited object is supreme consciousness, but he presents the first step of realizing the Self in very Vedānta-like terms as one of distinction, not unification:

Having first overthrown the semblance [avabhāna] of Selfhood in what is not-self, the Supreme Siva shatters the delusion [bhrānti] that sees not-self in Self.

- PS 39, trans. Barnett

Thus, while there is no explicit exposition of superimposition in the writings of Utpala, a distinctly Advaita Vedānta presentation of the topic is found in Abhinava's works. Utpala contends that the diverse manifestations of the world are directly identical with the light of supreme consciousness. Abhinava argues that they cannot be completely or directly identical with the Supreme because of their determinateness. Finally, Utpala implicitly acknowledges only the superimposition of non-self on Self, viz., the false differentiation of Self and non-self. Abhinava discusses two types of superimpositions-- which respectively entail not only the false differentiation of Self and non-self, but also the false identification of Self with non-self.

CHAPTER V
LEVELS OF REALITY AND SUBLATION

Utpala's Refutation of Sublation

We have already seen that Utpala extends the reality of the Supreme even to the limited manifestations of multiplicity. Everything, from Paramaśiva to a pot, is equally possessed of full consciousness (pūrṇa cit). All distinctions and gradations of reality, says Utpala, are caused by śraddhā--a word which may be translated "faith" or "belief" or, as does Gnoli, "human opinion."¹ What are the distinctions to which Utpala is referring? In a general sense they are all the various ways in which the label "reality" is affixed to some perceptions and denied to others--the distinctions between real-world and dream-world, real water and mirage, etc. Utpala also specifically refers to the distinctions between reality and appearance found in Śaṅkara's theories.

According to Śaṅkara, reality is divided into three levels: paramārtha--highest reality, vyavahāra--everyday-reality, and pratibhāsa--illusion. The highest reality is the absolute unity of Brahman alone. Conditional reality or appearance consists of everyday-reality, which is ordinary perceptions of objects such as pots, and illusion, which is hallucination and erroneous sense-perception and the like. These three categories of experience are all existent, sat, in contrast with those

things which are unreal, asat, and which can never be objects of experience, e.g., hare-horns and sons of barren women.

Within the realm of the existent, illusion is sublatale by everyday-reality, and everyday-reality, in turn, is sublatale by Brahman. Sublation (bādhā) is the counter-process of superimposition. For example, the superimposed snake is said to be sublatale when it is revealed to be nothing other than a rope. The process of sublation involves:

1. contradiction: the incompatibility of two cognitions, "this is a snake" and "this is a rope."
2. denial: rejection of the cognition, "this is a snake."
3. revaluation: replacement of the old cognition "this is a snake" with the new one, "this is not a snake but is a rope."

In the same way that the snake is sublatale by the rope, the whole real-unreal course of everyday-life (sarva-satyānṛtavayahāra), says Śaṅkara, is sublatale by the knowledge of Brahman.²

Of course, Utpala has little tolerance for any ordering of reality into levels. He deals with the Advaita Vedānta distinction between reality and appearance in chapter four of Śivadr̥ṣṭi. Although the arguments of the chapter are applicable to and directed against a variety of schools, their main thrust is toward a refutation of the Vedānta theory of sublation. In attacking the notion of bādhā, it is not the revaluative aspect

of sublation to which Utpala objects; he himself contends that our perceptions of the everyday-world are constantly changing and urges us to reevaluate our perceptions by replacing the viewpoint of diversity with the viewpoint of non-diversity. It is the contradiction and denial aspects of sublation which clash with Utpala's theory of the all-inclusiveness of reality, since Utpala wishes to avoid any rejection of the everyday world as unreal.

Earlier Kashmir Śaiva works, both Āgama and Spanda, make no direct mention of the paramārtha-vyavahāra-pratibhāsa divisions of reality. Utpala accepts these divisions for the sake of argument only to declare them meaningless in distinguishing reality from non-reality or greater reality from lesser reality. Everything is endowed with power, begins Utpala in his commentary on chapter four of SD, and everything is of the form of consciousness (cidrūpatā), real (vastu) and a form of Śiva (śivarūpatva). Even inert objects, such as rocks or trees, are manifestations of consciousness (cidvyakti) and shine as the indivisible light of consciousness (prakāśābheda); thus they are not only real, sat, but of the highest reality (paramārtha-sat), as well.²

At this point in the text an objector intervenes and asks: If everything is equally and undeniably real, how may one distinguish between proper (samyak) and false (mithyā) knowledge? Would not the perception of a pot and the perception of a rope-

snake be indistinguishably real if everything were of the nature of Śiva?⁴

Utpala replies that the distinctions made between illusion and reality are not themselves based on reality but on the functioning of the everyday-world, whose uncertain and unstable nature precludes its acting as a criterion of reality. As proof of the uncertain nature of the everyday-world, three examples are provided. Utpala cites the case of a king who passes off false coins in his border territories. The coins are false, i.e., not made of gold, yet because of the king's sanction they serve in everyday-affairs as real money and are regarded as such.⁵

The conditional nature of the everyday-world is also demonstrated by the effects of poison, which will kill one person but cause no harm to another who is protected by the hymn of Garuḍa, the mythical bird who is the destroyer of snakes.⁶ The everyday-world consists of mere pleasure (āhlādamātraka); if one is thirsty, one's thirst may be quenched by dream-water as well as real water, the effects of both being a satisfaction which is proven by one's own consciousness.⁷ Each of the above examples is very different in nature, but they all are used by Utpala to demonstrate the arbitrariness of distinctions between everyday-reality and illusion. They also lead to an even more serious objection than that previously presented. For if this world is of the highest reality and, at the same time, of such

uncertain nature, reality itself is reduced to being just as uncertain as the everyday-world.⁸ In other words, if everything is of equal reality, then illusion may be of the highest reality, but the highest reality can be no more real than rope-snakes.

Utpala answers this objection at great length. All manifestations of consciousness, including shell-silver and hare-horns, represent the undeniable reality of Śiva. The everyday-world is real, he says, because it is a manifestation of consciousness, not because of its conventional designation as "real" or because it is capable of subverting illusion.⁹ Utpala's arguments against sublation are summarized in the appendix; they revolve around the undeniable reality of all experience and his contention that "an object which is experienced does not become otherwise."¹⁰

Everyday-real and illusory objects do not contradict either the highest reality or each other; there is simply the perception of objects in different forms at different times. With regard to the illusory shell-silver, there is the perception of a precious metal, silver, which is followed by perception of a piece of shell. There has been a change in determinate perceptions (vikalpa-s), one perception replacing another, but there is no contradiction between the two perceptions. Nor is any denial of the earlier perception of silver possible at the time of the later perception of shell. For example, one perceives a pot at one moment and a piece of cloth at a later

moment, yet we don't say that the cloth serves to deny the pot. Milk changes into curds, but there is no contradiction in the process and milk is not sublated by curds. Different manifestations occur at different times, and there is no possibility of a later manifestation denying or contradicting an earlier one.¹¹

Utpala thus arrives at the audacious conclusion that "everything is real, nothing is false,"¹² that the reality of the everyday-world is no less than the reality of Śiva and no more than the reality of shell-silver. It would seem that Utpala's defense of the unsublatable reality of all world-experience actually ignores the experience of sublation. Identifying world-manifestations with the indivisible light of consciousness in itself serves to supersede, if not sublimate, the uncertainty and conflict of the everyday-world. But Utpala reasons, quite correctly, that if a distinction is allowed between the reality of the everyday-world and the reality of an illusion, there are even stronger grounds for distinguishing the highest reality of Śiva from the appearance of the limited world as a whole. His position with respect to sublation and levels of reality is necessarily extreme, for allowing reality to be anything but undivided and all-pervasive is a most extreme error from the viewpoint of the equal reality of everything.

Abhinava's Distinction Between Levels of Reality

Utpala draws no distinction at all between the reality of objects as such and the reality of their underlying substratum. This distinction between levels of reality is the basis of the Advaita Vedānta premise that all experience is real until shown to be otherwise. The lesson of the rope sublatting the snake is not that the māyā-world is fictitious or non-existent. Although Śaṅkara does sometimes declare world-manifestations to be unreal, he often and more precisely refers to everyday-reality and illusion as conditionally real--that is, real only until the conditions necessary for sublation are obtained:

Prior to the attainment of knowledge of Brahman, all worldly experiences are real [commentator: because they are not sublated], just as dream experiences prior to awakening.¹³
- BSB 2.1.14

Abhinava formulates the same distinction between the experience of the object as such as the sublatting experience of reality. The multiplicity of the object-world, he says, is not of the highest reality;¹⁴ the conditional existence of an object directly correlates with its being experienced as non-sublated:

As long as a thing is experienced as non-sublated, to that extent, it exists.¹⁵ - IPV I, p. 41.

There is even no need for a commentator's interjection of "because they are not sublated" (bādhābhāvāt), as in the BSB citation above, to qualify the reality of everyday-objects.

In another IPV passage Abhinava seems to apply the term paramārtha to world manifestations in a manner quite compatible with the views of Utpala; at least the interpretation rendered by Pandey gives that impression:

In this world whatever enters into consciousness is a mere manifestation of the Self, the Ultimate Reality to be defined later. Amongst the manifest, the causal relation, such as exists between the means and the end and so on, is also real, because all this is a fact of consciousness, and the reality of what enters into consciousness cannot be denied.¹⁶ - IPV I, p. 9, trans. Pandey

Pandey has "transcreated," rather than translated this passage to a point, if not beyond recognition, well beyond the bounds of good judgment. The above does serve as a fair summary of Utpala's position. But it falls far short of being either an accurate representation of Abhinava's views in general or of this IPV passage in particular.

To begin, the translation conflicts with other of Abhinava's statements to the effect that the objects of the everyday-world are not of the highest reality and are not, as such, identical with the Supreme. Pandey's translation implies that the causally related objects of the manifest world are themselves of the highest reality. This sharply opposes the implications of "as long as a thing is experienced as sublated. . . ." --namely, that the objects are merely conditionally real and subject to later sublation. Rather than assume that the relationships of the world are regarded as mere manifestation, prathamātra, in the first line, and then as the highest reality, paramārtha,

in the second line, a far less strained interpretation might make use of the natural opposition of the two terms.

In the very next lines of IPV Abhinava refers to the innumerable divisions of the manifest world--sentient and insentient, creator and created, knower and known--as the forms of ordinary life (lokavyavahārarūpa) which are to be established as of the nature of māyā.¹⁷ Abhinava obviously regards something's being of the nature of māyā as very different from being of the highest reality. M. R. Shastri, the editor of the text, comments on this section of IPV by saying, "Otherwise, if everything were of the highest reality of prakāśa, there could be no division of 'this cause' and 'this effect.'"¹⁸

I would then re-translate the second line of the original IPV passage to emphasize Abhinava's belief that the mere "show-objects" are not real as such, but are based on the reality of prakāśa, which serves as the substratum of all manifestations:

. . . But even those objects of the manifest world which partake of causal relation, such as ends and means, have as their basis the undeniable light of consciousness, and, in that sense, as prakāśa, they are of the highest reality.

The reason for examining this passage in detail is to show that a close reading of Abhinava reveals his separation of vyavahāra and paramārtha into two distinct levels of reality: māyā-manifestations and the real background of prakāśa. Although this does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the nature of the relationship between the two levels, it focuses upon them

as dependancy-related in the manner of Vedānta superimposition and sublation, and not identity-related as in the theories of Utpala. The Supreme in Abhinava's scheme does not become the manifest world in any real sense, but is instead the substratum of world-manifestations. "The immanence of the Lord," says Abhinava, "is through his sustaining world-reflections."¹⁹ Also, it must be remembered that Abhinava not only asserts that the manifestations of the world are mere reflections, but he further specifies that those reflections are not identical with the Self, and he often calls them illusory:

For all that [the manifest world] being essentially a manifestation of māyā, the principle of obscuration, and, therefore, unilluminative like darkness, cannot be a means to knowledge of the pure light, which is beyond māyā, and therefore is the opposite of manifestation.

- IPV II, p. 7, trans. Pandey

Although there is no snake in the rope, it causes a terror ending in death. Truly the great power of illusion cannot be easily pierced.

Similarly, dharma, adharmā, heaven, hell, birth, death, pleasure, sorrow, caste and stages of life--even though non-existent in the Self, appear because of the power of illusion.²⁰ - PS 28-29

The above lines from Paramārthasāra are remarkably similar, both in metaphor and intent, to passages in the writings of Śaṅkara.²¹ This is the only instance I have been able to find where Abhinava uses the rope-snake analogy. Although the analogy fits admirably into many of his remarks, it was perhaps too obviously linked with Vedānta thought for use by a Śaivite, which makes even its single appearance here all the more extraordinary.

As shown in Appendix C , much of Abhinava's Paramārtha-sāra is but a rewording or even literal borrowing from Ādi Śeṣa's earlier text of the same name. Abhinava doesn't even change "Brahman" to "Śiva" in the following verses, which stand as a clear expression of the distinction between the absolute reality of the Supreme and the illusoriness of world appearances:

This is Brahman, the supreme, pure, still, undifferentiated, equal, complete, deathless, real, that is merged in the Power of Essential Light.
On the other hand, the object of desire or knowledge or action, which is not experienced as Essential Light, is only a sky-flower. - PS 43-44, trans. Barnett

Abhinava's Theory of Error

Abhinava's distinctions between levels of reality and his use of sublation are found in the exposition of his theory of error. This discussion of error takes place as a commentary on Utpala's Kārikā 2.3.13. The shell-silver example is already familiar, and the perception of two moons refers to sensory error caused by double-vision:

Even when there is consciousness of silver at the sight of mother-of-pearl, there is no silver in the mother-of-pearl, because there is no agreement (between the two cognitions) in respect of their spatial limitation. In the case of "two moons" also, it is a particular point, in the heavenly vault that shines differently [anyathā].²²
-IPK 2.3.13, trans. Pandey

The word anyathā means "elsewhere," as well as "differently." Considering the kārikā's reference to spatial limitation (upādhideśa), error becomes a matter of the false juxtaposition of the elements of a cognition which may be independently real--

e.g., "silveriness" and "shell." It seems that Utpala is supporting the Naiyāyika theory of error (anyathākhyāti), which contends that errors are of misplacement and mistiming.²³

In Śivadr̥ṣṭi Utpala supported no particular theory of error and, in fact, attacked the very notion of erroneous perception. He contended there that judgments of the sort, "this is shell in space_x" made at time₂, cannot serve to deny the validity of the earlier judgment, "this is silver in space_x" made at time₁. Inconsistent as this kārikā seems to be with SD, Abhinava's commentary on it goes even further, in that Abhinava ultimately denies even the independent reality of the elements of erroneous cognition.

Abhinava refers to his theory of error (bhrāntitattva) as error of incompleteness or imperfection (apūrṇakhyāti). He lists as alternative theories concerning the nature of error, without mentioning who held them or how they differ from his own: the asatkhyāti of the Buddhists, viparītakhyāti of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, and anirvācanīyakhyāti of Advaita Vedānta.²⁴ Although obviously aware that anyathākhyāti represents the Nyāya theory of error, Abhinava doesn't acknowledge the use of anyathā in the kārikā. He perhaps didn't want to admit that Utpala was presenting the Logicians' view of error, or he may have intended to emphasize the difference between it and his own theory of apūrṇakhyāti.

The mechanics of apūrṇakhyāti refer back to an earlier IPV discussion of subject and object.²⁵ The empirical world is there described as an objective wave of ābhāsa-s which is joined to individual subject waves in a degree and manner corresponding to the taste, purpose and intellectual capacity of the subject. Accordingly, because of greed or near-sightedness or whatever, someone walking down the beach cognizes silver where there is only shell.

That space [deśa] which is the limiting condition [upādhi] of "here is silver" is (later found to be) the shell-space which shines with the lustre of silver.

- IPV II, p. 114, trans. Pandey

At the time of perception there is no error about the various separate ābhāsa-s, such as "this" or "silver" or even the connection between them, since they are directly experienced as vimarśa. Erroneousness arises only with the later vimarśa, "this is not silver—hard, heavy, etc.," which sublates (bādhate) the earlier one.

From Abhinava's brief exposition on error, it seems that the limited perceiver could never avoid error of an apūrṇakhyāti sort. Perfect (pūrṇa) knowledge, not possibly subject to later contradiction or amendment, would demand omniscience on the part of the perceiver--namely, his perceiving all the properties of any object at the same time. In the text a like-minded objector intervenes:

Objector: But knowledge of the shell is also incomplete. Then is all the world an illusion?

Abhinava: Horray! Your eyes are finally opening. All of the māyā-world is an illusion, and this lower illusion is like a dream in a dream, a pustule on a boil.²⁶

- IPV II, p. 116

The incontestable finality of the above needs little comment. Abhinava's response is indisputably that of an Advaita Vedāntin. Whereas Utpala declared vyavahāra and pratibhāsa to be indistinguishably real, Abhinava here says that they are distinct and sublatale levels of illusory appearance.

Part III
VEDĀNTA AND PRATYABHIJÑĀ

Chapter VI

Having examined the basic differences in the theories of Utpala and Abhinava, we will now proceed to a brief critique of some general evaluations of Pratyabhiññā made by others. As already noted, the issues of Part II of this dissertation have not been taken into consideration in previous assessments of Pratyabhiññā's position relative to other schools of philosophy.

Illusionist Vedānta and Realist Pratyabhiññā

The theories of Pratyabhiññā as a whole have been variously called a form of "realistic idealism,"¹ "monistic idealism,"² "idealistic monism"³ and "concrete monism."⁴ While Pratyabhiññā is surely monistic and, by any reasonable definition of the word, also idealistic, the supposed realistic nature of Pratyabhiññā's theories warrants closer consideration. Without entering into a discussion of the Western philosophical systems associated with the term, it will be readily agreed that Pratyabhiññā is "idealistic," since it defines reality as spiritual and the world as a form of consciousness. There being no separate material cause to the world according to Utpala and Abhinava, their philosophies are also "monistic"--that is, believing in one supreme principle alone and without a second (advaita).

However, the "realism" of Pratyabhijñā, if it may be called so at all, is quite different from the realism of dualist Sāṅkhya, which is based on the modification of material energy or prakṛti, and also from the atomistic theory of realism held by pluralist Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Pandey contrasts what he considers to be Pratyabhijñā's synthesis of realism and idealism, i.e. "realistic idealism," to the "pure idealistic monism of Advaita Vedānta which declares the world to be mere illusion."⁵ Using different terms to the same effect, Kaw distinguishes Pratyabhijñā's "concrete monism" from the "absolute idealism" of Śāṅkara:

Śāṅkarācārya's view with regard to the existence of object is quite contrary to that of the Pratyabhijñā system. According to his system the only reality is subject and the existence of the object is fictitious. This view supposes the subject and object to be opposed to each other as are darkness and light. . . . The approach of Pratyabhijñā philosophers to the problem of object (non-ego) is realistic. In their view the world with all animate and inanimate objects is real.⁶

Kaw's remarks may be shown to misconstrue the positions of both Vedānta and Pratyabhijñā. His contention of a basic difference between the fictitious object-world of Śāṅkara and the realism of Pratyabhijñā completely ignores the illusionistic stream of Abhinava's thinking. Kaw also seriously oversimplifies the illusionism of Śāṅkara and the realism of Utpala.

Śāṅkara: Subject-Object

Śāṅkara's position with respect to the reality of objects

is itself a synthesis of realistic and idealistic views. Kaw's assessment of Śaṅkara is possibly justified if one limits oneself to the passages in the Māṇḍūkyakārikābhāṣya which emphatically assert the falsity of objective experience. "Objectivity (drśyatva)," Śaṅkara there contends, "is indistinguishably false in both the dream and waking states."⁷

This is diametrically opposed to passages in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya where Śaṅkara states that external objects cannot be non-existent because they are perceived (upalabdha), and that which is perceived cannot be non-existent. He refutes a subjectivist (viññānavādin) argument that objects, although perceived as if external (bahirvat), are still unreal:

Why say 'as if' external? No one says that Viṣṇumitra appears 'as if' the son of a barren woman.

- BSB 2.2.28, trans. Apte

Śaṅkara continues in this most thoroughly realist vein, arguing that objects of the waking state cannot be the same as dream-objects because they are dissimilar, different in their essential natures (vaidharṃya):

The actual distinction between remembrance or memory [smṛti] in a dream and perception or experience [upalabdhi] in a waking condition which is of the nature of separation from or contact with a thing is directly experienced by a person himself, when he says, for instance, "I remember my dear son but am not able to see him. But I do wish to see him."

- BSB 2.2.29, trans. Apte

The above analogy and others of a similar realist type (such as real water quenching thirst versus a mirage) are put to harsh attack in MKB. The negative dialectic of Śaṅkara's

ajätivāda (literally, the theory that "nothing is born") opposes subject-object differentiation even within an idealistic framework. The arguments used by the subjective idealists (viññānavādin-s) to deny the reality of external objects (MKB 4.25-27) meet with Śaṅkara's approval, but the subjective idealists' own position is in turn refuted:

We also approve the view of the subjective idealists that consciousness appears as a jar even though there is no such jar etc., therefore it also stands to reason that consciousness appears to be born even though there is no such thing as birth. . . therefore those idealists who see the birth of consciousness as momentariness, sorrow, non-self, etc., (are claiming to) see by means of that very cit, that which is of the nature of cit and cannot be seen. They see the tracks of birds in the sky itself and are thus even more audacious than the other dualists.

- MKB 4.28, trans. Gambhirananda

Although these remarks ostensibly concur with Kaw's description of the object as "fictitious" in Vedānta, they represent an attack upon the ultimate reality of perceiving subject as well as perceiving object. From the highest standpoint, mental states or ideas have to be as unreal as any other constituent of the world. Neither the external object (bahirdrśya) or object of consciousness (cidrśya)--in fact, no object (drśya) or "seeing" at all in any ordinary sense--is ultimately real.

The differences between idealists and realists, however, are based precisely on that which we see in the everyday-world. As has already been shown, Śaṅkara does recognize and deal with the limitation and differentiation of the māyā-world, allowing that it is conditionally real until sublated by the knowledge

of Brahman. His idealism should not be considered "subjective", like that of the Buddhist Vijñānavādin in the East or Bishop Berkeley in the West, since it is the limitation of subject-object duality which is to be denied and transcended by the highest reality.

Kaw's misleading interpretation of Śaṅkara is similar to a statement by Radhakrishnan, who says, "Śaṅkara declares that subject and object are opposed like light and darkness."⁸

Radhakrishnan, though, also states:

Śaṅkara approaches the problem [of everyday experience] from the subjective and objective sides which do not ultimately diverge. . . . In ordinary usage we regard mental states as subjective and physical states as objective. But from the metaphysical point of view both orders of phenomena, mental and material, are equally objective.⁹

Utpala and Abhinava: Subject-Object

The "realistic approach to object" which Kaw ascribes to Pratyabhijñā is not even found in the theories of Utpala, who also contends that the subjective and objective sides of experience do not diverge. Utpala denies any subject-object difference, and not clearly or merely in the sense of ultimate identity, contending that both orders of phenomena are equally subjective. Without drawing any distinction between everyday-reality and highest reality, he tries to show a necessary identity of jīva-self and object, i.e., perceiver and pot, and of both, in turn, with supreme consciousness. If the pot were really material or really external, he argues, then it could not be experienced in consciousness--that is, not be experienced at all.¹⁰

Much like Śaṅkara in MKB, Utpala denies the reality, or rather the metaphysical significance, of the distinction between dream and waking states. Also similar to ajātivāda is the manner in which Utpala examines everyday-distinctions (the distinctions which are at the core of any traditional realist position) from the viewpoint of non-differentiation. Shells, shell-silver and hare-horns are all said to be equally representative of vyavahāra, which, because of its uncertainty and inconclusiveness, provides no grounds for determining reality or even establishing metaphysical priorities.

In explaining the reduction of a manifestation of consciousness (cidābhāsa) to the state of inertness (jādyā), Utpala defines that inertness in terms of the object's dependence on the perceiver or experient (pramātr).



Jaḍabhūtānām pratiṣṭhā jīvadāśrayā.

The being of the Insentient depends entirely on the Sentient..

- IPK 1.1.4, transl. Pandey

A problem arises in trying to establish whether jīvat means:

1. jīva, the limited perceiver of the māyā-world, or 2. Para-māśiva or supreme consciousness, as Pandey's capitalized "Sentient" seems to imply. The two alternatives may be illustrated as follows:



The first scheme illustrates subjective idealism, which does not even represent Śaṅkara's position, much less Utpala's

or Abhinava's. Despite a certain amount of ambiguity in the writings of Utpala, he and Abhinava and Śaṅkara all subscribe to the second scheme. In Abhinava's case, this is clearly seen in his IPV discussion of subject and object.

Abhinava describes the cosmic thought process as a journey. The experience of the Supreme (parāmarśa) is the final resting point of the journey, the culminating point which alone is of the highest reality. Limited subjects and objects and perceptions ("I" and "blue" and "I see blue") are only middle points in the journey, which both begins and ends in the "Perfect I" (parāhantā) of Parameśvara.¹¹ Unlike Utpala, Abhinava clearly distinguishes the transcendent "I" of the Supreme from the limited "I" of the everyday-world. Both of them, though, oppose any ultimate distinction between subject and object. In neither Pratyabhijñā nor Vedānta are the objects of the everyday-world to be interpreted as projections of the limited jīva-self.

Śaṅkara: World Experience

Śaṅkara's explanation of world-experience is not based on any opposition of subject and object, but instead on the distinction between the highest reality of Brahman and the conditional reality of world appearances. The jīva is the product of limiting conditions (upādhi-s) which are brought about by ignorance (avidyā). In some instances the Brahmasūtra-s on

which Śāṅkara comments present the jīva as being different from the ātman.¹² Śāṅkara dismisses any such notions and says:

The difference between the embodied jīva and the Inner Controller antaryāmin is not real na pāramārthika but due to the limiting conditions of cause and effect established through ignorance. - BSB 1.2.20, trans. Apte

An analogy is given of the "two-fold carpenter" (takṣobhayathā) who is unhappy when he uses tools at work but becomes happy and at ease when he leaves his tools and work behind to go home. The jīva similarly possesses a two-fold nature:

The jīva-self becomes an agent only as it requires organs-of-sense such as the mind, etc., for all its activities, but is not an agent so far as itself is concerned ātmanā akartr. - BSB 2.3.40, trans. Apte

The limited nature (anutva) of the jīva arises from his taking on the essence of the qualities of the limiting conditions, and the Self thus becomes non-pervasive and non-omniscient. The jīva's limitedness, though, is only in a figurative or secondary sense, since "in the highest reality, the jīva is all-pervasive and infinite."¹³ And even as the limitedness of the jīva must not be taken literally, so also with jīva-ātman unity. In Advaita Vedānta the identity of limited self and supreme Self cannot be obtained to the degree that the jīva is a product of superimposition; ātman is not identical with jīva as jīva.¹⁴

Śāṅkara sometimes identifies ātman and jīva in the very same terms as Brahman and world, treating the jīva just as he does the illusory world. The two-fold nature of the world-experient, who is both limited and unlimited and both jīva and ātman, parallels

the nature of objective experience which is neither entirely real nor entirely unreal and is indescribable (anirvacanīya) as either real or unreal:

It should be understood that this jīva-self is merely a false appearance, i.e., reflection of the Highest Self, similar to the reflection of the sun in water. It is neither the Highest Self actually na sa eva sākṣāt, nor is it quite a different entity altogether.

- BSB 2.3.50, trans. Gambhirananda

Śaṅkara's remarks above may be contrasted with Utpala's view that the manifest world is actually and directly Śiva Himself (sākṣāt śiva eva sarvam).¹⁵ They do not, however, substantiate Kaw's contention that there is no place for "practical life" in Śaṅkara's system of Vedānta. Kaw interprets Śaṅkara's references to the māyā-world as false and illusory to mean that the world-illusion disappears in a cloud of sublation like an elephant which suddenly vanishes in a magician's disappearing act:

While in Advaita the manifestations are unreal appearances caused by error, those in Pratyabhijñā are real facts of experience. The experiences of the former constitute the very nature of Śiva and do not cease after being 'recognized,' whereas, in the latter, these are wrong perceptions or illusion (bhrānti) and must therefore cease after the knowledge of the real background is achieved.¹⁶

We will later return to the distinction between realizing the world is illusory, i.e. realizing that the snake is really a rope, and recognizing the world to really be Śiva.¹⁷ But even in MKB, which contains Śaṅkara's most radical ajātivāda theories, every illusion is said to be based on reality. The snake has the rope as its grounding in reality, and all the illusions of the world find their substratum in the non-dual, non-changing Brahman.

Even when the illusion is destroyed, the non-illusory substratum continues to exist by the very fact of its being non-illusory. No illusion can be perceived that is without a substratum. - MKB 2.32-33, trans. Gambhirananda

It is unclear exactly why Kaw believes that the world is any less a "fact of experience" for Śāṅkara than for the Śaivites. It will be remembered that Śāṅkara denied that objects are experienced "as if" external and said that external objects are not non-existent because they are directly experienced. The snake is seen as a snake, with all its fright-causing potential; it is not experienced "as if" a snake or as the illusory superimposition of a snake.¹⁸

The Advaita principle of the self-validity of all knowledge (svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda) presumes that all knowledge is intrinsically valid and true.¹⁹ All worldly experiences, even dreams, are real on their own level until shown to be otherwise.²⁰ Utpala also says that knowledge is self-proven (jñānaṁ svataḥ-siddham)²¹; but in Utpala's case, though, knowledge is unsublatable and proven to be ultimately real. Śāṅkara does regard all worldly knowledge as sublutable, and he seeks its sublation. However, Śāṅkara does not at all mean to say that the world, even if false, is experienced as false by the limited subject.

Abhinava and Utpala: World Experience

Despite Kaw's oversimplification of Śāṅkara's illusionism, the Advaitin's distinction between reality and appearance is firmly opposed to Utpala's doctrine that everything is equally

real. Surprisingly enough, Kaw's distinction between illusionism and realism roughly approximates the differences between Abhinava and Utpala, rather than Vedānta and Pratyabhijñā.

Like Śāṅkara, Abhinava uses reflectionist metaphors to describe the relationship between the Supreme and world manifestations. He also presents theories of superimposition and sublation. Abhinava's remarks concerning limited objects being not different from nor the same as prakāśa may be seen as an anirvācānīya formulation similar to Śāṅkara's. That Abhinava distinguishes reality from appearance cannot be doubted; one need only note his references to the world as illusory and to empirical error as "a pustule on a boil." Abhinava, in fact, is as likely as Śāṅkara to be interpreted as supposing the everyday-world to be fictitious.

As already noted, if Utpala is a realist at all, he is a very strange sort of one. His conclusion is indeed that everything is real, yet his approach to the object-world is anything but realistic. In his approach to the world, though, Utpala tolerates no mention of illusion and squashes all distinctions between reality and appearance. His arguments are directed against Vedānta, but they are equally applicable to the theories of Abhinava.

Anticipating Kaw, Utpala oversimplifies, if not misinterprets, the position of Advaita Vedānta when attacking the views of the Brahmavādins.²² Thus the differences between

Utpala's brand of realism and Abhinava's and Śaṅkara's illusionism may not be so completely irreconcilable as might be gathered by the length and vehemence of Utpala's arguments against illusionism. But the similarities between passages of Abhinava's works and the theories of Śaṅkara are certainly striking, as are the corresponding points of divergence between Abhinava and Utpala.

CHAPTER VII
IS ABHINAVA A CRYPTO-VEDĀNTIN?

From the material presented thus far, it might easily be assumed that Abhinava's sympathies lie wholeheartedly with Advaita Vedānta and that his theories represent an attempt to reconstrue Utpala's position in a Vedāntin light. The question of Abhinava's being a crypto-Vedāntin--i.e., a Pratyabhijñāvādin in name only--is a serious one. An affirmative answer to the question would deny Abhinava credit for any significant degree of originality in his thinking; it would also place Abhinava's philosophy in complete opposition to the Pratyabhijñā tradition to which he belongs.

But in order for Abhinava to be regarded as a crypto-Vedāntin, it must be shown that he accepts the Vedānta view of supreme consciousness as completely unqualified, and not just the Vedānta view of the world as illusory. Abhinava does not do that. There are many statements by Abhinava which are typically Kashmir Śaivite and in complete agreement with the theories of Utpala, that show significant differences between his philosophy and that of Śaṅkara. And in discussing the causal relationship between supreme consciousness and manifestation, Abhinava even directly refutes the philosophy of Śaṅkara.

Abhinava's Arguments Against Vedānta

In IPK 2.4.19 Utpala denies that the Sāṃkhya prakṛti can be a causal agent. In his commentary, Abhinava defines the agent of an act of transformation (pariṇāma) as "characterized by freedom to assume multifarious changes which are constantly taking place,"¹ and thus being differentiated (bhinna) through the different forms which arise and non-differentiated (abhinna) through the oneness of its nature. The prakṛti of Sāṃkhya cannot be a causal agent, because it is inert, a unitary substance, an objective thing indicated as "this" and an object of knowledge.

But both unity and difference are found in that which does not fall to the state of being the object of knowledge, but, which, because it is of the nature of light of consciousness, has only one essential characteristic, namely, "Cit," and which is pure svaccham.² - IPV II, p. 177, trans. Pandey

The word svaccham means "clear" as well as "pure," and this passage serves as an introduction to a discourse on reflectionism. It is difficult to understand how the One is manifested as many if not by entering the object-state, and Abhinava's subsequent analogy involves such objects as mirrors and mountains. Moreover, the confusion inherent in possessing contradictory natures, such as diversity and non-diversity, is not resolved at all by ascribing them to a sentient subject rather than an inert object. The unitary Supreme, without any change in its own nature (akhaṇḍitasvabhāva) is said to be the cause of the world of multiplicity which is ever non-different from its own nature

(sadā svātmārūpa). Abhinava recognizes the difficulty in conceiving of such a proposition, and he explains that the freedom of Mahesvara is such that He indeed "does that which is very difficult to do."³

Although the cause of world manifestations must be sentient and not inert, Abhinava adds that not just any definition of consciousness will meet the specifications of causality. Śiva can be possessed of diverse characteristics (blue and yellow) and even contradictory ones (blue and not-blue), but the Vedāntin's Brahman has no definable characteristics whatsoever. It is the purity (śuddhatva) of Brahman--its lack of freedom--to which Abhinava objects in his depreciatory references to the Vedāntin theory of consciousness.

If it were pure and unqualified nirviśesa consciousness then it could not be the cause of determinate shining because it is the same in regard to yellow, etc.

- IPV I, p. 157, trans. Pandey

Cit without svātantryam, though, like the consciousness viññāna called Brahman, is incapable of entering into multiple forms.

- IPV II, p. 180, trans. Pandey

It would seem that Abhinava himself is trying to do "that which is very difficult" in proposing that the Supreme is the causal agent of the object world and, at the same time, that the Supreme never abandons the oneness of its reality. Śaṅkara can very appropriately object, "One half the hen is cooked while the other half is laying eggs."⁴ The Advaitin agrees that Brahman is incapable of manifesting itself as multiple forms. But any such propensity on the part of the Supreme is wholly

unacceptable to Śāṅkara, since Brahman is to be realized as unitary consciousness, and not as object or multiplicity.

In the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya an objector takes a stand similar to that of Abhinava above. In his response to this objection Śāṅkara refuses to attribute world-manifestations to the power of the Supreme, and he explains them as due to the ignorance of the limited selves:

Objector: Brahman is equipped with various powers and propensities for creating effects [anekaśaktipravṛttiyuktam], so that its oneness and manifoldness are both necessarily and equally true . . . just as the sea as sea is one, yet considered in its aspect as foam, waves, etc., it is manifold.

Śāṅkara: The unity of Brahman is the only one and the highest truth . . . its (so-called) manifoldness is merely the display of false-ignorance [mithyajñānavijṛmbhitam]. For if both were to be true, how could a person observed to be involved in phenomenal worldly existence be said to bank on falsehood? - BSB 2.1.14, trans. Apte

Śāṅkara is asking, then, in what sense is the jīva deluded, ignorant of his being ātman? If the māyā-world is itself a manifestation of the power of the Supreme, then how does the jīva realize the unitary reality of the Transcendent Supreme, or what purpose would he have in even striving to do so?

The argument may be continued by presenting the only section in IPV which contains a lengthy confrontation between Abhinava and Śāṅkara. Abhinava's remarks are not prompted by anything said by Utpala, since the kārikā makes no mention of Vedāntins.

Brahmavādin: The sentient cidrūpa Self is really one, and all this multiplicity⁵ is due to the trouble of Māyā or Avidyā.

Abhinava: Then you cannot explain 'to whom does this Avidyā belong?' It cannot be the characteristic of the Brahman, because He is simply pure consciousness vidyaikarūpa, and in reality vastutah there is no limited soul, etc., to whom this may belong. - IPV II, p. 179, trans. Pandey

The question is a difficult one for an Advaitin to answer and poses one of the basic problems about Advaita theory. In the text the Brahmavādin is given no chance to reply. If pressed to provide a brief answer, one might say that māyā "belongs" to Brahman in terms of ontological dependency; Śāṅkara's refusal to allow the māyā-world any independent reality implies its dependence upon Brahman. Avidyā, as an epistemological concept or false judgment, belongs to the jīva—although not "in reality," if that means in the highest reality (pāramārthikam).

But little of Śāṅkara's philosophy can be understood if limited to the categories of real and unreal, i.e., Brahman and hare-horns. Utpala ignores this in attacking the Vedāntins for their declaring the world unreal. ⁶ Abhinava, though, also considers Śāṅkara's anirvācāniya formulation, i.e., the world not being describable as either real or unreal:

If you [the Brahmavādin] say that Avidyā is inexplicable [anirvācya], we cannot understand to whom is it so? If you say that the idea present in your mind when you say it is indescribable is that it cannot be explained with reasons; I would say, what can be the reasoning which disregards our experience and what strange improbability (of existence) can there be of one that is shining [bhāsanasya]?

- IPV II, p. 180, trans. Pandey

It is well worth noting that in Advaita Vedānta it is Brahman-consciousness that "shines" as self-manifest, and the object-world merely "appears"; the root bhās may be used in both ways. This is a distinction which Abhinava himself draws in calling the world "mere manifestation" (ābhāsamātra),⁷ yet Abhinava here defends the undeniable reality of world-experience in a manner quite similar to that of Utpala.

If you say that the Brahman is Sat and shines indeterminately as a unity, that this multiplicity is due only to the act of determination [vikalpa], then to whom does the act of determination belong? If you say, "to the Brahman," then He becomes associated with Avidyā (and ceases to be omniscient). For there is in reality no other (to whom Avidyā may belong). - IPV II, p. 180, trans. Pandey

The same question again, though one wonders how Abhinava persists at it. For if there be any ignorance in the world at all - and there certainly is according to Abhinava, then that ignorance is of necessity most intimately associated with Śiva. But unlike Śāṅkara, Abhinava lays no claim to the Supreme's being absolutely unqualified.

Abhinava concludes his arguments against Vedānta by saying that the appearance of consciousness as multiplicity is only possible if there is freedom characterized by capacity for action (kartr̥tvalakṣaṇa svātantrya).⁸ Utpala also contrasted the active nature of Śiva-consciousness (prakāśa-vimarśa) to the passive nature of Brahman-consciousness, prakāśa devoid of vimarśa. Kṣemarāja's summary of the difference between Vedānta and Pratyabhijñā can then apply to both Utpala and Abhinava:

The word svatantra denotes supreme power as of the essence of consciousness and distinguishes it as different from Vedānta.⁹ - PH, p. 38

Śāṅkara: Unqualified Brahman

Śāṅkara denies that any qualities (viśeṣa-s) at all may be attributed to the qualitless (nirviśeṣa) Brahman. The creative aspects of Brahman are regarded in Advaita Vedānta as accidental (taṭastha) properties which are distinct from the essential (svarūpa) definition of the Supreme.¹⁰ The most common definition of Brahman is being-consciousness-bliss (sat-cit-ānanda).

Sat represents the ontological principle, the unsublatable existential substratum of all subjects and objects. Pure subjectivity of awareness, the pure witness aspect of consciousness, is denoted by cit. Śāṅkara equates being and consciousness and says that there is no mutual exclusion of one from the other.

Brahman is to be realized as one who exists asti iti upalabdavya. . . Brahman cannot be only Being and not Consciousness, though, for how could He then be taught to be the Self of the conscious jīva? - BSB 3.2.21, trans. Apte

But Brahman must not be thought of as an agent (kartr) involved in the activities of the everyday-world. Even the jīva, in his true nature as ātman, is not an agent.¹¹ In Śāṅkara's view, ascribing agency to consciousness is equatable with contending that the Supreme is subject to the duality and limitations of the everyday-world.¹²

Ānanda, bliss, is the third member of the sat-cit-ānanda triad. The fullness of Brahman's bliss in Advaita is the inner-directed and self-contained repose of śānti,¹³ never overflowing and always resting within the Self. Even if ānanda is to be viewed as something positive, not mere absence of sorrow, Śāṅkara warns against its being confused with the specific characteristic of happiness (sukhalakṣaṇa-viśeṣa), which is only imagined on the qualitless (nirviśeṣa) Self.¹⁴ Sankara also says that the Brahman which is of the nature of bliss must be a lower-order Brahman, since qualification (viśeṣa) implies modification (vikāra), and "even the tiniest bit of qualification should not be resorted to."¹⁵

All positive characterizations of Brahman ultimately serve only to affirm qualities which are denials of their opposites.¹⁶ The best Advaita characterization of the Supreme is that it is not-this, not-this (neti, neti).¹⁷ This via negativa safeguards the Brahman from the limitations inherent in predication; it also establishes the Brahman's essential unrelatedness to any other form of experience.¹⁸

Abhinava: Attributes of Śiva-Consciousness

Abhinava describes Śiva-consciousness such that much more than a tiny bit of qualification seems to adhere to the Highest Self. While Śāṅkara specifically denies that the Self is a substance with attributes (na dravyaṁ dharmi),¹⁹ Abhinava ana-

lyzes the relationship between unity and plurality in those very terms.

IPK 1.5.12 begins with the statement that the Self is consciousness (ātma ata eva caitanya).²⁰ Abhinava explains that caitanya stands for a word which indicates the attributes of the Self (dharma-vācaka-upalakṣaṇa) and that the Self is a substance possessed of attributes (dharmisvabhāva-dravya). Dravya is defined as "that, resting in which, all objects shine."

Don't be angry, but . . . because the primary nature of the Self is vimarśa . . . the Self is the primary substance, the substance, the substratum, resting in which all the categories, elements, beings and worlds shine.

- IPV I, p. 201,
trans. Pandey

Abhinava quite properly cautions us against becoming angry. For what he is saying is that everything in the world is an attribute of the Self, and that any word at all may be used to indicate the nature of the Self.

Ānanda is said by Abhinava to be the chief form (mukhyaṁ rūpam)²¹ of the Supreme--not merely a lower order form of consciousness. Just as he does with vimarśa, Abhinava defines ānanda as both:

1. the absolute unity, changelessness and self-containment of the Supreme (svātmaviśrānti)²², and
2. freedom and supreme power (paramaiśvarya)²³

Abhinava makes many statements based on this assumption of freedom of consciousness which are quite in accord with the theories of Utpalā. For example:

Śiva's freedom is that he assumes plurality from the state of unity, and from plurality resumes his unitary state.

- IPV I, p. 31, trans. Pandey

There is no doubt about it that the Self, which is omnipotent, manifests itself. It is free in its manifestation, therefore there is no form in which it does not manifest itself.

- IPV I, p. 36, trans. Pandey

Abhinava's remarks may be construed as an elaboration upon the notion that the Self is the substratum of all. This is not opposed to the theories of Śaṅkara, who believes that everything is grounded on the underlying reality of Brahman. However, Abhinava also seems to be saying that the world is a real attribute or mode of the Supreme and that multiplicity of manifestation is part of the essential nature of the Supreme--not superimposed through ignorance.

Māyā as the Power of the Supreme

P. T. Raju makes an interesting, although misleading, observation concerning the power of the Supreme in Pratyabhijñā and Vedānta. It seems that Raju thinks the answer to the question of Abhinava's being a crypto-Vedāntin is yes. For in a reference to Śaṅkara's influence on non-vedic schools of thought, Raju says:

The followers of the Kashmir school of Śaivism such as Vasugupta and Abhinava Gupta, who were definitely influenced by Śaṅkara, accepted his non-dualism intact, with the proviso that māyā, as the incomprehensible power of Brahman, was real. And now and then, for argument's sake, they even admitted Śaṅkara's position, thereby implying that this kind of formulation is of secondary importance when we accept the fact that māyā is a śakti of ultimate reality and is identical with it.²⁴

The paragraph is not easy to understand, and there are several problems with it. Unfortunately, Raju provides no substantiation of his remarks and mentions Kashmir Śaivism only briefly in passing.

First, there is the assumption that Vasugupta was influenced by Śaṅkara. This is probably unprovable, since the Śivasūtra-s of Vasugupta are presented as religious revelation and emphasize practical methodology rather than metaphysical speculation. Even if we ignore the mention of Vasugupta, we find a more formidable problem in Raju's contention that differences between Abhinava and Śaṅkara revolve around a real power--illusory power proviso. Finally, it is not at all obvious that, as Raju seems to be saying, Abhinava and Śaṅkara share the premise of māyā being the power of the Supreme.²⁵

Sankara uses the word māyā in a variety of contexts--not merely in the sense of the illusoriness of the phenomenal world. He uses the word to indicate:

1. The power or nature of the Supreme--The manifest world is non-independent (avyatirikta)²⁶ and non-different (ananya)²⁷ from Brahman. To the extent that Śaṅkara addresses himself at all to questions of world causality, his non-dualism and adherence to satkāryavāda²⁸ allow for no cause other than Brahman.

2. The illusory, dream-like quality of the world--This is to distinguish the reality of Brahman from the unreality

(asatyatva)²⁹ of world manifestations. The inviolable purity of the Supreme is free of any contamination by the limitations of the māyā-world. Referring to the illusory nature of the world serves to contrast the sublatale world of appearance and the unsublatable reality of Brahman.

3. The inexplicability of the relationship between the Supreme and the world--Śaṅkara demonstrates that the very question of the relationship between Brahman and the world is illegitimate and impossible of answer.³⁰ A relationship implies two distinct things to be related. From the bird's eye view of Brahman-consciousness, the question of the nature of the world and its relationship to Brahman does not even arise. The question only arises from the worm's eye view of limited consciousness, where there is no pure Brahman which requires to be related to the world.

The notion of the Supreme being endowed with power (śakta) is essentially incompatible with the via negativa of Advaita. The first two of the above formulations (the power of the Supreme and the illusory world) are primarily used in a negative manner by Śaṅkara respectively to demonstrate that the world is neither completely unreal nor completely real. The third formulation, māyā as anirvacanīya, incorporates the other two and is brought into greatest prominence by Śaṅkara. The inexplicableness of world phenomena is of overriding importance, since it means that all attempts at explaining the world or its relationship with Brahman are unsatisfactory.

Each of these three meanings of māyā is found in the theories of Abhinava. He uses the illusory nature of the world in much the same manner as Śaṅkara does to demonstrate the distinctions between levels of reality, between reality and appearance. As has already been noted, Abhinava's description of the manifest world as being neither identical to nor different from supreme consciousness is comparable to Śaṅkara's anirvacanīya formulation.³¹ However, Abhinava's use of supreme power as an ultimate and satisfying explanation of world manifestations distinguishes his position from Śaṅkara's.

According to Śaṅkara, the māyā-world and its relationship to the Supreme is indescribable. Abhinava would agree that world manifestations cannot be explained logically. But Abhinava does not agree that the question of the relationship between Supreme and world is unanswerable. He answers all such questions by referring to the power of the Supreme. In saying that "Śiva does that which is very difficult to do," Abhinava acknowledges the paradoxical nature of Śiva-consciousness, which both rests within itself and does not rest within itself; at the same time, he is also affirming the essential relatability and relatedness of Śiva and the māyā-world.

This point may be clarified by examining a passage of IPV which includes elements of both Utpala's and Śaṅkara's theories:

Vimarśa, free consciousness, is all-powerful, identifies itself with others, denies itself, merges both into one, and denies both which have been merged into one.³²

- IPV I p. 205, trans. Pandey

Abhinava is here describing various levels of consciousness, from the limited self to Supreme Self. In Abhinava's conception of the Supreme, unity and multiplicity are not merged into one another, nor do they stand apart from one another. "Identifies itself with others" and "denies itself" respectively represent the superimposition of Self on non-self and non-self on Self. "Merging both into one" corresponds to Utpala's emphasis upon the unity of subject and object in their identity as non-differentiated prakāśa. But Abhinava also adds that the unity of consciousness involves a subordination (nyagbhāva) of the apparently distinct elements of the manifest world; like Śāṅkara, he portrays the reality of a unity which transcends the mere appearance of multiplicity.

On the other hand, all the above verbs--"identifies," "denies," "merges"--denote processes which apply to the active subjectivity of consciousness. According to Śāṅkara, the Supreme "is" (is to be realized as existent) but does not do anything. Vimarśa, the activity of consciousness, is the means whereby Abhinava associates unity with the objects of the māyā-world as they figure in consciousness joined together as one.

Returning now to Raju's assessment of Abhinava and Śāṅkara, we find that it is at least partially correct: it is true that the illusoriness or reality of supreme power is

secondary to the more basic question of whether the world-process can be at all regarded as part of the essential nature of the Supreme. But Raju contends that differences between Abhinava and Śāṅkara can be easily resolved, by accepting one minor condition--namely, the proviso that māyā, as the incomprehensible power of Brahman, is real. Raju thus erroneously assumes that Abhinava and Sankara are in agreement as to "the fact that maya is a śakti of ultimate reality."

Actually, the difference between illusory power and real power should be used to differentiate Abhinava's position from Utpala's, not from Śāṅkara's. That Abhinava's philosophy differs from Utpala's--of that there can be no doubt. Equally certain is the fact that Abhinava is not "a Vedāntin in disguise," subverting his predecessor's views. Central to both Utpala's and Abhinava's philosophy is the idea of power being part of the essential nature of the Supreme and also being the explanation of the relationship between the Supreme and the world. Such a notion is at most peripheral, and often antithetical to the theories of Śāṅkara. Abhinava ascribes to consciousness a freedom of action which, as Kṣemarāja says, "distinguishes it as different from Vedānta," and which, as we have seen, is a distinction of major importance between Abhinava and Śāṅkara.

CHAPTER VIII

PARINĀMA AND VIVARTA

By presenting Abhinava's arguments against Vedānta, we have distinguished his position as different from Śāṅkara's as well as Utpala's. In doing so, we have also found two divergent trends within Abhinava's philosophy: the first following the precedents of Pratyabhijñā tradition with respect to the world being of the nature of supreme consciousness; the second following the via negativa of Advaita Vedānta in denying the ultimate reality of world manifestations. One might simply stop at this point, concluding that Abhinava joins the views of Utpala and Śāṅkara, forming a new combination of Pratyabhijñā and Vedānta. But that would not help to explain the combination of theories which Abhinava has seized upon, or to make any sense of his philosophy as a whole.

There is what has been called "a tendency to compromise"¹ among Indian thinkers. Indian philosophers often find no difficulty in absorbing extraneous material into their own system. However, we have been seeing that Abhinava's philosophy makes little sense if it is viewed as merely a combination of Pratyabhijñā and Vedānta elements, or as the philosophy of Utpala to which are attached certain of Śāṅkara's theories. Abhinava's position is best understood by considering it as part of the development of Pratyabhijñā philosophy out of the basic

tenets of Kashmir Śaiva monism—a development that will be described below in terms of a shift from a parināma to a vivarta theory of causation.

There are two sources which, although historically far removed from each other and from Abhinava, provide interesting perspectives of Abhinava's position vis-à-vis Utpala and Śaṅkara. First we will turn to the Pañcadaśī of Vidyāraṇya, a fourteenth century Vedāntin. Pañcadaśī is relevant to the issues at hand because, allowing for differences in terminology, one can extract from the treatise theories quite in accord with the views of Utpala or Śaṅkara. Also, Vidyāraṇya outlines a compromise between parināmavāda and vivartavāda which suggests that Abhinava's illusionism is not completely incompatible with the theories of Utpala.

The relationship between parināmavāda and vivartavāda will then be further explored by referring to the Grammarian philosophy of Bhartṛhari (ca. 650 A.D.) and, more specifically, to Gaurinath Shastri's contemporary analysis of Bhartṛhari's philosophy. Shastri assesses Bhartṛhari's philosophy as being dominated by the very same difficulty as Utpala's--namely, a unitary and transcendent Supreme which transforms itself into an equally real manifest world. In his attempt to deal with the problem, Shastri demonstrates that in any non-dualistic system there is a logical tendency to distinguish between levels of reality. Shastri reinterprets Bhartṛhari in a vivartavāda manner much as Abhinava does with Utpala.

Vidyāraṇya: A Combination of Utpala's and Śaṅkara's Views

The Pañcadaśī of Vidyāraṇya² is a general manual of Advaita Vedānta, whose position in the school is comparable to that of Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam in Kashmir Śaivism. Just as Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam summarizes Āgama as well as Pratyabhijñā theories, Pañcadaśī is a general compendium of Advaita Vedānta, based not only on the writings of Śaṅkara, which are themselves liable to a wide variety of interpretations, but on a broad spectrum of Upaniṣadic philosophies also. Without any attempt at resolving the apparent incompatibility of the two viewpoints, Vidyāraṇya juxtaposes:

1. descriptions of māyā as the creative force of Brahman, the world as a modification of Brahman, and
2. remarks more proper to an Advaita Vedāntin on the superimposition and illusion of the maya-world, along with repeated references to the unqualified Brahman as pure witnessing consciousness (sākṣin).

An example of the first tendency is Vidyāraṇya's lengthy exposition on the nature of bliss (ānanda) as the creative tendency of Brahman, as the idea, "Let me be and not cease to be."³ The world is said to be not different from bliss, and Vidyāraṇya describes the all-embracing projection of Brahman's bliss⁴ in terms similar to the vimarśa of Pratyabhijñā:

All beings are born of bliss and live by it, and are finally reabsorbed into it, there is therefore no doubt that Brahman is bliss. - PD 11.13, trans. H. P. Shastri

Vidyāraṇya also extols the wondrous power of māyā, which manifests the phenomenal world without in any way affecting the real nature of the Supreme:

How powerful māyā is. As fluidity is the nature of water, heat of fire and hardness of stone, so the making of the impossible possible is the nature of māyā.⁵

- PD 6.134-135, trans. H. P. Shastri

Vidyāraṇya, much more so than Śāṅkara, clearly contends that māyā, whatever its ontological status, "belongs" to Brahman. This may be seen in his use of the terms śaktimān and śakti, the powerful and the power.⁶ Through His māyā (svamāyayā), says Vidyāraṇya, the Supreme Self becomes the world, entering into it as jīva.⁷ And among his numerous citations from the Upaniṣads, Vidyāraṇya even quotes the Śvetāśvatara, which is notably theistic and dedicated to Śiva:

This māyā, which rests unmanifest in the immutable Brahman, subsequently undergoes many modifications. Māyā is prakṛti, and the Supreme Lord is the ruler of māyā.⁸

- PD 13.66, trans. H. P. Shastri

On the other hand, Vidyāraṇya draws upon the writings of Śāṅkara in describing māyāśakti and its products as anirvacanīya-- neither identical to nor different from Brahman,⁹ neither existent nor non-existent.¹⁰

From the viewpoint of the ignorant, māyā is assumed to exist, for the illumined it is insignificant, and empirical reason establishes its indefinability.

- PD 6.130, trans. H. P. Shastri

Reflectionist metaphors (e.g., a face in a mirror, the sun in water) are used to illustrate the differentiation of the Self into cidābhāsa, which is the limited manifestation of māyā. The

cidābhāsa is said to be a changing and vanishing detail in the magic show of the world.¹¹

The Witness [sākṣin] itself is unchanging, and one comes to realize the unreality of cidābhāsa and its separateness from the Supreme. - PD 7.218, trans. H. P. Shastri

The unchanging nature of Brahman is used to demonstrate that the association of Brahman with the world is unreal. Brahman is said to be associationless (asaṅgacidvabhū) and incapable of agency, because it is beyond time, space and causation.¹² In surprising contrast to his descriptions of māyā as wondrous power, Vidyāraṇya sharply distinguishes the purity of Brahman-consciousness from the agency of the manifest world:

A courtesan suffering from a certain disease is ashamed to demonstrate her charms to a lover who is acquainted with her condition. Similarly cidābhāsa is ashamed to consider himself as the agent.

- PD 7.238, trans. H. P. Shastri

It is difficult to reconcile the divergent patterns of thought which are introduced in Pañcadaśī. Within the writings of Śaṅkara one can relegate his discussions of māyā as the power of the Supreme to the level of a practical or popular truth, rather than the highest reality. In Pañcadaśī no such approach is possible, and the two streams of thought outlined above are randomly interspersed. Vidyāraṇya adopts positions which parallel those of both Utpala and Śaṅkara, but he never manages to integrate effectively his theories into a cohesive and consistent philosophy. Abhinava, four centuries earlier than Vidyāraṇya, did manage to do so. For Abhinava did more than

just include and adopt Vedānta theories; he reconciled and syncretized them with Utpala's philosophy.

Pariṇāma and Vivarta

In his discussion of causation, Vidyāraṇya defines vivarta as the appearance of a different state (avasthāntarabhānam), like the rope-snake or a magic-show created by a magician.¹³ This is contrasted to pariṇāma, where one thing is actually transformed (pariṇamita) into another, e.g., milk into curds, clay into pot and gold into ring.¹⁴ Vidyāraṇya goes on, however, to use the clay analogy to demonstrate vivarta:

The pot is produced from clay by a Śakti . . . the pot is not different from the clay because it has no separate existence . . . is not identical with the clay because it does not exist when the clay is in a lump.

Products such as the pot, though visible, are everchanging . . . subject to destruction . . . merely names . . . The knowledge of the substratum, clay [or Brahman], destroys the idea of the reality of the pot [or world], but not its appearance [ābhāsa].

The appearance of the pot is illusory [vivartatvam] because there is no abandonment of the nature of the clay.

- PD 13.30-48, trans. H. P. Shastri

Unlike milk irretrievably transformed into curds, which is only pariṇāma, Vidyāraṇya claims that the gold-ring and clay-pot are illustrative of both pariṇāma and vivarta, since the substratum is never changed and may be retrieved by smashing the pot or melting the ring.¹⁵ But the dissolution of the effect back into its cause also applies to the universal destruction (pralaya) of the Sāṃkhya prakṛti; it is indicative of the impermanence of

the world and not the unaffectedness of the substratum. Śaṅkara, in fact, uses the gold-to-ring transformation as an example of mutation (vikāra).¹⁶

If the non-abandonment of the substratum were the only criterion for admission to the school of vivartavāda, Utpala's philosophy would certainly qualify. Utpala never even questions, let alone abandons, the unity of Śiva-consciousness. However, these analogies of clay and gold are truly illustrative of vivartavāda only to the extent that the pot and the ring are regarded as "merely names"¹⁷ --a point which remains highly doubtful in the case of Utpala.

Vidyāraṇya's classification of "both pariṇāma and vivarta" nevertheless provides a convenient category in which to place Utpala's theory of causation. Such a placement can be but partly justified by his not clearly espousing either pariṇānavāda or vivartavāda. It is also supported by the fact that Śivadr̥ṣṭi and the IP Kārikā-s are preceded in Kashmir Śaivism by the pariṇāma-like tattva theory of evolution and are followed by a theory of causation very much akin to vivartavāda in the writings of Abhinava.

As noted earlier,¹⁸ the tattva system represents a pariṇāma view of world evolution and plays a major role in the Śaiva Āgamas where the process of creation is so important. However, the categories of manifestation are more suited to a dualistic system such as Śaiva Siddhānta than to the monism of Kashmir

Śaivism. If the Supreme itself actually evolves into the manifest world, then its independence and perfection are severely compromised. In Śaiva Siddhānta, for example, it is said that Śiva uses śakti as a material cause and māyā as an instrumental cause; the result is that, although individual souls and the material world are pervaded by Śiva, there is only inseparability and not oneness (ekatva).

Utpala insists upon absolute oneness and rejects not only differences between ātman and jīva, but all other gradations of reality as well. Because of this, he denies the separate reality of every category of cosmic activity and makes only perfunctory use of the tattva system. Utpala nonetheless specifically refers to the process of world manifestation as a transformation of supreme consciousness, i.e., the Supreme actually assumes the form of multiplicity in giving rise to the māyā-world.

Parameśvara fashions by Himself His own self in the form of diverse objects.¹⁹ - SD 4.47 comm.

Multiplicity is the action which follows temporal sequence of the One Self. Thus the Self becomes a causal agent through the process of transformation (pariṇamattayā).²⁰
- IPK 2.4.18

An objector in SD asks if the pariṇāma formulation means that Śiva's oneness is non-existent when He is manifested as multiplicity. Utpala replies that Śiva's oneness ever remains, just as a hand remains a hand whether clenched in a fist or seen as outstretched fingers; there is no destruction (vināśa) of

the cause in the process of producing an effect, only non-manifestation (anabhiyakti) of the substratum.²¹

The objector then asks if manifestations of Śiva's oneness at one time and non-manifestation at another is not a serious fault, indicating a rather fickle nature on the part of the Supreme. Utpala replies that non-manifestation of the unchanging substratum is simply due to the incapability of our senses (indriyāsāmarthya), which hides from us the fact that Śiva ever remains in his essence as He really is.²² Utpala seems to be saying that the pariṇāma view of causality is itself based on the inadequacy of our senses. The changing names and forms of the manifest world are perceived--that is, misperceived--such as to lead us to the misapprehension that causality involves a change in nature and that Śiva is Himself subject to the changes of the everyday-world.

Utpala does not depend, as does Abhinava, on the illusoriness of world manifestations for his defense of the non-modification of the Supreme. He does, however, deviate from pariṇāma in his stress upon the non-modification of the cause and in his treatment of causality as subjective, with manifestation being the external projection of what is internal. Utpala encounters many difficulties in explaining his theories on the basis of objective analogies, such as gold or clay. He then reverts to the example of yogic creation, which is more of a scale model than an analogy. Although Utpala approaches world manifestation

as a real process of externalization and concretization, yogic creation is not so very different in form and intent from the familiar Vedānta example of the magician and his magic show. In both cases the yogin or magician is sufficient unto himself for manifestation and does not change in the process of manifestation.

Kaw's confusing classification of Pratyabhijñā's theory of manifestation has already been mentioned.²³ Kaw not only says that Pratyabhijñā "maintains pariṇāma-vāda with some modification" and "accepts vivartavāda in a slightly altered form," but he also declares that "the two theories are not much different."²⁴ It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Abhinava's view of the world-process, viz., illusory superimposition and sublation, is remarkably similar to Śaṅkara's. Abhinava's consistent use of reflectionist metaphors alone suggests the attachment of a vivarta label to his views. It is Utpala who maintains pariṇāma-vāda with some modification. Those modifications constitute a step away from the pariṇāma background of the Āgamas and, to some extent, even anticipate the vivartavāda of Abhinava. One need not, as does Kaw, ignore the differences between pariṇāma-vāda and vivartavāda. The corresponding differences between the positions of Utpala and Abhinava may be seen as part of the development of Kashmir Śaivism as a whole, rather than viewed in terms of conflict.

The pariṇāma aspects of Utpala's theories are perhaps only vestiges of Āgama dualism, incompatible with Vasugupta's introduction of absolute monism into Kashmir Śaivism. But the development from pariṇānavāda to vivartavāda is not merely a historical pattern--not merely the way Pratyabhijñā happened to be expounded under the successive dominance of Somānanda, Utpala and Abhinava. There is a logical pattern to the development given the presuppositions of absolute monism.

From the viewpoint of Utpala, the obvious defect of a vivarta formulation is that it declares the world-product illusory. However, a vivarta formulation, much more so than any pariṇāma theory of causation, supports Utpala's contention that unitary consciousness is the sole cause of the world and ultimately identical with the world without ever ceasing to be unitary in nature. The paradoxical power of Śiva to both rest within Himself and not rest within Himself demands a philosophy which distinguishes between levels of reality. The basic difficulty in Utpala's system lies in the tension between the reality of a real unitary Supreme and an equally real multiplicity. The difficulty stems from Utpala's attempt to explain the absolute monism of Pratyabhijñā by means of the "real world"--pariṇāma metaphors of dualistic and theistic Āgamas.

Abhinava's answer to this difficulty, as seen in his divergences from the theories of Utpala, is a reasonable and natural response. The same sort of response may be seen in Gaurinath Shastri's analysis of Bhartr̥hari's Grammarian philosophy.

Bhartṛhari: A Logical Development

Bhartṛhari was the famous logician and grammarian who preceeded Śaṅkara and whose influence is seen in both Advaita Vedānta and Pratyabhijñā. Bhartṛhari's doctrines are based on the ancient theory that the world evolves from speech (vāk). The idea goes back to the mythology of the Vedas, where the Goddess Vāk is said to be the ultimate creator of the universe, and the idea is later developed metaphysically in the Pāṇinian school of grammar. In the Grammarian system as expounded by Bhartṛhari, we find a monism in which the reality of Brahman as the Absolute Word (śabdabrahman) is the basis of all world phenomena. The universe is said to be of the nature of speech (vāgātmaka), and the successive stages in the manifestation of the universe are seen as:

paśyanti--formless and undifferentiated consciousness,
 spaceless and timeless internal knowledge;
madhyamā--subtle sounds, idealized speech;
vaikhari--expressed speech, articulated by the various
 organs of speech--throat, larynx, etc.

Although most later Grammarians interpreted Bhartṛhari's philosophy along the lines of Advaita Vedānta, there is a great deal of philosophical ambiguity in Bhartṛhari's own writings. In some instances Bhartṛhari does say that the world with all its distinctions is imaginary and unreal. Elsewhere, though, he seems to say that the world is very real, and that the world-

process--viz., paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī--acts under the control of śabdabrahman. His stages of evolution for speech imply a real transformation of the Absolute Word into the manifest world. But Bhartrhari uses the terms parināma and vivarta interchangeably in his discussion of causation. All later Grammarians describe speech as divided into four stages, with Supreme Speech (paravāk) being the first and transcendent stage. It is unclear, though, whether Bhartrhari himself advocated a three-fold or four-fold division of speech.

Most of the second chapter of Śivadrsti is devoted to a discussion of the Grammarian system. Somānanda criticizes the conception of paśyantī as the ultimate metaphysical principle. Paśyantī (from the root drś, "to see") implies duality and distinction, says Somānanda, which must be absent from the transcendent Supreme.²⁵ From the Śaiva point of view, paśyantī is nothing more than the power of knowledge (jñānaśakti), which characterizes the sadāśiva category. Somānanda criticizes the association of the highest aspect of speech with the physical body to account for the rise of articulate sound.²⁶ He also objects to the contention that vaikharī is unreal or indescribable.²⁷ Somānanda and Utpala's lengthy arguments in chapter two of SD and commentary need not be gone into in detail. The prima facie position attributed to the Grammarians is at best only a partially accurate portrayal of Bhartrhari's own views.²⁸

All of SD's criticism of Bhartrhari does not lead to a rejection of the Grammarian position, but instead to a reformulation of the Grammarian doctrines in terms acceptable to the Śaivites. Somānanda and Utpala persuade their imaginary Grammarian opponent to admit that:

1. paśyantī implies both diversity and non-diversity,³⁰
2. paśyantī sees or manifests itself as different forms in the manifest world,³¹
3. all the relations of the manifest world--subject-object, action and time, etc.--depend on the Self and have no independent reality,³²
4. the phenomenal world is real,³³
5. and most importantly, parā vāk is to be conceived of as the highest form of speech, to which may be attributed the powers of will, knowledge and action in subtle forms before it is materialized in the manifest world.³⁴

At this point the Grammarian view is said to be in accord with Śaiva doctrines. And in all the works of Utpala and Abhinava the same accord is reached. Although speech is treated as but one of the principal elements of manifestation, parā vāk becomes identified with, and synonymous with Paramaśiva. Parā vāk's three-fold division into paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī is identified with Śiva's powers of will, knowledge and action.³⁵

Pratyabhijñā's acceptance of the Grammarian system actually involves not much more than an adoption of Grammarian terminology, to which Pratyabhijñā concepts are attached in various manners by the different Pratyabhijñāvādins. Even Śāṅkara accepted the Grammarian viewpoint—emphasizing, of course, its vivartavāda theories. "The theory according to which the world originates from the Absolute Word," says Śāṅkara, "is unobjectionable."³⁶

Because of the associations of the Grammarian system with the two schools, Gaurinath Shastri's analysis of Bhartr̥hari's philosophy³⁷ contains extensive comparisons with both Pratyabhijñā and Advaita Vedānta. Shastri compares Bhartr̥hari to Śāṅkara in the same terms which could be used to describe the differences between Abhinava and Śāṅkara:

So far as the world-process is concerned, Bhartr̥hari's position seems to be analogous to that of Śāṅkara, though the two philosophers may not be in agreement with regard to the nature of the Ultimate Reality.³⁸

Shastri contends that the views attributed to the Grammarians in the second chapter of SD were not really Bhartr̥hari's own views. Shastri, of course, does not take into account differences between Utpala and Abhinava in concluding that the Pratyabhijñā and Grammarian schemes are "rather identical."³⁹ Comparing Paramaśiva's power of vimarśa to paśyantī as the power of Supreme Speech, he says that in both cases the powers are "identical in essence"⁴⁰ to the Supreme. Shastri goes on, however, to distinguish the two systems by saying that Paramaśiva

and vimarśa stand in the relation of the substantive and its attribute, with the latter to be looked upon as subordinate to the former.

Thus vimarśa cannot be viewed as an independent and self-sufficient principle in the same way in which it is conceived in the system of the Grammarian. It must, however, be admitted that the difference in the conceptions of the two systems is logical rather than real.⁴¹

It is true that neither Utpala nor Abhinava ever considers supreme power as independent or self-sufficient. Utpala relates the Supreme to the world in terms of an identification which is complete and unambiguous, as in his analogies of the same water and the same gold being seen in various forms. Abhinava's vivarta analogies emphasize the dependence of the reflection on the object reflected; his discussion of the Self as the substance whose attributes are denoted by the world⁴² also implies a dependence relationship, which involves neither complete identity nor complete separateness.

For both Pratyabhijñā and the Grammarians, Shastri posits "essential identity" as the relationship obtaining between the Supreme and the world-process. Exactly what sort of a relationship is this? This principle of essential identity is used by Shastri to describe three very different types of relations: Utpala's complete identity, Abhinava's subordination of an attribute, and Bhartr̥hari's self-subsistence of an independent principle.

Shastri dismisses these differences as "logical rather than real"--a phrase which he also resorts to in his comparison of Bhartṛhari and Śaṅkara. The Grammarian-Vedāntin comparison, though, disregards the very distinction drawn by Shastri himself with respect to the greater independence of supreme power in Bhartṛhari's system.

In Śaṅkara's Vedānta the unity is absolute and unqualified, and the plurality of powers is a mere appearance which has no ultimacy. . . .

In Bhartṛhari's philosophy the plurality of powers has no independent being apart from the Absolute Word and each member of the plurality partakes of the Word as the powers are inherent in and identical with the Absolute. . . . Bhartṛhari has not declared that the powers of the Absolute are not real. On the contrary, he is unmistakably positive that the powers of the śabdabrahman are eternally present in the relation of identity.⁴³

Insisting upon the unqualified monism of Bhartṛhari's philosophy, Shastri brings us to the very contradiction found in evaluating Utpala's philosophy as a pariṇāma system—the reality of a manifold evolution which opposes the reality of the purely unitary principle of the Absolute. In Shastri's attempt to resolve this contradiction, it can be seen that vivartavāda is the necessary culmination of pariṇāmavāda viewed from a monist position.

The antinomy does not exist because the śabdabrahman and the powers are not opposed to one another but are not different at all. They are identical in essence. In fact, the conception of the two is only the outcome of our logical activity when the logical mind seeks to relate It and the World Order.⁴⁴

He [Bhartrhari] emphatically denies the ontological difference of powers. The pluralism of the powers is not a metaphysical pluralism, it is conjured into existence by the necessity of the laws of logical interpretation. So metaphysically the śabdabrahman is strictly a monistic principle and the pluralism is only [my emphasis] a logical construction serving as the prius of the phenomenal activity.⁴⁵

The "only" which I have underlined above is equivalent to the mātra which Abhinava adds to the word ābhāsa in describing the world as "mere manifestation" (ābhāsamātra).⁴⁶ Shastri's explaining away of the contradiction may also be understood in terms of a shift from pariṇāma to vivarta, with the two not being opposed to one another and the former leading the way to the latter.⁴⁷

The change from real to illusory product is clearly seen in Shastri's arguments. He first takes Bhartrhari's position literally with respect to "real powers," but he later describes the multiplicity of the world as "conjured into existence" and "not a metaphysical pluralism." Shastri's intent seems to be that of a proper Advaitin (and Abhinava as well), who turns to the epistemological as a corrective to the metaphysical. Mere logical activity is synonymous with mere phenomenal activity, which is only a euphemism for ontological unreality--i.e. "logical rather than real."

To summarize, the very same antinomy which Shastri attempts to resolve with respect to Bhartrhari is also present in Utpala's philosophy: a real unitary Supreme and an equally real world of differentiation. In defending the absolute monism

of Bhartṛhari's theories, Shastri interprets the Grammarian viewpoint as being multi-leveled. He distinguishes the reality of the One from the appearance of the many by explaining that the plurality of the manifest world is not metaphysical, but is merely a logical construction.

Abhinava provides a similar interpretation of Utpala's philosophy, which also results in a reduction in the reality of the manifest. If the difficulty common to Bhartṛhari and Utpala is deemed a serious one, then Abhinava's divergence from Utpala's position may be viewed as an acknowledgment of the inherent validity of Advaita Vedānta theories in defending absolute monism. That is, Utpala's position may be seen as defective and in need of the remedy of Advaita epistemology and vivartavāda. However, any such evaluation of the differences between Utpala and Abhinava must be qualified by the vivarta elements in Utpala's writings and also by Abhinava's traditional Śaiva regard for the world as an extension of supreme consciousness.

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS

One of the major purposes of this study has been to document and analyze the points of divergence in the philosophies of Utpala, Abhinava and Śaṅkara. We still may speak of "Pratyabhijñā philosophy" or of Pratyabhijñā and Advaita Vedānta as "non-dualistic systems," but we should do so only with a full awareness of the limitations of such categorizations. In the most general terms, Utpala and Abhinava and Śaṅkara all believe in the existence of one supreme principle of consciousness which constitutes the basis of the interaction of spiritual and material worlds as a phenomenal duality. However, any such summary of Pratyabhijñā and Advaita Vedānta obscures the most vital and interesting aspects of the three philosophers' individual theories.

The differences between Utpala and Śaṅkara are clear-cut and unambiguous. It is Abhinava's philosophy that, as the meeting-ground between the theories of Utpala and Śaṅkara, provides us with the greatest difficulties in understanding. Accordingly, Abhinava's philosophy will be taken as the focal point of this concluding chapter, which first reviews Abhinava's position relative to Utpala, and then to Śaṅkara.

Utpala and Abhinava

A summary of the premises shared by Utpala and Abhinava can be very lengthy and detailed. Particularly with respect to the aims and purposes of their philosophies, the large common ground which exists between Utpala and Abhinava may be outlined as follows:

1. Śiva is defined as prakāśavimarsā. He is described as always resting within Himself--in negative terms as nondual, timeless and unchanging. In positive terms the experiential aspect of Śiva-consciousness expresses itself through Śiva's freedom, His omnipotence and His all-pervasiveness.
2. The manifestation of the limited and differentiated world is an expression of the power of the Supreme, due to Śiva's nature as vimarsā. It is not necessary to admit the reality of an external world independent of supreme consciousness. It is also incorrect to say that the external world is the product of another entity in association with the Supreme (e.g., Brahman and māyā), for it is through the spontaneity of ultimate consciousness that the illumination of all objects is made possible.
3. Limited selves are identical with--not merely a part of, or inseparable from--Śiva, a fact which is not recognized because of the limitations of the everyday-

world. This rejects the theistic notion that the jīva is ultimately different from the Supreme.

4. Śiva's non-dual nature is not modified by the appearance of multiplicity and change. This establishes the permanency of the Self. The non-dual and non-changing aspect of Śiva's nature remains true in spite of points 2 and 3.

One might well ask, if Utpala and Abhinava's philosophies agree to such a large extent after all, then what of the differences shown between the two of them? The answer is that Utpala and Abhinava use different reasonings in support of these same doctrines and place different orders of priority upon them. By reviewing those points which Utpala and Abhinava each expend greatest effort in supporting and in defending from refutation, the differing priorities of their respective concerns can be determined.

Utpala does not entirely ignore the negative aspect of the Supreme (svātmaviśrānti), but most of his theories are directed to establishing the active freedom of Śiva-consciousness. In a number of different ways Utpala attempts to demonstrate how the subject-object experiences of the everyday-world can only be understood in terms of a direct and complete identification with the experience of supreme consciousness. He shows that there can be no reality independent of the Supreme by appealing to the oneness of all reality. He demonstrates that there is

no contradiction between Śiva-consciousness and world experience because of the impossibility of even considering any experience as apart from Śiva-consciousness or as something which may be denied by Śiva-consciousness. Utpala's concern for the total affirmation of Śiva's identity with the manifest world is, of course, diametrically opposed to the *via negativa* of Advaita Vedanta.

A contradiction arises, however, in Utpala's defense of the reality of the manifest world as experienced (yathānubhūta), which is contrary to his disregard for the distinctions inherent in its being diversely manifested and directly experienced as diversity. The confusion possibly stems from a muddling of epistemological viewpoints. The real-false distinction of the shell and silver may be invalid, or perhaps only inconsequential, from the standpoint of ultimate reality. But all discussion of vyāvahārika reality must necessarily be held on the level of vyāvahārika--which is something that Utpala refuses to do.

Although Utpala declares all experience to be undeniably real, he provides no explanation for the experience of denial itself. The transitory quality of shell-silver's reality is readily discernible in the everyday-world. In his arguments Utpala fails to furnish us with any means of distinguishing the way in which the highest reality of Śiva differs from the reality of even shell-silver or hare-horns, let alone how it differs from the reality of the everyday-world. In his avoidance of all negation

and denial, Utpala also succeeds in avoiding the question of the nature of the jīva's ignorance in the māyā-world. If water is nothing but water, then what would prompt the jīva-selves to steer a different course, or any course at all, in their navigation of the māyā-world?

Abhinava proposes a less direct identity between supreme and limited consciousness, thus lending greater credence to the negative aspects of the Supreme and to the supposed non-modification of the Supreme. He places greater priority upon the non-dual, non-changing nature of Śiva-consciousness as being transcendent, making the Supreme the substratum of manifest experience rather than directly identifiable with it. Abhinava contends that, from the true point of view, the Supreme does not actually become the world. He affirms the engagement of supreme consciousness in creating and maintaining the world only in the sense that the world is experienced as external and that we all experience ourselves as leading separate existences, i.e., not in any ultimate sense. In his rejection of the notion of a "real world," or at least Utpala's notion that everything is equally real, Abhinava actually shows a greater regard for everyday-reality than does Utpala. Although he denies its ultimate reality, Abhinava does accept the conditional reality of the everyday-world in terms of the very duality and multiplicity with which it is experienced.

Since Pratyabhijñā is presented as a path of knowledge, the distinction between freedom and bondage must be expressed in terms of a distinction between knowledge and ignorance. Utpala simply states that freedom is the viewpoint of non-diversity and bondage is the viewpoint of diversity--insisting at the same time that the two are not contradictory or opposed to each other. Abhinava distinguishes freedom and bondage as reality and appearance, respectively: reality being the undeniable truth of Śiva-consciousness which supersedes, upon recognition, the illusion superimposed by ignorance. Abhinava's distinction between reality and appearance seems justifiable. If we do not allow the experiences of the everyday-world a level on which they may be evaluated as distinct from the experience of the Supreme, then there is no point at all to considering world-experience.

It must be remembered, though, that Utpala was also familiar with Vedānta illusionism and sublation. It is not through any error of omission, but obviously a matter of choice, that Utpala fails to distinguish clearly between the experience of Śiva-consciousness and world experience as such. His choice is understandable in terms of the greater priority which he places upon the identity of the world-process and world-products with Śiva-consciousness; lesser priority is placed upon the non-modification of the Supreme. Also, Utpala thus manages to maintain a considerable portion of the traditional Śaiva belief (even

though it be the theistic tradition of the Āgamas) that the world is a real transformation of Śiva-consciousness.

A variety of explanations may be offered for Abhinava's departure from Kashmir Śaiva tradition in general as well as from the immediate precedent of Utpala: an inherent defect in Utpala's reasonings; the difficulty of defending Utpala's position against Vedānta attack; a more thorough understanding of Vedānta philosophy which led Abhinava to realize that aspects of it could be utilized to serve Pratyabhijñā purposes; or an acceptance of Vedāntin epistemology and theory of causation as necessary tools in justifying a philosophy of absolute non-dualism. Abhinava does bring the Pratyabhijñā position closer to Śaṅkara's with his greater emphasis upon the non-modification of the Supreme, which is a central concern of Advaita Vedānta; the shift from pariṇāmavāda to vivartavāda involves a corresponding shift in priorities as well. It is important to note, though, that the most likely explanations of the divergences from Utpala's position do not entail Abhinava's acceptance of Śaṅkara's philosophy as a whole.

Abhinava and Śaṅkara

The differences between Abhinava and Śaṅkara are more significant than the differences between Abhinava and Utpala, since they stem from a more fundamental disagreement concerning the nature of the Supreme. Pratyabhijñā and Vedānta both make

use of the Sāṃkhya tattva system in describing the mental and physical processes of the māyā-world. Abhinava's acceptance of Vedānta vivartavāda and elements of Vedānta epistemology is, for the most part, similarly limited to everyday-reality.

To Śāṅkara, that the pure Self is unattached to any kind of impurity is the ultimate truth, a matter to which no exception can be taken. Vedānta's most persuasive argument against either Utpala or Abhinava's position concerns the non-modification of the Supreme. Abhinava's claim that the Supreme is affected but not modified, even though supported by Abhinava's vivartavāda, does not meet Śāṅkara's demands that even the tiniest bit of qualification should not be resorted to. It is this same claim of Śāṅkara's, viz., the complete dissociation of Brahman from the qualities of the everyday-world, which forms the basis of Abhinava's attack upon him. Abhinava's arguments against Śāṅkara did not center around the illusoriness of the world, but instead on the Vedāntin tendency to view māyā as something other than Brahman (not Being, but dependent on Being) and the impossibility of doing so if Brahman is the reality.

Śāṅkara's insistence upon an unqualified Supreme leads to two major possible interpretations of the manifest world. These interpretations are not entirely mutually exclusive, but they may be looked upon as alternatives:

1. ajātivāda--which, in a Buddhist fashion, declares the world to be unreal, never really created, no less unreal than dreams or hare-horns.

2. anirvacanīyavāda--which says that the world is somehow and to some extent existent, but we cannot explain how or how much, nor can we explain the relationship between the world and Brahman other than to say that they are neither the same nor different.

Ajātivāda and anirvacanīyavāda are best evaluated by means of Plato's dictum that:

If then amid the many opinions about the gods and the generation of the universe we are not able in every respect to render all our ideas consistent with each other and precisely accurate, we need not be surprised . . . on these subjects we should be satisfied with a likely story and demand nothing more.¹

The similarity of ajātivāda's equal unreality of everything to Utpala's equal reality of everything was previously noted. The same criticism applies to both; they are explanations of phenomenal duality which do not sufficiently take into account the experiences of the phenomenal world. One can establish an internally consistent philosophy by declaring everything indistinguishably real or indistinguishably unreal, but in neither case is the result a very likely story.

The alternative explanation of the manifest world's relationship to the qualitiess Supreme is the anirvacanīya formulation, which is more representative of Śāṅkara's views. The likelihood, i.e., probably validity, of such an approach is great. Supreme knowledge (paravidyā) does not completely annul lower knowledge (aparavidyā), nor is the latter identical with

or a part of the former. The two knowledges do not relate to each other as in the obviously limited rope-snake analogy, which Śāṅkara uses only as a popular example. The rope and the snake are essentially commensurable knowledges of the same order. The limited perceiver is able to relate the two to each other and assimilate them in a logical manner, e.g., the perception of the rope replaces the perception of the snake. It does seem likely that the widely disparate levels of reality and appearance (formless-formed, unitary-multiple, etc.) do not relate to each other in any such reasonable fashion or in any explainable manner at all. It also seems appropriate that the logical inexplicability of the world should entail an ontological inexplicability as well, i.e., neither being nor non-being. On the other hand, being presented with the inexplicability of world phenomena is not a very satisfying answer to questions concerning the nature of the world, and it represents, in effect, a refusal to tell any story at all.

Abhinava's philosophy incorporates a great deal of Śāṅkara's anirvacanīyavāda, but Abhinava's theories allow us to say a great deal more about the world and its relationship with the Supreme than Śāṅkara's. From the Vedāntin viewpoint the price Abhinava pays for this is a less satisfying picture of the Supreme in terms of "pureness" of consciousness. Although he does declare the world illusory, Abhinava's use of superimposition and sublation is not totally incompatible with Utpala's

position. Abhinava never leads us to believe that the world is to be dismissed as a cosmic illusion which has somehow arisen to afflict us--this being the interpretation which some later Advaitins give to the theories of Śaṅkara.²

Śaṅkara himself uses sublation in two ways, usually depending on whether he is discussing the sublation of the māyā-world or of the jīva-self:

Whereas the world is "false" (mithyā) according to Advaita, in that it may completely disappear from consciousness when sublated, the self (jīva) is only misperceived, the self is really Brahman. In other words, the self is not so much denied by Brahman as its real nature (as not-different from Brahman) is revealed when Brahman is realized.³

These two different approaches to sublation can be used to distinguish Abhinava's denial of the world from Śaṅkara's, and also to demonstrate the axiological differences between the two philosophers.

Both kinds of denials may be illustrated by the rope-snake analogy:

In the first instance, "whereas the world is false," there is the failure to distinguish between the snake as illusion and the rope as reality. Here, the prime example of *via negativa*, the greater emphasis is placed upon the two orders of being as distinctly different kinds of things, belonging to levels between which relations cannot be established.

In the second case, where "the self is only misperceived," there is a failure to recognize that the perception of the snake is totally dependent upon the real rope as its substratum of

existence. The precise nature of such total dependence is unclear, but the implication is that total dependence = not independent = not different. The result, after realization, is that the snake is revealed to be the rope.

This second type of sublation predominates in the writings of Abhinava, especially in the way in which it has been rephrased, as "recognition." Abhinava tends to treat both jīva and world as cases of misperception; perceiver and pot are both revealed as Śiva when Śiva is realized. Of necessity, a greater value is posited to the perception of reality than to appearance--to water rather than to waves, to consciousness rather than to objects of consciousness. In Abhinava's philosophy, though, the reality of the underlying import of the phenomenal world is approached as an affirmation as well as a negation.

The realization of Reality does not detract from, or impoverish life, but is, really, another way of seeing it.⁴

Contemporary thinkers who are sympathetic to the monistic idealism of Advaita Vedānta find it difficult to relegate the world in which they live to the status of complete ignorance or illusion; they try to reconcile the results of Śaṅkara's Advaita with an active interest in the practical world.⁵ Even Radhakrishnan, who is a follower of Śaṅkara, tends to regard māyā as an element of the Absolute. Radhakrishnan contends that the Absolute can be reached positively, and not merely negatively as many orthodox Advaitins claim. In an attempt to answer the question, "If the Absolute is to include the world,

how is this inclusion to be understood?", Radhakrishnan seizes upon those passages in Śāṅkara's writings which, he says, depict a positive relation between the world and Brahman.⁶ The mainstream of Advaita Vedānta, though, runs counter to the concerns of contemporary Indian philosophers for conservation of world values.

Abhinava's system offers a possible solution to this difficulty. The manifest world, according to Abhinava, is non-existent in the highest reality as the forms perceived by the limited selves. The world is, however, of greater value and significance to Abhinava, because it exists in a supremely synthesized form as a reflection of the experience of the Absolute.

APPENDIX A

THE TATTVAS

1. ŚIVA (in Prat. includes 2. ŚAKTI) - pure, undivided state of perfect consciousness.

3. SADĀŚIVA - experience of I-am-this

4. ĪŚVARA - " this-is-I

5. SADVIDYĀ - " I am I - this is this

Categories 3-5 form the perfect-imperfect state, identical and yet distinct from Śiva

6-11. MĀYĀ with its five sheaths: KALĀ - limited authorship, efficacy

VIDYĀ - " knowledge

RĀGA - " fulfillment

KĀLA - " time

NIYATI - " space and causality

12. PURUṢA - principle of limited subjectivity.

14. BUDDHI - intellect, capacity of judgment.

15. AHANKĀRA - personal ego.

16. MANAS - mind, controller of senses.

17-21. JĪVĀNA-INDRIYA-s - powers of sense-perception: hearing, skin-sensations, sight, taste and smell.

22-26. KARMA-INDRIYA-s - capacities of action: speech, handling, locomotion, excretion and procreation.

13. PRAKṚTI - principle of limited objectivity

27-31. TANMĀTRA-s - subtle elements: sound, touch, color and shape, flavor, odor.

32-36. MAHĀBHŪTA-s - gross elements: space, air, fire, water, earth.

Categories from māyā downwards constitute the lower order, where everything is experienced as different from everything else. Categories 12-36 are the Sāṃkhya tattvas.

APPENDIX B : EXCERPTS FROM CH.4 OF ŚIVADĪPĪ AND COMMENTARY

TATHĀ YATRA SAD ITY EVAM FRATĪTIS TAD ASAT KATHAM/

YAT SAT TAT PARAMĀRTHO HI PARAMĀRTHAS TATAḤ ŚĪVAḤ// 6

SARVA BHĀVEṢU CIDVYAKTEḤ STHITAIVA PARAMĀRTHATĀ/

Śaktaṁ vastu levety uktam, vastu ca sad ucyate. Yac ca sat,

tan nāsad iti sa eva paramārthaḥ. Yasmāc ca paramārthas

tataḥ sattvāt paramārthatvāc chivāḥ. Nanu katham paramārtha-

mātratvena śivaḥ, jagdo 'pi katham na paramārthaḥ? Tan na.

Jagasya sattaiva katham cidvyaktim vinā sidhā. Sphura-

rūpatā hi sattā. Sphuradrūpatā ca prakāśamānatā. Tatas

ca jagatā tāvan nāsti. Prakāśamānatā hi prakāśabhedāḥ. Pra-

kāśas cānapahnavanīyaḥ sarvapratisthārūpaḥ paramārthaḥ. Sarve-

śām ca ghaṭādīnām prakāśarūpatayā viśeṣābhāvād ekaparakāśātmatā-

tata evaikaśivatvam. Etad īśvarapratyabhijñāyām vistāritam.

MITHYĀJÑĀNAVIKALPYĀNĀM SATTVAM CIDVYAKTIŚAKTATĀ// 7

VIDYATE TAT TAD ATRĀPI ŚĪVATVAM KENA VĀRYATE/

ITI CED EṢU SATYATVAM STHITAM EVA CIDUDGAMĀT// 8

TATHĀ ŚIVODAYĀD EVA BHEDO MITHYĀDIKAḤ KATHAM/

VYAVAHĀRĀYA SATYATVAM NA CA VĀ VYAVAHĀRAGAM// 9

Mithyājñānavikalpanīyānām rajatasarpācīnām ghaṭādīnām iva

cidvyaktiśaktatā prakāśamānatā nāma vidyate, tac eva sattvam

paramārthatvam ato 'pi tac chivatvam. Anivāryam ca etac iṣ-

yata eva eṣu satyatvam cidabhivyakteḥ, tena tena rūpeṇa śivesya

prasaro 'yam yataḥ. Ghaṭājñānaraajatajñānayoś ca ovayor api

satyatve samyagmithyātvabhedas tarhi katham. Vyavahārāya

vyavahārasrayojano 'sau. Na ca aprarūḍhatvāt vyavahārasat-

yatvam vā satyatvam bhavati.

TATHĀ CA DEŚE KVAČANA RĀJĀJÑĀ JĀYATE YATHĀ/

VYAVAHĀRAS TU DĪNĀIR ĒTAIR AVYAVAHĀRAGAIḤ// 10

PRAVARTATE TATHĀBHŪTAIR ANYATRĀPI TATHĀNYATHĀ/

Rājājñayā kūṭadīnārair api vyavahāro 'sty eva. Tathānyatrāpi icchāmātrāt yathāsaṁketam vastu anapekṣyaiva kālavvyavasthārambhūdivyavahāraḥ.

VYAVAHĀRASYA SATYATVE SARVATRĀSATYATAIVA TE// 11

SATYATVE TASYA HĀNIḤ SYĀT PAKṢE 'BHYUPAGATE KILA/

Yadi punar aprarūḡhasya vyavahārasyaśatyasyāpi satyateṣyate, tad evamjatiyatayā sarvam idam jagat satyam syāt, asatyatā paramārtham vyavahāravat ity arthaḥ. Tasya jagataḥ paramārthataḥ satyatve saty ayaṁ doṣo vyavahārasaorśasatyatātmakaḥ syūt tava. Evam ca sarvasatyatāvādoapakṣe 'bhyudite śāstrudite hāniḥ syāt.

TASYĀPI KIM ŚIVĀVĀPTIḤ KATHAM UKTĀ HY ASATYATĀ// 12

VYAVAHĀRATAYAIVĀSTĪ SATYATVAM NA NIBANDHANĀT/

Tasyāpi vyavahārasya kim cidudgamāt sivāvāptiḥ śivarūpateṣyate anāyāsāgatāsyā śivatety arthaḥ. Evam cet katham asya vyavahārasyaapy asatyatctā, satya evāyam evam sati syād ity arthaḥ. Satyam, kim tu vyavahāratayaivāpy asya vyavahārasya satyatvam, na tu nibandhanāt nibandhanatvāt prarūḡhatvād ity arthaḥ.

(13-14)... Tasya ca tathāivāstu śivatvenāvasthitiḥ, kena vinivāritā cidudgamāt śivatvalakṣaṇayogāt. Vikalpasya vyavahārasya satyatvāsatyatvapakṣabhedo prak nimittam uktaṁ yat prakāśamānasya satyatve, satyatvam eva. Citabhedākhyātimayatvāt satyatvam iti evam ca sarvatvaiva na vismaraṇīyam.

MITHYĀTVAM KRIYATE KASYA KIM KĀLE YATRA TAD BHAVET/

KĀLA EVA SA NA BHAVED ITI CEN NAIVA KUTRA CIT// 15

AKĀLE JANANAM KIM CID BĀDHYATE VĀ JANIKRIYĀ/

KṚTVĀ KĀRYAM KRIYĀ YĀTĀ GATĀYĀM KIM PRABĀDHYATE// 16

Bāchake ca pramāṇe sati nedaṁ rajataṁ nedaṁ rajataṁ śuktikā,
- iti niṣedhaniṣṭhatayā pratītau mithyātvaṁ syāt. Tena
bāchakena pramāṇena mithyātvaṁ kāryam. Tat kasya kriyate,
tatra kim yasmin kāle tadrajatatā bhavet. Sa kāla eva na
bhavatīti mithyātvaṁ ity abhyupagamaḥ. Tan na. Naiva hy
akāle kālābhāve kasya cij jananam nāma kim cit kālaramitāyāḥ
kriyāyā ayocāo ity arthaḥ. Janikriyā vā yaci bādhyate, tan
na. Rajatādikāryam kṛtvā kriyā samāptā. Tasyā asatyāḥ ko
bāchārthaḥ svayam eva tasyā abhāvāt. Idānīm ca bāchaviṣaya-
syābhāvāt ko bāchaḥ.

... NĀNUBHŪTO 'NYATHĀ BHAVET// 17

Na hi anubhūto viṣayo 'nanubhūto yuktaḥ... Tasmād yāvat saṁ-
bhavaṁ vikalpane sarvathā rajatācipratītau na kim cin niṣedh-
uṁ śakyate - iti na kaś cid bāchārthaḥ... Sarvathā yathā yat
pratibhūtam, tathaiva tat, nānyathā kartuṁ śakyate iti satyam
eva na kim cid mithyātvaṁ.

TĀVATĀ VYAVAHĀRO VĀ YAD ĀTMĀHLĀDAMĀTRAKAM// 20

ARTHAKRIYĀSAMARTHATVAM ETAD EVĀSYAVĀSTAVAM/

Athavā yad āhlādamātrakaṁ, tāvataiva vyavahāraḥ. Etaḥ eva
cāhlācākāritvam arthasya arthakriyākāritve svasamvedanasicoh-
atvena, bhrāntatvāo vāstavasvapnajalasya pānācyarthakriyā
bhrāntāpi syāt, triṣṭāvṛittyā tu tṛptiḥ svasamvedanasicohā na
visaṁvacati. Sāpi cāhlācāikā arthakriyā kūtāceḥ svapnajalāder
vā syāt, tad api satyam vyavahāryam ceti vyavanāre 'pi na
bādhasitih.

6. WHEN SOMETHING IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD TO BE EXISTENT, HOW MAY IT BE NON-EXISTENT? THAT WHICH IS EXISTENT IS THE HIGHEST REALITY, AND THUS ŚIVA. THE HIGHEST REALITY IS FOUND AS THE MANIFESTATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN ALL THINGS. Whatever is endowed with power is real, and that which is real is existent. That which is existent is not non-existent and is the highest reality. Because of its existence as the highest reality, it is Śiva.

(Objection :) Is Śiva the only highest reality and an inert object not of the highest reality?

(Answer :) No. How may the being of an inert object be shown without the manifestation of consciousness? Manifestation alone is being. Manifestation is the shining of the light of consciousness. An inert object is non-existent to the extent that it does not shine forth. There is no differentiation of the light of consciousness in manifestation. The light of consciousness is not to be denied, because it is the basis of all and the highest reality. Because there are no distinctions as to the nature of the light of all objects such as pot, etc., there is a oneness of light and thus a oneness of Śiva in them all. This is elaborated upon in Īśvarapratyabhijñā.

Note: "The object that is made manifest is not different from light. For what is not light cannot be said to exist."
- IPK 1.5.3, trans. Pandey

7-9. (EVEN) ILLUSORY FALSE PERCEPTIONS ARE REAL AND EMPOWERED WITH THE MANIFESTATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS. THEIR ŚIVANESS MAY NOT BE DENIED. REALITY IS ESTABLISHED IN THEM THROUGH THE ARISING OF CONSCIOUSNESS WHICH IS ŚIVA.

(OBJECTION :) THEN HOW CAN THERE BE ANY SUCH DISTINCTIONS AS "FALSE" (OR "TRUE")?

(ANSWER :) REALITY IS NOT A MATTER OF EVERYDAY-REALITY OR USAGE.

There is the shining forth of manifested consciousness in illusory false-perceptions, such as the rope-snake or shell-silver, just as in the perceptions of pots and other objects (of everyday-reality). Therefore, they are real, of the highest reality, and of the nature of Śiva. Their reality as manifest consciousness is undeniable, since Śiva extends Himself as these various forms.

(Objection :) If both the knowledge of pot and the knowledge of shell-silver are real, how may there be any distinction between false and proper knowledge?

(Answer :) This (distinction) is a matter of everyday-usage. Because of its uncertainties, however, everyday-reality is not truly real.

Note: In saying that "everyday-reality is not real", Utpala is not contending that the everyday-world is itself illusory or false, but rather that any distinctions of reality and illusion based on the experiences of the everyday-world are false, i.e., invalid criteria of reality. Somānanda next provides an example of the vagaries of the ordinary world which is attested to today by our own use of paper money.

10. THUS, A KING'S RULE IN A COUNTRY IS SOMETIMES SUCH THAT EVERYDAY-LIFE IS CARRIED ON WITH FALSE (I.E., NOT GOLD OR SILVER) COINS. AND SUCH IT IS SIMILARLY ELSEWHERE IN THE EVERYDAY-WORLD.

By the king's command, the everyday-world functions even with false coins. Similarly, in other matters also, the everyday-world of time, situation, impetus, etc., proceeds according

to the will (of the king), ignoring the reality of the matter.

11. (OBJECTION :) YOUR MISTAKE ARISES IN TAKING THE POSITION THAT EVERYTHING IS REAL. FOR IF EVEN THE ILLUSIONS OF THE WORLD ARE REAL, THEN EVERYTHING IS UNREAL.

If that which is unreal in the uncertain everyday-world (e.g., rope-snake or shell-silver) is also taken to be real - then, by the same classification, all this world would be real, but ultimately unreal, just as (the illusions of) the everyday-world.

If the world is ultimately real, then your mistake is in considering reality to be similar to the everyday-world. This is your error in accepting the position of everything being real.

12. (OBJECTION CONTINUED :) IF THAT (EVERYDAY-WORLD) ALSO CONSISTS OF ŚIVA, HOW MAY IT BE CALLED UNREAL?

(ANSWER :) ITS REALITY IS THROUGH ITS EVERYDAY USAGE, NOT THROUGH DENIAL.

If that everyday-world is obtained to be Śiva through the arising of consciousness, then its being of the nature of Śiva is easily arrived at. If this is so, then how may the everyday-world be called unreal? It is, and should be, (understood as) real.

(Answer :) True. But the reality of the everyday-world is through its everyday usage, not because it is certain or because it serves to deny (illusion).

Note: The meaning of ślokas 11 and 12 is difficult to understand because the word vyavahāra is being used to represent both ordinary pot-perceptions and illusory perceptions of rope-snakes. The objector appears to be arguing that: 1. if pot-perceptions and illusions are equally

real, then the world is reduced to the level of illusion, and 2. if the world, with all its uncertainty, is of the highest reality, then Śiva is reduced to being of the nature of that uncertain world. Utpala answers that the everyday-world is indeed real in terms of everyday-functioning, but that its uncertainty precludes its acting as an agent of sublation.

The discrepancy in the text between the na ābhāṣya in Somānanda's line 14a and the ābhāṣya of Utpala's commentary is probably the result of a manuscript error. That portion of the text will be admitted. The last part of Utpala's commentary on śloka 13 and 14 repeats the argument that all manifestations are real; it is followed by a series of objections which attempt to define the conditions under which an object may be denied and, thus, shown to be false.

13-14. ... That which is a form of Śiva, being characterized as Śivaness by the arising of consciousness, may not be denied. With respect to the (erroneous) view that the everyday-world is real and illusion is unreal, it was earlier explained that reality is nothing other than manifestation. Because of the non-differentiation of consciousness, reality is everywhere; this must not be forgotten.

15-16. (OBJECTION :) SOMETHING IS FALSE IF IT DOES NOT EXIST AT THAT TIME IN WHICH IT WOULD BE (THOUGHT TO EXIST).

(ANSWER :) WITHOUT TIME, NEITHER THE CAUSATION NOR THE ACT OF CAUSATION MAY BE DENIED. WHAT ACT, HAVING BROUGHT ABOUT ITS RESULT AND COME TO A CONCLUSION, MAY BE DENIED?

(Objection :) When there is a denying source of authority (knowledge of the shell), and it is shown through denial that "this is not silver", "this is not silver, but is shell", then there is falseness. Falseness is the result of that denying source of authority. What is shown to be false? If the silver does not exist at that time when it is thought to exist, then the silver is accepted to be false.

(Answer :) No. Without time, there is no causation, because

there can be no action without time.

(Objection :) It is the act of causation that is denied.

(Answer :) No. An action which brings about an effect, such as silver, is completed. What is the meaning of the denial of that (action) which is unreal, itself being non-existent? And now (at the moment of perception of the shell) what denial can there be since the object of denial is non-existent?

Note : The discussion continues with a great deal of repetition. The Saivite argument is essentially based on the premise that the present perception of shell is unrelated to the previous perception of silver. The perception of silver being followed by the perception of shell does not constitute a denial of the former, Utpala says, since even a "proper" perception, such as of a pot, may be displaced by a subsequent perception of shell.

17-18. ... THAT WHICH IS EXPERIENCED DOES NOT BECOME OTHERWISE.

An object which is experienced does not become non-experienced ... To the extent that there arises the illusory manifestation of silver, nothing may deny that perception of silver, and, thus, there is no object of denial... Everything is as it appears and cannot be made otherwise. Everything is real; nothing is false.

Note: To remind us that appearance is reality, and reality is nothing more than appearance, Somānanda repeats the false coins-analogy in lines 19 and 20a. Lines 20b and 21a further attack the use of vyavahāra as a standard of reality, i.e., the attributing of a greater reality to the everyday-world than to illusion.

20-21. ... THE EVERYDAY-WORLD IS MERELY SELF-PLEASING CAUSAL EFFICACY, AND THAT IS THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER.

... Mere pleasure is the extent of the everyday-world. The pleasure-causing nature of the everyday-world is proven by one's own awareness of the causal efficacy of an object. Even

the act of drinking may be illusory. Either dream-water or real water may be drunk, yet the satisfaction which results (in either case) is proven by one's own awareness of satisfaction and is irrefutable. The pleasure caused by false coins or dream-water, etc., is also reality of an everyday sort. Thus, there are no grounds for denial in the everyday-world.

APPENDIX C: PARAMĀRTHASĀRA

L. D. Barnett's translation of Paramārthasāra in 1910¹ was the first Western presentation of a Kashmir Śaiva text. In the same year PS was edited and published in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies (no. 7, 1910) along with a commentary by Yogarāja, who was a student of Kṣemarāja and probably of Abhinava himself as well.² Lilliane Silburn's French translation of PS appeared in 1957³ and is much improved over Barnett's, benefiting not only from his earlier effort but also from the other Kashmir Śaiva studies of the intervening period.

In his introduction to PS Barnett noted the similarity of the work with another text of the same name, whose author is variously known as Ādi Śeṣa or Ādhāra.⁴ Barnett thought that Ādi Śeṣa's work was the later of the two and was based on Abhinava's text. J. C. Chatterji,⁵ however, demonstrated that the reverse is true and that the Ādi Śeṣa text preceded Abhinava's. Chatterji shows that the Ādi Śeṣa treatise is quoted in a Spanda text authored by Utpala Vaiṣṇava--who must not be confused with the Pratyabhijñāvēdin Utpala, but who also lived earlier than Abhinava. Pandey⁶ agrees with Chatterji and adds as evidence another line from Ādi Śeṣa's treatise which is cited as scriptural authority (śruti) by Abhinava in his commentary on the Gītā.

The opening lines of Abhinava's PS clearly state that Abhinava bases his work on the kārikā-s which were recited

by the sage Ādhāra in response to questions by his pupil.⁷
 There can be little doubt that the text which was and is still known outside Kashmir as Paramārthasāra is the work upon which Abhinava based his treatise. To distinguish it from Abhinava's Paramārthasāra, Ādi Śeṣa's work will be referred to below as the Ādhāra-kārikā-s (AK),⁸ the name by which it became known in Kashmir.

Previous Kashmir Śaiva studies have devoted hardly any attention at all to the philosophical principles of AK or to the significance of Abhinava's basing PS on Ādi Śeṣa's earlier work. Pandey, for example, suggests a very simple and logical relationship between the two treatises. AK is a Sāṃkhya text, he says, from which Abhinava uses the material which does not conflict with Kashmir Śaivism, and to which Abhinava adds new verses of his own which contain ideas peculiar to Kashmir Śaivism.⁹

Both Chatterji and Silburn note that AK is representative of theistic Sāṃkhya. According to Silburn,¹⁰ AK describes the principles of a Sāṃkhya philosophy which is "colored by Vaiṣṇavism," and consequently closer to the philosophy of the Mahābhārata than that of the Sāṃkhyakārikā-s. She contends that, apart from adopting a number of AK's eighty-five verses to the 105-verse PS, most of the Śaiva text belongs to Abhinava himself. She says nothing else about AK and devotes most of her lengthy introduction to a discussion of tantraism and the Śaiva tattvas.

Chatterji places greater emphasis on the importance of the philosophy of AK. The very fact that Abhinava chose to re-write AK along Kashmir Śaiva lines, he says, indicates the popularity of theistic Sāṃkhya during that period. He also suggests that theistic Sāṃkhya was a major source upon which Kashmir Śaivism drew in the formulation of its philosophy. Chatterji concludes by saying, "A comparison of the two texts would prove, to my mind, interesting, and I propose to make it on another occasion."¹¹ It is unfortunate that, as far as I can ascertain, Chatterji never published such a comparison.

It is also unfortunate that Kaw, who concerns himself more with an analysis of the philosophy proper of Pratyabhijñā than other Kashmir Śaiva scholars, does not mention AK. In his comparison of Pratyabhijñā and Vedānta, Kaw makes a great many generalizations concerning the "common Upaniṣadic background" of the two systems. All the major principles of Pratyabhijñā, he says, may be traced back to the Upaniṣads.¹²

But in searching for a point of influence or a philosophical background to Pratyabhijñā philosophy, Kaw ignores the more immediate and specific reference point of AK.

Abhinava's use of Ādi Śeṣa's text as a basis for one of his works is a very striking peculiarity. The only other non-Śaiva text which Abhinava uses is the Bhagavad Gītā. His commentary on the Gītā is understandable, though, since Kashmir Śaivites accept the work as scriptural authority. But if AK is a Sāṃkhya

treatise, why would Abhinava attempt to accommodate it to Pratyabhijñā? Both he and Utpala treat the Sāṃkhya position not at all sympathetically; in fact, they refute it at great length. The answers which are so summarily provided by Chatterji, Pandey and Silburn are utterly unsatisfactory. It is not at all true that AK is a dualist work which Abhinava rewrites along monist lines. Ādi Śeṣa's treatise does not ascribe to the principles associated with dualist Sāṃkhya, and the philosophy of Abhinava's PS is not so very different from the theories of the earlier work.

AK as a Vedānta Text

Just as Kashmir Śaiva scholars have ignored the reflecticism, superimposition and sublation which are so prominent in PS, they have similarly ignored the Vedānta aspects of Ādi Śeṣa's treatise. By way of contrast, Mahadevan¹³ treats AK as an early Vedānta text. Although Mahadevan does not examine AK in the context of a possible Vedānta influence upon Abhinava, he does suggest that Ādi Śeṣa's work may be the source of some of the ideas found in Gaudapāda's Māṇḍūkyakārikā-s (MK).

Mahadevan notes a number of significant points of resemblance between Ādi Śeṣa's treatise and MK¹⁴:

1. The Self is described in four states: viśva, taijasa, prājña, and turya. The first three are equated with waking, dream and sleep, respectively. The fourth and transcendental state of turya is alone uncondition-

- ally real. (AK 31 and MK 1.11)
2. Māyā is the illusory power of the Lord, whereby He seems to appear as the endless forms of the manifest world. (AK 30, 32, 33, 56 and MK 1.9, 2.12, 2.19.)
 3. In the highest reality there is neither creation nor destruction, neither bondage nor release. (AK 69 and MK 2.32.)
 4. One who has realized the truth is beyond karma, ritual and ethical standards. He may do as he pleases in the world, wandering about like a madman or a fool. (AK 76-79 and MK 2.36-37.)
 5. The truth of the highest reality of the Supreme conflicts with no system of thought. Although different schools conflict with one another, they each proclaim the Self of all. (AK 65 and MK 3.17, 4.5.)

Besides these doctrinal similarities, Mahadevan further notes that many of the key terms and phrases are the same in both AK and MK, and both make use of the rope-snake, shell-silver and other analogies. Although Ādi Śeṣa's work does bear doctrinal and terminological affinities to MK, Mahadevan concludes only that AK is an early Advaita work which is pre-Śāṅkara and which uses the language of Sāṅkhya. It is impossible, he says, to determine for certain whether AK preceded MK or not.¹⁵

S. S. Suryanarayan Sastri recognizes essentially the same textual similarities between AK and MK as does Mahadevan.¹⁶ Sastri

definitely asserts that AK influenced Gaudapāda's Kārikā-s. Sastri further contends that similarities between AK and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa prove that the latter borrowed from Ādi Śeṣa's work.¹⁷ Sastri concludes that AK is an "early manual of Advaita Vedānta"—representing a transition from Sāṃkhya to Advaita Vedānta and datable to a period before Advaita Vedānta was fully formulated. Sastri assigns both the Māṇḍūkyakārikā-s and the Bhāgavata to the sixth century. "It is clear," he says, "that the Paramārthasāra forms one of the basic texts for the Gaudapāda's Kārikā-s and for the Śribhāgavata and may be assigned to the fourth century A.D."¹⁸

We should not forget, of course, that the relationship between AK and MK is none too certain. It is possible that MK is the earlier of the two texts, or that both borrowed from an even earlier work. The relationship between AK and the Bhāgavata is even less certain, based almost exclusively on supposed doctrinal, rather than textual, similarities.¹⁹ Actually, the dates of the Kārikā-s and the Bhāgavata are themselves subject to a great deal of controversy. Scholars date Gaudapāda to as early as the fifth, and as late as the ninth century.²⁰ The Bhāgavata, even though of a more unified composition than most other Purāṇas, has also been ascribed to anywhere from the fifth to the ninth centuries.²¹ Thus, Sastri's dating of AK to the fourth century should be regarded as mere conjecture.

For our purposes, the possibility of a relationship between AK and Gauḍapāda's Kārikā-s or the Bhāgavata is less important than the more general and also more certain fact that the Sāṃkhya material of AK is colored by Advaita Vedānta theories as well as Vaiṣṇavism. The AK verses extracted by Mahadevan are only those which most closely parallel the wording of MK, and the full measure of AK's Vedānta philosophy will be seen below.

Pandey's Comparison of AK and PS

Pandey acknowledges that the wording of AK is not very different from that of PS. At the same time, he contends that the Sāṃkhya theories of AK can be easily distinguished from the Kashmir Śaiva philosophy of PS.

They [Adi Śeṣa's Kārikā-s] gave in brief the most essential principles of the Sāṃkhya philosophy and taught that the final emancipation could be obtained by discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. The original with a few omissions and alterations was adopted to serve as a medium of teaching the most essential principles of Trika.²²

Pandey documents his statement with the following comparison of AK and PS²³:

1. When there is no difference of principles between AK and Kashmir Śaivism, Abhinava reproduces the language of the original without any alteration. For instance:

Puṇyāya tīrthasevā nirayāya śvapacasadanānidhanagatih/
puṇyāpuṇyakalaṅkasparśābhāve tu kiṃ tena//

Visiting holy places makes for merit, meeting one's death in an outcast's hovel leads to hell; but what signifies this when there is neither merit nor demerit?

- AK82, PS 84, trans. Barnett

2. As an example of Abhinava's altering AK to suit Kashmir Śaivism, Pandey provides the following śloka:

Nānāvidhavarṇānām varṇam dhatte yathāmalaḥ sphaṭikaḥ,
tadvad upādher guṇabhāvitasya bhāvaṁ vibhur dhatte.

As the pure crystal assumes the color of various colored objects, so likewise the Lord assumes the state of the limiting condition brought about by the tendencies of Prakṛti. - AK 16.

Nānāvidhavarṇānām rūpaṁ dhatte yathāmalaḥ sphaṭikaḥ,
suramānuṣapaśupādaparūpatvaṁ tadvad īśo 'pi.

As the pure crystal assumes the form of various colored objects, so likewise the Lord assumes the form of gods, men, beasts and plants. - PS 6.24

"Here the difference of principle," says Pandey, "will be apparent to anyone familiar with the ideas of the two systems." He explains that Sāṅkhya believe limitation to be the result of the nearness of puruṣa to prakṛti, while the two have separate independent existences. Kashmir Śaivites, on the other hand, believes that limitation results from the free will of the Supreme, independent of which nothing exists. According to Pandey, Abhinava retains much of the original language in his adaptation because of the idea that the limitation is only apparent, since the Supreme is unaffected by these varying conditions, is common to both Sāṅkhya and Kashmir Śaivism.

3. As an example of an AK sloka which Abhinava altogether omits, Pandey cites the following verse:

Yadvad acetanam api sannikaṣṭhe bhrāmake
bhramati loham,
tadvat karaṇasamūhaś ceṣṭati cidadhīṣṭhite dehe.

Just as iron, though insentient, moves when near a magnet, similarly, the body as a collection of organs becomes active when controlled by intelligence.

- AK 12.

This śloka, says Pandey, "deals with the effect of the mere presence of puruṣa in bringing about activity in the insentient senses . . . a matter in which the two systems [Sāṃkhya and Kashmir Śaivism] fundamentally differ."

There are indeed, as Pandey says, only three basic means of dealing with AK's verses at Abhinava's disposal: inclusion, alteration, or deletion. However, the example which Pandey provides of inclusion (AK82, PS 84) is actually a very insignificant one. Almost any Indian school of thought, except for Mīmāṃsā followers who believe in the ultimate validity of actions and ritual, would concur with it.

In the example of alteration (AK 16, PS 6) the first lines of the two ślokas convey no important difference in meaning; both employ the reflectionist metaphor of a colorless crystal. It is true that Abhinava avoids the terms upādhi and guṇa in the second line of his verse. He does use the term upādhi elsewhere in PS, though, in very Sāṃkhya-like circumstances to describe, in the words of Barnett, "a gem . . . become darkened from the box which is the surrounding medium"²⁵ and "Consciousness . . . released from the surrounding medium of the body."²⁶ The difference in principles between the two verses is not at all apparent, and Pandey's reference to "the free will of the Supreme" has nothing to do with the passive reflectionism of a crystal.

Pandey is more correct in his analysis of AK 12, which Abhinava rejects because of a difference in viewpoints. The main import of the verse is to contrast the agenciless Self with the actions of the māyā-world. This conflicts with Abhinava's view that all actions ultimately reside in the Self, and that supreme consciousness is the substratum of all worldly actions. But the notion that the Self remains agenciless, even though identical with the embodied jīva, is found in Advaita Vedānta²⁷ and not just Samkya; it is also, as will be seen, found to some extent in Abhinava's PS as well.

The PS ślokas which cannot be traced to AK can be partly accounted for by such material as Abhinava's lengthy description of the tattva system. For instance, Abhinava refers to the tattvas not found in the Sāṅkhya system:

Śivaśaktisadāśivatām īśvaravidyāmāyīm ca tattvadaśām,
śaktīnām pañcānām vibhaktabhāvena bhāsayati.

He manifests the categories of Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, Īśvara and Vidyā as the diverse conditions of his five powers.²⁸

- PS 14.

And there are such ślokas as PS 19-22, which list the categories from puruṣa to earth common to both Sāṅkhya and Kashmir Śaivism. These verses simply contain a more detailed version of a single verse in AK (sloka 20); they are not important philosophically. The same is true of the numerous ślokas in PS which are merely elaborations upon the theme that a man of knowledge is beyond merit and demerit. Abhinava's philosophical deviations from AK are much less frequent than the textual, and they will be care-

fully noted below.

Before proceeding to a further comparison of AK and PS, the different strains of thought which have been attributed to Ādi Śeṣa's treatise—namely, Sāṃkhya, Vaiṣṇavism and Vedānta-- will be separately examined.

Sāṃkhya in AK

In verses 2-7 of AK a disciple approaches the preceptor Ādi Śeṣa and asks a series of questions concerning the crossing of the ocean of samsāra. Who is it, the student asks, who wanders through beginningless samsāra, and what is his relationship with it? If the jīva is bound, like a silkworm in a cocoon, by the products of his actions, then how may he achieve release? How is it that he who discriminates between puruṣa and the tendencies (guṇa-s) of prakṛti is free of bondage? All these other questions are subsumed under the student's final request, which is simply: "Tell me of puruṣa and prakṛti."²⁹

The student has asked, in the dualist manner of Sāṃkhya, for an accounting of puruṣa and prakṛti as two separate and different things. In his answer, which takes up the remainder of the text, Ādi Śeṣa describes knowledge as being the discrimination of puruṣa and prakṛti³⁰ with its guṇa-s.³¹

It is through association with the limiting conditions (upādhi-s) of prakṛti that puruṣa appears as if it were bound.³²
All the categories acting in the creation, destruction and main-

tenance of the world are merely the effects of prakṛti which must be rejected.³³ The guṇa-s of prakṛti bring about creation, but the conscious Self is nowhere touched by the creations of prakṛti.

Prakṛtīvikārair aparāmrṣṭaḥ paraḥ puruṣaḥ.

The Supreme Puruṣa is unaffected by the modifications of prakṛti.
- AK 35.

Vaiṣṇavism in AK

The parts of AK noted above, if read out of context, would together form a quite respectable summary of Sāṃkhya theories. Elsewhere in AK, however, the Supreme and the world are placed in a very different Vaiṣṇava context. In neither Sāṃkhya nor AK is prakṛti ever referred to as puruṣa's prakṛti. Ādi Śeṣa often, though, refers to the Supreme as Viṣṇu and to the world-process as Viṣṇu's power of māyā. Viṣṇu is then depicted as both the agent and material cause of world manifestation.

AK opens with an invocation to Visnu:

Paraṃ parasyāḥ prakṛter anādim ekaṃ niviṣṭaṃ bahudhā guhāsu,
sarvālayaṃ sarvacarācarasthaṃ tvāṃ eva viṣṇuṃ śaraṇaṃ pra-
padye.

In you, the beginningless Supreme who is beyond prakṛti, the One who dwells as many in the depths (of the māyā-world), the substratum of all who is found in all that is moving or still, in You, Visnu, I take refuge. - AK 1.

The ideas found in this verse are taken up at later points in the text. Śloka nine, for instance, describes Viṣṇu as "He by whom the world is brought forth through His prakṛti."³⁴ The Supreme is said to be all-pervasive (sarvagatam), as well as non-

dual (advayam).³⁵ All the categories of the world are the modifications (vikṛtayah) and different conditions (avasthābhedāḥ, avasthāviśeṣāḥ) of the Supreme.³⁶

Prāṇādyanantabhedair ātmānaṁ saṁvitatya jālam iva,
saṁharati vāsudevaḥ svavibhūtyākriḍamāna iva.

Like a spider with its web, through His power Vāsudeva envelops Himself with, and withdraws Himself from the endless different forms of the world, as if in sport. - AK 30.

The Lord deludes Himself, says Ādi Śeṣa, through the appearance of duality which is brought about by his own māyā (svamāyayā).³⁷ Using a variety of metaphors, AK describes how the non-dual Supreme appears as a multiplicity. Like the one body with its many parts, like the lump of clay which takes various shapes, like the sparks which arise from a piece of metal--"the world which is non-dual appears as if dual."³⁸ Ādi Śeṣa even uses the water-analogy favored by Utpala in depicting world-manifestations as the very nature (svabhāva) of Viṣṇu:

Himaphenabudbudā iva jalasya dhūme yathā vahneḥ,
tadvat svabhāvabhūtā māyaiṣā kīrtitā viṣṇoḥ.

Like the ice, foam and bubbles of water, like the smoke of a fire, so māyā is said to be the nature of Viṣṇu. - AK 56.

The Vaiṣṇava elements of AK are not, as Silburn suggests, very close to the theism of the Maḥābhārata. Ādi Śeṣa stresses the oneness of the Supreme Self and limited self, not merely their inseparability. Furthermore, AK is exclusively devoted to the path of knowledge (jñānamārga); Ādi Śeṣa shows no inclination,

and sometimes even disdain, for the paths of devotion or action.

Vedānta in AK

In those passages which contain Sāṃkhya terminology, it is prakṛti that causes the creation of the world, and not the Self.³⁹ In other passages Viṣṇu Himself is the cause of the world's creation, maintenance and destruction.⁴⁰ Both these statements must be taken as lower-order truths, since Ādi Śeṣa further explains in the manner of Advaita Vedānta that all worldly causation is not real, but merely illusory.

Apart from the general references to the Supreme as non-dual, which are found throughout AK, the first inkling of specifically Advaita Vedānta theories occurs in śloka nine. The world is there said to be "as if real, but unreal" (satyam iva jagad asatyam). In verses 21-22 Ādi Śeṣa distinguishes between the highest reality and the māyā-world by introducing a host of illusionistic metaphors:

Dharmādharmau sukha-duḥkha-kalpanā svarganarakavāsaś ca,
 utpattinidhanavarṇāśramā na santīha paramārthe.
 Mṛgatrṣṇāyām udakam śuktau rajatam bhujāṅgamo rajjvām,
 taimirikacandrayugavad bhrāntam nikhilam jagadrūpam.

Merit and demerit, pleasure and pain, heaven and hell,
 birth and death, caste and station in life--none of these
 exist in the highest reality.
 Like the water of a mirage, like the rope-snake or shell-
 silver, like the moon seen through double vision, all the
 world is an illusion. - AK 21-22

The origins of the world-illusion are explained by means of vivartavāda analogies. In verse 23 Ādi Śeṣa presents the reflectionist analogy of the sun which appears in different bodies

of water. Verses 24-25 introduce a limitationist analogy: space, which is all-pervasive, is only apparently divided by the delineation of separate objects such as jars and jar-spaces. Ādi Śeṣa later repeats the rope-snake analogy twice, and he also brings forth the limitationist analogy once again. The illusory superimposition of the rope on the snake is compared to the illusory superimposition of the Self on the non-self:

Rajjvām nāsti bhujāṅgaḥ sarpabhayaṁ bhavati hetunā kena,
tadvad dvaitavikalpabhrāntir avidyā na satyam idam.
Ētat tad andhakāraṁ yad anātmany ātmatā bhrāntya,
na vidanti vāsudevaṁ sarvātmanaṁ narā mūḍhāḥ.

What cause is there to fear the snake, for the snake does not exist in the rope? Similarly, the illusion of dualistic perception is ignorance, and not real. It is blindness that the Self (is perceived) in the non-self through illusion. Deluded fools do not know Vāsudeva, the Self of all. - AK 28-29

The Supreme Self is said to be devoid of the qualities of world-manifestation; creation and destruction no more reside in the Self than the snake in the rope:

Rajjvām bhujāṅgahetuḥ prabhavavināśau yathā na staḥ,
jagadutpattivinaśau na ca kāraṇam asti tadvad iha.
Janmavināśana-gamaṇāgama-malasaṁbhandhavarjito nityam,
ākāśa iva ghaṭādiṣu sarvātmā sarvadopotaḥ.

Just as the rope is not the cause of the snake's origination and destruction, (the Self) is not the cause of this world's origination and destruction. Just as space (pervades) jars, the ever-present Self of all is eternal and free of any relationship with the defilement of birth and destruction or coming and going. - AK 50-51.

Finally, in verse 69, Ādi Śeṣa leaves no doubt in our minds that he believes the Supreme to be the unconditional reality, which

is unqualified by the unreal phenomenal world.

Kṣayavṛddhivadhyaghātakabandhanamokṣair vivarjitam nityam,
pāramārthatattvam etad yad ato 'nyat tad anṛtam sarvam.

The highest reality is eternal, free of increase and decrease, free of bondage and freedom, neither the slayer nor the slain; all else is false. - AK 69

The parallels between doctrine and terminology in AK are clearly evident. When Ādi Śeṣa uses the terms puruṣa and prakṛti, he adopts a dualist viewpoint, distinguishing between the actionless Self and the world-process as if they were separate and independent realities. When he refers to Viṣṇu, it is as the single reality which evolves the world through His nature as māyā. When he adopts a Vedānta viewpoint (usually in reference to the highest reality), Ādi Śeṣa dissociates the unqualified Supreme from the world-process, and he explains the unaffectedness of the Supreme by means of the illusory nature of the world and a vivartavāda theory of causation.

These streams of thought are, of course, interrelated. For instance, descriptions of the unaffectedness of the Self and of the actionless nature of consciousness fit into the framework of either Sāṃkhya dualism or Advaita Vedānta absolute monism. And the world, even when it is said to be brought about through the nature of Viṣṇu, may still be regarded as illusory:

Asatyam idam viṣṇor māyātmakam jagadrūpam.

The world, which is of the nature of Viṣṇu's māyā, is unreal.

- AK 74.

Because of its repeated and consistent references to the unitary nature of reality, AK cannot at all be considered representative of dualist Sāṃkhya. While the philosophy of AK may be called a form of Vaiṣṇava Sāṃkhya, the treatise also anticipates the reasonings and absolutism of Śaṅkara's Vedānta. Abhinava's similar affinity for Vedānta theories may be a reason for his using AK as a basis for his PS. It is surely the explanation of Abhinava's being able to adapt a supposedly Sāṃkhya treatise to Kashmir Śaivism while changing so little of the original text.

Differences in Terminology between AK and PS

Abhinava never refers to the Supreme as Viṣṇu, Vāsudeva or Narāyaṇa; as might be expected, he substitutes Śiva, Maheśvara, Bhairava and Śambhu instead. Ādi Śeṣa usually refers to the world-process as māyā and never uses the term śakti, even when explicitly describing the power of the Supreme. No less than twelve of PS's verses make reference to Śiva's śakti.

In IPV Abhinava restricts the use of Brahman to the Vedānta system, which is there called brahmavāda.⁴¹ Brahman, though, is accepted and used by Abhinava in PS as a non-sectarian designation of the Supreme.⁴² Abhinava's use of Brahman results in some peculiar phrases. Ādi Śeṣa states that "he who regards everything as Brahman becomes of the nature of Brahman" (AK 59). Abhinava changes this to read:

Śivamayatatvam abhiyāte . . . sarvaṁ brahmāvalokayataḥ.
He who regards everything as Brahman becomes of the nature
of Śiva. - PS 52.

Dhyāyataḥ paraṁ brahma . . . śivatvam abhyeti.
He who meditates on the Supreme Brahman becomes Śiva.
- PS 104.

The most notable difference in terminology between AK and PS is Abhinava's avoidance of the Sāṁkhya terms: puruṣa, prakṛti, and guṇa. Although Abhinava does mention puruṣa and prakṛti as the intermediate categories of the Śaiva tattva system,⁴³ he avoids AK references to them as independent realities. One exception to this is śloka 36 of PS which is identical to AK 35 save for Abhinava's substitution of "the modifications of māyā" (māyāvīkṛtibhiḥ) for Ādi Śeṣa's "the modifications of prakṛti" (prakṛtīvikāraiḥ):

Jaladharadhūmarajobhir malinīkriyato yathā na gaganatalam,
tadvan māyāvīkṛtibhir aparāmrṣṭaḥ paraḥ puruṣaḥ.

Just as the surface of the sky is not soiled by clouds, smoke or dust, so the Supreme Puruṣa is unaffected by the modifications of māyā. - PS 36.

In this śloka Abhinava not only uses puruṣa to designate the Supreme, but he also declares it to be aparāmrṣṭa, non-affected. Since parāmarśa is used in Pratyabhijñā as a synonym for vimarśa, this is tantamount to saying that the Supreme is avimarśa, non-experiencing.⁴⁴ As already shown, however, Abhinava employs in PS many reflectionist metaphors which depict non-modified supreme consciousness as devoid of action or experience.

AK Vaiṣṇavism and PS Śaivism

Abhinava does incorporate a great deal of AK's Vaiṣṇava material into PS. Abhinava begins PS with an invocation which, differing only slightly from Ādi Śeṣa's, also proclaims the simultaneous transcendence and immanence of the Supreme in the māyā-world:

Param̐ parastham̐ gahanād anādim ekaṁ niviṣṭam̐ bahudhā guhāsu,
sarvālayam̐ sarvacarācarastham̐ tvām eva śāmbhuṁ śaraṇam̐ pra-
padye.

In You, the beginningless Supreme who is beyond the abyss, the one who dwells as many in the depths [of the māyā-world], the substratum of all who is found in all that is moving or still, in You, Śāmbhu, I take refuge. - PS 1.

Only two alterations are made from Ādi Śeṣa's original verse:

Śāmbhu instead of Viṣṇu, and param̐ parastham̐ gahanād instead of param̐ parasyāṅ prakrteḥ. The term gahana, with which Abhinava replaces prakṛti, is used by Ādi Śeṣa himself in two later verses as synonymous with illusion and māyā.⁴⁵

As does Ādi Śeṣa in AK 30, Abhinava describes the Supreme as Himself weaving and becoming woven into the web of māyā:

Ātmānam̐ veṣṭayate citram̐ jālena jālakāra iva . . .
iti bandhamokṣacitrām̐ kṛiḍām̐ prat anoti paramaśivaḥ.

Like a spider with its web, He cloaks himself in various forms . . . thus Paramaśiva carries out His manifold sport of bondage and freedom. - PS 32-33.

However, only some of Ādi Śeṣa's other metaphors relating to Viṣṇu's manifesting the world are included in PS, and not without alterations.

Rasaphāṇitaśarkarikāgudakhaṇḍādya yathekṣurasa eva,
 tadvad avasthābhedaḥ sarve paramātmanaḥ śambhoḥ.
 Vijñāntaryāmi prāṇavirāḍdehajātīpīṇḍāntāḥ,
 vyavahāramātram etat paramārthena tu na santi eva.

As syrup, molasses, jaggery, sugar-balls, candy, etc., are all alike juice of the sugar-cane, so the divers conditions [of the māyā-world] are all of Śambhu, the supreme Self. Comprehension, inward controller, breath, cosmic body, generic existence, individual; these are nothing but the experiences of everyday-reality, which do not exist in the highest reality. - PS 26-27.

These two verses each begin identically with AK śloka 26 and 27, but they have quite different meanings. Ādi Śeṣa says that the "syrup, etc." are modifications (vikṛtayaḥ) of the sugar-cane, just as the diverse conditions of the māyā-world are the many forms of the supreme Self (paramātmany eva bahurūpāḥ). Ādi Śeṣa also states that "comprehension, etc." are the different conditions of the Self in the everyday-world (vyavahārās . . . ātmany ete avasthāviśeṣāḥ). Abhinava avoids the terms vikṛtayaḥ and bahurūpāḥ, and also the implication that the diversity of the everyday-world represents actual modifications of the Supreme. Abhinava borrows the phrase, "non-existent in the highest reality" (paramārthena na santi), from AK 21 where Ādi Śeṣa used it in conjunction with a string of illusionistic metaphors. By transposing the phrase to the pariṇāma metaphor of the sugar-cane, Abhinava provides a transition to the next verses in both texts (AK 28, PS 28), which contain almost identical renderings of the rope-snake analogy.

The other pariṇāma examples of AK are not amended by Abhinava, but completely omitted instead. Ādi Śeṣa's references

to the modifications of clay (vikārajātāni, AK 46) and to the various forms of water (AK 56) are nowhere found in PS. The same is true of Ādi Śeṣa's metaphor of the body and its parts (AK 46) and the sparks which arise from heated metal (AK 56). Despite Abhinava's obvious avoidance of any suggestion that the Supreme is actually modified in world manifestation, he does include one pariṇāma metaphor in PS which is not found in AK:

Raśanākuṇḍalakaṭakam bhedyāgena dṛśyate yathā hema,
tadvad bhedyāgo sanmātraṃ sarvam ābhāti.

Just as a girdle, ring or bracelet are all seen as gold when one abandons the differentiation (of names and forms), so all the world appears as pure being, when one abandons differentiation. - PS 42.

The gold-analogy is a favorite of Utpala's, but Abhinava here presents it with a different emphasis than does Utpala. The various gold ornaments, says Abhinava, may be regarded as gold only upon abandonment of multiplicity (bhedyāgena)⁴⁶. This implies the necessity for a denial or sublation of the māyā-world, or, at least, a disregard for the mere names and forms of the world.

Vedānta and PS

Almost all the Vedānta material in AK is utilized by Abhinava, and in some cases it is even expanded upon. Most of the verses in PS which expound Vedānta theories have already been presented in chapters 4-6 above. Examples of Abhinava's reflectionism, his superimposition, his distinction between levels of reality and sublation, are all found in PS.

PS ślokas 6, 7, 12 and 13⁴⁷ describe reflectionist metaphors. Verses 6 and 7, which are identical to AK 16 and 17, contain the analogies of the crystal and of the moon in the water. PS 12 and 13, which are not found in Ādi Śeṣa's text, contain Abhinava's own analogy of the village which is reflected in the water.

Abhinava's discussion of reciprocal superimposition (PS 30, 31, 39)⁴⁸ is also essentially his own. Ādi Śeṣa, in AK 29, described only one kind of "blindness" or illusion: the perception of non-self where there is really only Self. Abhinava outlines a scheme of reciprocal superimposition (non-self on Self and Self on non-self), which he refers to in śloka 40 as "the pair of illusions" (vibhramayugalam).

In PS 43-44⁴⁹ Abhinava distinguishes the reality of Brahman from the sky-flower world of appearances; these verses are closely related to AK 69, which stated that "the highest reality is real . . . all else is false." Abhinava's rope-snake analogy (PS 28-29)⁵⁰ is almost identical to Ādi Śeṣa's verses 28 and 21. However, while Ādi Śeṣa refers to the rope-snake three times, this is the only instance of its use in Abhinava's treatise.

Abhinava also uses Ādi Śeṣa's space-analogies, which demonstrate the non-affectedness of the Self. In PS 36, which was noted earlier as identical to AK 35, it is stated that the Supreme is as unaffected by the modifications of māyā as the surface of the sky by dirt or smoke. Abhinava continues in this vein in the

next two verses as well, which closely follow Ādi Śeṣa's verses 36 and 34, respectively:

Ekasmin ghaṭagagane rajasā vyāpte bhavanti nānyāni,
malināni tadvad ete jīvāḥ sukhaduḥkhabhedajuṣaḥ.
Śānte śānta ivāyaṁ hr̥ṣṭe hr̥ṣṭo vimohavati mūḍhaḥ,
tattvagane sati bhagavān na punaḥ paramārthataḥ sa tathā.

When one jar-space is filled with dust, others remain unsoiled. It is the same with the jīvas which are subject to the differentiation of pleasure and sorrow. It is as if the Lord were peaceful when the collection of categories are peaceful, happy when they are happy, deluded when they are deluded. But in the highest reality, He is not so.
- PS 37,38

Abhinava is saying that the limitations of the māyā-world are illusory and do not pertain to the Supreme in any real sense.⁵¹

Abhinava is also repeating his opposition to the modification of the Supreme, which was seen in his amendment or rejection of AK's pariṇāma metaphors.

Conclusions

The verses in AK which have been isolated and presented as Vaiṣṇava in nature portray a position quite compatible with Utpala's; they use pariṇāma metaphors to describe the Supreme manifesting Himself as the world through His own nature. When the illusionism and the distinctions placed between reality and appearance in AK are considered alongside AK's numerous references to the world being a product of supreme power, they closely parallel the philosophy of Abhinava.

It is difficult to draw any but the most tentative of historical conclusions on the basis of AK. The work is of uncertain

date and does not correspond to any familiar stage of development of either Vaiṣṇavism or Vedānta. Furthermore, many of AK's eighty-five ślokaś have not even been touched upon here because they express views common to almost all Indian schools of thought. By comparison, Abhinava's PS is a much more coherent work; it is better organized and free of AK's ambiguous Sāṃkhya terminology.

Since Abhinava demonstrates a familiarity with the theories of Śāṅkara, it cannot be said that Ādi Śeṣa's treatise itself inspired Abhinava's deviations from the position of Utpala. One can, though, look upon AK as either a post-Upaniṣadic link between Abhinava and Advaita Vedānta or as a direct source of pre-Śāṅkara Advaita influence upon Abhinava. The former course seems preferable, since the historical relationship between AK and Advaita Vedānta tradition is none too certain.

A comparison of AK and PS clearly shows that the Vedānta theories of Abhinava are not incidental to his philosophy. Nor are they placed there for argument's sake, since both AK and PS are presented as expositions of the highest truth, with no interjections of counter-arguments. Having examined the Vedānta theories in some of Abhinava's other works, it is not surprising that, given a choice of AK material to either include or omit in PS, Abhinava chose to emphasize the vivartavāda and illusionism of Ādi Śeṣa's treatise.

Introduction Notes

1. In dealing with Indian philosophy, it is difficult to avoid the use of Sanskrit terms. As much as possible, I have tried to confine the Sanskrit appearing in this work to the notes and appencixes. In order to avoid excessive underlinings, some Sanskrit words used very frequently - such as ātman, jīva, māyā and tattva - will be underlined only at their first appearances and then will appear without either underlining or capitalization.
2. In the Śaiva Āgamas, Śiva presents doctrines in response to the questions of Pārvatī, the pupil. Śākta scriptures are called nigama-s. In accordance with the Śākta school's greater emphasis upon the female principle of Divine Power (śakti), the deities' roles are reversed in the nigama-s, with Śiva being the questioner and Pārvatī the preceptor.
3. Sir John Marshall, Mohenjo-daro and the Indus Valley Civilization, 3 vols. (London, 1931), I, p.55.
4. The Nīlamata Purāṇa is probably the oldest extant work from Kashmir. Lachmidhar Kalla in The Birthplace of Kālidāsa (Delhi; Delhi Univ., 1926) contends that the tenets of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy may be traced back to sections of the Nīlamata, such as vv.1243-1256 of the appenuix, which describe Śiva as the only supreme reality who creates the world by his willpower (icchā). These verses are not, however, in accord with the general spirit of the work and are probably later additions. The picture which the Nīlamata gives is of a simple cult of Śiva and Umā which is far removed from the monistic form of Śaivism which appeared in 9th century Kashmir. See Ved Kumari, The Nīlamata Purāṇa: A Cultural and Literary Study (Śrinagar: Jammu and Kashmir Academy of Art, 1968), pp.228-233.
5. K. C. Pandey, Abhinava Gupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study, Chowkhamba Skt. Studies Vol.I, 2nd ed. (Varanasi, 1963), pp.148-151.
6. TA I, p.35, cited J. C. Chatterji, Kashmir Śaivism, KSTS No.2 (Śrinagar, 1914, 1962), p.5. The same legend is referred to in SD 7.7-9.
7. According to them, the specific feature of conceptual knowledge (Pali saññā, Skt. saṃjñā) is the recognizing (paccabhiññā, pratyabhiññā) by means of a sign (abhiññānena, abhiññānena). See S. N. Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1922-1955), I, p.98.

8. SD 4.116-120.

9. IPV I, p.20.

10. IPV II, pp.274-275, trans. Pandey. Lacchmidhar Kalla, op. cit., contends that the similarity between this allegory and Kālidāsa's Śakuntalam indicates that Kālidāsa was a follower of Pratyabhijñā philosophy. He fails to show, however, that any specific mention is made of Pratyabhijñā or Pratyabhijñā philosophy in Kālidāsa's works; see R. K. Kaw, The Doctrine of Recognition: Pratyabhijñā philosophy, Vishvesharan Institute Series No.40 (Hoshiapur, 1967), pp.43-49.

11. IPV I, p.17.

12. Sughṭa eṣa navamārgaḥ - IPK 4.1.3.

13. Tato 'pi paramaṃ jñānam upāyādivivarjitam. - TA I, p.166.

14. G. Bühler, "Detailed Report of a Tour in Search of Sanskrit Manuscripts Made in Kashmir, Rajaputana and Central Asia," in Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Extra Number, 1877.

15. L. D. Barnett, "The Paramārthasāra of Abhinava Gupta," in The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Gt. Britain (London, 1910), pp.707-747.

16. Vedānta tradition holds that Śaṅkara himself was a practicing Śaivite, and hundreds of devotional hymns are attributed to him. Even Śaṅkara's philosophical works contain a great many scriptural interjections which stand quite apart from the general tone of his metaphysical writings. See BSB 2.1.25, cited infra, p.38.

17. This is the case even in the two most widely known critical histories of Indian philosophy: Das Gupta's History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., and S. Radhakrishnan's Indian Philosophy, 2 vols. (London, 1952, 1953). Das Gupta provides only an occasional passing reference to Abhinava. Radhakrishnan sandwiches his brief treatment of the Pratyabhijñā system (II, pp.731-734) between Śāktaism and Mādhva dualism in his chapter on "Śaiva, Śākta and Vaiṣṇava Theism."

18. Bühler, p.78.

19. S. N. Das Gupta, Indian Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1933, 1962), p.193.

20. Kaw, p.10.

21. Pandey, Abhinava Gupta, p.51.
22. Pandey presents the legend as fact in Abhinava Gupta, pp.88-90., Kaw, pp.6-11, shows that there is no real evidence of Saṅkara's ever having visited Kashmir.
23. See Karl Potter, Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp.98-102.

Cn.1 Notes

1. There are also other derivations of the name trika; see Chatterji, p.1, and Pandey, Abhinava Gupta, p.170. These two works, along with Kaw, pp.239-273, may be referred to for a more detailed discussion of the Agama and Spanda branches than that which follows.
2. See TA, Ah.36, vv.381-388, cited Pandey, Abhinava Gupta, p.134.
3. Mircea Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, 2nd ed., Bollingen Series LVI (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969), p.254.
4. Chatterji, pp.8-9.
5. These upāya-s are three in number: 1. āṅavopāya - where external things such as jaṅa and the body-centers are used as a means to self-realization; 2. sāktopāya - where the mental activities of meditation are more important; and 3. sāmbhavopāya - where willpower predominates without concentration on a particular object. Abhinava discusses these three methods at great length in TA, calling them respectively the upāya-s of action (kriyā), knowledge (jñāna) and will (icchā). Pratyabhijñā philosophy, in contrast to these, is said to be free of practices of any kind (anupāya) and to be a way of reasoning (tarka). See TA I, pp.230-235.
6. The very first line of the Śivasūtra-s abruptly reads: Ātmā caitanyam.
7. See Spandakārikā-s 2.3-5.
8. See Spandakārikā 2.10.
9. Tarkasya kartā - TA I, p.10.
10. R. Gnoli, "Śivadṛṣṭi by Somānanda: Chap.1", in East and West, Vol.VIII (Rome, 1957), Introdu., p.1b.
11. See TA comm., Ah.8, vv.136-137, cited Pandey, Abhinava Gupta, p.17.
12. Pandey, Abhinava Gupta, pp.25-26.
13. Ibid., pp.27-28.
14. See F. Otto Schrader, Kashmir Rescension of the Bhagavad-gīta (Stuttgart: V. W. Kohlmann, 1928).

15. PH, p.34. All PH citations will be taken from the text of Jaideva Singh's Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam: Samskrita Text with English Translation and Notes (Varanasi: Motilal banarsidas, 1963).

16. Bnāskara is the most interesting of the later Pratyabhijñāvādins. However, he interprets Abhinava in the light of all the Advaita Vedānta developments of the intervening eight centuries. This makes it difficult to utilize Bnāskara's commentary in ascertaining Abhinava's position vis-à-vis either Utpala or Saṅkara.

17. Chatterji, p.6.

18. Chatterji, pp.7-17.

19. Fandey, Abhinava Gupta, p.291.

20. Kaw, p.62.

21. Kaw, p.334.

Ch.2 Notes

1. TA I, p.105. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
2. IPK 4.1.5.
3. Ibid.
4. See Pandey, Abhinava Gupta, pp.635-653.
5. IPV I, p.268.
6. TA I, p.105. See also PH, p.56.
7. Ibid.
8. PH, p.35.
9. Svābhāvikam avābhāsyā - IPV I, p.196.
10. Ananyamukhaprekṣitvam - IPV I, p.198.
11. Svātmaviśrāntilakṣaṇam - IPV I, p.198.
12. Antarbaḥiṣkaraṇasvātantryam - IPV I, p.198.
13. Saṃyojanaviyojanānusaṃdhānādirūpam svātantryam
- IPV I, p.202.
14. Svātmamātrāyām eva jagadvad aviśrāntatvam - IPV I, p.202.
15. Appendix A contains a chart of the tattvas. For a very complete discussion of the Śaiva categories, see Chatterji, pp.43-85.
16. See PH, p.29. Since PH is a general summary of Kashmir Śaivism as a whole, Kṣemarāja presents Śiva and Śakti as separate categories in the manner of the Āgamas.
17. Chatterji, p.66.
18. IPK 3.1.2.
19. IPV II, p.190.
20. The sadāśiva, īśvara and sadvioyā tattvas are all eternally existent and subsequent to one another in priority, but not in time. Each preceding stage establishes the necessary conditions for the subsequent one. But time, as a succession of moments, is only brought into being with the 26th tattva, kāla (see intra, p.38). This is a point to be born carefully in mind, since even when speaking of a purely

logical process, we must use such terms as "before", "after", "next", etc.

21. PH, p.11.

22. IPV II, p.193.

23. IPV II, p.192; PH, p.40.

24. IPV II, p.193; PH, p.40.

25. PH, p.41.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Chatterji, p.76.

29. Paratvaṁ pūrṇatvaṁ ananyāpekṣatvaṁ iti... aparatvaṁ anyāpekṣatvaṁ iti. - IPV II, p.199.

30. Māyāśaktyā tulyā vedyabhāge bhedaprakāśanāt... na ca māyā eva grāhakasya cinnātriabhāge tāvad aviparyāsanāt.
- IPV II, p.200.

31. Atrāparatvaṁ bhāvānām anātmatvena bhāsanāt, paratānantāyācchācāt parāparaśā hi sā. - IPK 3.1.5.

32. Utpala and Ahoṇava use the term māyā in various ways, usually in reference to the limiting power of consciousness (māyāśakti). They seldom refer to māyā as a specific category.

33. Tirohanakarī māyābhichā... virodhate āvṛṇute vimohinī sā. - IPV II, p.203.

34. Sarvato bhinnat - PH, p.42.

35. See IPV II, p.207; PH, p.60.

36. IPK 3.1.1-11.

37. Cf. Gerald Larson, Classical Sāṁkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969), pp.192-197.

38. Sāṁkoco 'pi vicāryamāṇas' cidaikātmyena prathamānatvāt cinnaya eva, anyathā tu na kiṁcit. - PH, p.45.

39. Śivabhedapratītimātraṁ mokṣas, tadapratītis tu bandha, iti tāvatā pratītimātreṇa. Na tu vastvanyathāṅve bandha-

mokṣayor bandhamokṣatā. - SD 3.70 comm.

40. Vikalpabalādo eva jantavo badhanaḥ ātmānam abhimanante.
Sa abhimānaḥ saṁsārapratibandhanahetuḥ. - TS, p.26.

Vikalpa has the general meaning of erroneous cognition. It also has a special technical sense in Pratyabhijñā, and Pandey usually translates the term as "dualistic, determinate cognition."

41. See IPV II, pp.150-152, 246-247.

42. BSB 2.1.33. See also MKB 1.7.

43. Potter, p.111.

44. Kaw, p.38.

45. Ibid.

Ch.3 Notes

1. Chaṇḍogya Up. 7.25.2.
2. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. 2.3.6.
3. Paramaśivāt prabhṛti ghaṭādyantānām api padārthānām
anatiriktā ca śivatā pūrṇacidrūpānatirekāt. - SD 1.48 comm.
4. Nātra svātmavikāreṇa janayed bhāvamaṅgalam. - SD 3.35.
5. Patadgrahādike hemni hematvam mukuṭākike,
sthitam eva na hemno 'sya kācid asti vibheditā.
- SD 3.44-45.
Patadgraha also means a begging vessel.
6. See SD 4.6 comm., infra, Appendix B.
7. Ātmāta eva caitanyaṁ citkriyā citikartṛtā,
tātparyeṇoditas tena jagāt sa hi vilakṣaṇaḥ.
Citih pratyavarmarśātmā parā vāk svarasoditā,
svātantryaṁ etan mukhyaṁ tadaiśvaryaṁ paramātmanaḥ.
- IPK 1.5.12-13.
8. Samvid apy aparāmarśarūpā ced tad asāv api abhāvena
jagēnātha tulyaiva prāgvadātmani. - Siddhitrayī, p.9.
9. Svabhāvam avabhāsasya vimarśaṁ vidur,
anyathā prakāśo 'rthoparakto 'pi sphaṭikādijagopamaḥ.
- IPK 1.5.11.
10. See infra, pp.109 ff.
11. Ye vedāntavidvaṁsaḥ... bhrāntirūpatām viśvam, na satya-
rūpatvam... pratibimbatayā cānye ye vā sargamukhe svayaṁ
brahmaiva gṛṇāty ātmānam. - SD 6.8-11.
12. Cidātmanaḥ pratibimbakalpair bhāvair anādhikyāt. Nāpi
tadātmaprathā bhrāntiḥ. - SD 1.17 comm.
13. Atnaikatve 'pi śarīropāśrayaḥ pravibhāgaḥ sphaṭikasye-
veti. Tan na, tāny asatyānti tava darśane vyavasthā. Na
cāsatyam akiṁcidrūpam kvacid upayogi bhavatīti yāvat.
- SD 2.43 comm.
14. Yady api ekam eva śivatattvaṁ, tathāpi tadīyam eva
svātantryaṁ svātmani svarūpabhedam tāvat pratibimbakalpatayā
darśayati. - IPV II, p.191.

15. Darpaṇabimbe yadvan nagaraṅgrāmāui citram avibhāgi,
bhāti vibhāgenaiva ca parasparaṁ darpaṇāo api ca.
Vimalatamaṇaparamabhairavaṇudāt taovad vibhāgaśūnyam api,
anyonyam ca tato 'pi ca vibhaktam ābhāti jagad etat.
- PS 12-13.
16. Ioaṁ hi pratibimbasya lakṣaṇam. Yad bñeḍena bñāsitam
śaktam anyavyāmiśratvenaiva bhāti tat pratibimbam.
- TS, p.10.
17. Mukharūpam iva darpaṇe, rasa iva dantocake, gancha iva
ghrāṇe, mithunasparśa ivānandendriye... nāpi gandhasparśau
mukhyau, guṇiṇaḥ tatrābhavetaylor ayogāt kāryaparamparānā-
rambhāt. - TS, p.11.
18. Ittham atyarthabhinnārthāvabhāsakhacite vibhau,
samalo vimalo vāpi vyavahāro 'nubhūyate. - IPK 1.7.14.

Ch.4 Notes

1. Anampratyavamarśo yaḥ prakāśātmiṇi vāgvapuḥ,
nāsau vikalpaḥ sa hy ukto dvayākṣepi viniścayaḥ.
- IPK 1.6.1.
Pratyabhijñānvācins occasionally use the terminology of
the grammarians, e.g., parā vāk. See infra, pp.116-118.
2. Cf. sphuṭa, supra, p.31, where world manifestation is
described as a progressively clearer and more distinct de-
limitation of objectivity.
3. IPK 1.3.7.
4. Utpala doesn't object to the conception of negative-reals
or non-jars, per se, but rather to the duality and differ-
entiation implicit in the determinate cognitions which are
formed on the basis of negative-reals.
5. BSB, introduction.
6. Na cāpy atra bhedeshv asatyeshu satyabudhnyā chrāntirūpā
khaṅganāstivedoktavat, yato bhāvānām sarveṣām eva śivarū-
patve sthite banutvam ekatvam vā. - SD 3.71 comm.
7. bhede 'pi tathā bhedarūpeṇa śivasyāvasthānām svecchā-
vaśāt, sa ca bhedaḥ śivātmakaḥ. - SD 3.72 comm.
8. Bhedātmakam na tu bhāvabhedapṛthagbhūtam... evam
vyavasthānasvabhāvatvāt tasya paramēśvarasya nānarūpe
'pi viśvasmin satyataiveti. - SD 1.49 comm.
9. Atadrūpaṁ tadrūpaṁ yadāvasīyate yathā manorājyādi,
tadā tat kalpanā kalpyamānam bhavet. Yāvatā sākṣāc chiva
eva sarvam iti vastusthityā pṛtnivyādi śiva eva śivatvena
kiṁ kalpitaṁ bhavati nabhavaty evety arthaḥ. - SD 3.83 comm.
10. Kaṭake kiṁ suvarṇatvam satyam kuṇḍale tu kalpitaṁ,
naivety arthaḥ. - SD 3.84 comm.
11. Grāhyagrāhakatābhinnāvarthau bhātaḥ pramātari.
- IPK 1.4.6.
12. See supra, p.37, n.39.
13. Advayaḥ sa evāpi śaktimatparikalpane - TA I, p.109.
14. Na ca vicchedanam vastutaḥ sambhavatīti vicchedanasya
avabhāsamātram ucyate. - IPV I, p.110.
15. Etat tad anukāram yad bhāveṣu prakāśamānatayā,
ātmanatirikteṣv api bhavaty anātmābhinnāno 'yam.
- PS 30.

16. Prakāśamānatā hi prakāśābhedoḥ... tata evaikāśivatvam.
- SD 4.6 comm.
17. Timirād api timiram idaṁ gaṅgāsyo pari mahān ayam sphoṛṣṭiḥ,
yad anātmāny api denapraṅgācāv ātmamānitvam.
- PS 31.

Ch.5 Notes

1. Tatra śraddhāmātreṇ o papattirahitena jantūnām, na tu vastūnām śuddhir aśuddhir vā kā cit. - SD 1.48 comm.
2. BSB 2.1.14.
3. SD 4.1-6 comm.; see Appendix b for text and translation of arguments from SD 4.6-20 comm.
4. SD 4.7-9 comm.
5. SD 4.10 comm.
6. SD 4.27 comm.
7. SD 4.20 comm.
8. SD 4.10 comm.
9. SD 4.11-12 comm.
10. SD 4.17-18 comm.
11. SD 4.15-16 comm.
12. SD 4.17-18 comm.
13. Sarvavyavanārāṅām prāgbrahmatāvijñānāt satyatvopapattiḥ [cānābhāvāt] svapnavyavanārasyeva prāgprabohāt. - BSB 2.1.14. The bracketed comment is that of Nārāyan Kām Ācharya, editor of the text.
14. Banutvam apāramāarthikam - IPV I, p.42.
15. Tena yad yatnā yāvad abhāditām vimṛśyate, tat tatnā tāvad asti. - IPV I, p.41.
16. Yac yat kiñcit sphurati, tat tad vakṣyamāṇ eśvararūpa-svātmaprathāmātram. Tatra tu upāyopeyabhāvaprabhṛtiḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'pi yathāprakāśam paramāarthabhūta eva prakāśasyānapahnavanīyatvāt. - IPV I, p.9.
17. Sa tu māyīyatvena vyavasthāpayiṣyate jagadacetanācy-avāntarabhedasatasamābhinnas ca asau, tatkiṛtas ca sarvo 'yam niṣpāyāniṣpācakabhāvajñāpyajñāpakabhāvāvabhāso lokavyavanārārūpaḥ. - IPV I, p.10.
See also IPV I, p.38: Na kērakavyāpāro bhūgavati, nāpi jñāpakavyāpāro 'yam, api tu mchāpasaraṇamātram etat.
18. Anyathā sarvatra prakāśoparamārthatve asya idam kāraṇam kāryam vā iti vibhāgo na yujyeta ity arthaḥ. - IPV I, p.10, n.20.

19. Viśvapratibimbadhāritvāc ca viśvātmakatvam bhaḡvataḡ.
- TS, p.21.

20. Silburn's translation, "En verité la grande Énergie de l'erreur ne peut être percée à jour," is preferable to Barnett's: "Truly the mighty power of illusion cannot be pierced." The latter is literally correct yet unduly pessimistic. The Sanskrit reads: bhrānter mahatī śaktir na vivektum śakyate nāna.

21. Cf. MKB 2.32.

22. Rajataika vimarśe 'pi śuktau na rajatasthitiḡ,
upāhidesāsānīvādāc dvicanore 'pi nabho 'nyathā.
- IPK 2.3.13.

23. See Potter, pp.203-210.

24. IPV II, p.113. These theories respectively contend that the object or error is unreal (asat), otherwise than it appears (viparīta), and indescribable as real or unreal (anirvacanīya).

25. IPK 2.3.1-3 and IPV II, p.65.

26. Nānu satyarūpyajñānam apy apūrṇaknyātiḡ. Tatas tarhi kim. Idam ataḡ sarvaṁ bhrāntiḡ, ity āgacchet.

Diṣṭyā drṣṭir unmimīliṣati āyusmetatḡ. Māyāpadaṁ hi sarvaṁ bhrāntiḡ. Tatrāpi tu svapne svapna iva gaṅḡe sphoṭa iva apareyam bhrāntir ucyate. - IPV II, p.114.
Pandey surprisingly translates gaṅḡe sphoṭa as "boil on a cheek", which misses the allusion to a double layer of infection. Cf. PS 31, cited supra, p.61.

Ch.6 Notes

1. J. Rudrappa, "Kashmir Śaivism", in Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society, Vol.45, no.3 (Bangalore, 1955), p.291. Also Pancey, introd. to Bhāskarī III, p.cc.
2. Pandey, Abhinava Gupta, p.161.
3. Chatterji, p.2.
4. Kaw, p.358.
5. Pandey, introd. to Bhāskarī III, p.cc.
6. Kaw, p.121.
7. Jaṅgaddṛśyānām bhāvānām vaitathyam... dṛśyatvam asatyatvām cāviśiṣṭa ubhayatra. - MKB 2.4.
8. Radhakrishnan, II, p.477.
9. Radhakrishnan, II, pp.475-476.
10. Anyathā sa pratipattā pravibhedāt kāraṅāt kathāṁ ghaṭo 'yam iti vetti, na kathāṁcit jānīyād ity arthaḥ.
- SD 4.31 comm.
- See also IPK 1.5.1-2 and 1.7.1.
11. IPV I, p.221. Parāhantā (literally, "supreme I-ness") is devoid of the subject-object differentiation which is found in the limited subject's principle of egoity (ahaṁkāra).
12. Brahmasūtra 1.2.20 reads: Śarīraś cobhaye 'pi hi bhe-
denainam adhiyate. "The embodied jīva-self also could not
be (the antaryāmin) because both (the rescensions of the
Bṛhadāraṇyaka) recite it as being different (from the
antaryāmin)." - Trans. Apte. Śaṅkara treats this sūtra
as the purvapakṣin argument of an opponent, and he re-
futes it in his commentary.
13. Vibhūr jīvaḥ... pāramārthikāṁ cānantyam. - BSB 2.3.29.
14. See Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical
Reconstruction (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1969),
p.50.
15. SD 3.83 comm., cited supra p.55.
16. Kaw, p.59.
17. Infra, pp.133-134.

18. See MhB 2.44.
19. Deutsch, p.86.
20. See BSB 2.1.14, cited supra, p.69.
21. IPK 1.6.13.
22. See supra, pp.54-55.

Ch.7 Notes

1. Satatapravahadbahutaracharmabhedasambhedasvātantrīya-lakṣaṇaṁ pariṇāmanakriyākartṛkatvam - IPV II, p.176.
2. Yat tu prameyadaśāpatitaṁ na bhavati kiṁ tu cidrūpatayā prakāśaparamārtharūpaṁ cidēkasvabhāvaṁ svacchaṁ, tatra bhedābhedarūpatopalabhyate. - IPV II, p.177.
3. Prakāśaparamārthenaiva bhedena prakāśayati maheśvaraḥ, - iti tad evāsyāticurghaṭakāritvalakṣaṇaṁ svātantrīyam aiśvāryam ucyate. - IPV II, p.181.
4. MKB 3.12.
5. Fanuey translates bheda as "duality", here and in other excerpts cited from this section of IPV. I have substituted "multiplicity" instead.
6. Supra, pp.54-56.
7. See supra, p.57.
8. IPV II, p.182.
9. Svatantraśabdo brahmavādavailakṣaṇyam ācakṣāṇaḥ, cito māheśvāryasāratām brūte. - PH, p.38.
10. See Deutsch, p.9.
11. BSB 2.3.40, cited supra, p.84.
12. The Self cannot be a mode of action because action modifies that in which it abides - BSB 1.1.14. Action is brought about by ignorance - BSB 2.3.40, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.8 4.5.15. Action is motivated by desire - intro. to Taittirīya Up.8. Action is a form of duḥkha - BSB 2.3.40.
13. Tao eva śāntacidrūpatvam, śāntatvam hi vimarśākyakṣobharahitatvam evaṁ teṣāṁ iṣṭam. - Bhāskarī I, p.10.
14. MKB 2.32.
15. Anumātram api viśeṣam anāśritya - BSB 3.2.21.
16. Siddhaṁ tu nivartakatvāt - MKB 2.32. See also Taittirīya Up.8 2.1.1.
17. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. 2.3.6.
18. See BSB 2.1.6, 2.1.11.

19. MKB 4.45.
20. Cf. supra, p.17, n.6.
21. IPV I, p.14.
22. IPV II, p.268.
23. IPV I, p.14.
24. P. T. Raju, "Metaphysical Theories in Indian Philosophy," in The Indian Mind, ed. Charles Moore (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), p.4.
25. Raju is not referring to māyātattva, the 6th category of Kashmir Śaivism, but to māyā in the more general sense common to both Abhinava and Śaṅkara as denoting the forms of the manifest world and the principle which gives rise to those forms (see supra, pp.71-72). Raju's application of the terms māyā and śakti to both Abhinava and Śaṅkara is confusing, but what he seems to be saying is that both philosophers regard world manifestation to be a power of ultimate reality. In Abhinava's case the terminological and conceptual equivalence of māyā and śakti is evident in his use of the term māyāśakti. Śaṅkara rarely uses the term śakti, and he only occasionally uses māyā in the sense of supreme power.
26. BSB 2.1.20.
27. BSB 2.1.14.
28. See supra, p.37-40.
29. See MKB 2.4, cited supra, p.79, n.7.
30. Na hi sadasatoḥ sambandhaḥ - MKB 2.7.
31. Supra, p.58.
32. Vimarśo hi sarvaśahaḥ param api ātmīkaroti, ātmānam ca parīkaroti, ubhayaṁ ekīkaroti, ekīkṛtaṁ dvayam api nyagbhāvayati ity evaṁsvabhāvaḥ. - IPV I, p.205.

Ch.8 Notes

1. J. Gonda, Viṣṇuism and Śivaism: A Comparison (London: Athlone Press, 1970), p.95.
2. Ed. Pitambaraji (Delhi: Ratan Eno Co., 1942). Trans. H. P. Shastri, Pañcadaśī: A Treatise on Advaita Metaphysics (London: Shanti Sadan, 1956).
3. PD 1.8.
4. PD 13.2. Much of Vidyāraṇya's discourse on bliss is drawn from the Upaniṣads; cf. Taittirīya Up. 2.6.
5. Cf. supra, p.91, n.3.
6. See PD 2.53, 13.11, 13.65.
7. Paramātmādvayānandapūrṇaḥ pūrvaṁ svamāyayā, svayam eva jagad bhūtvā prāviśaj jīvarūpaḥ. - PD 8.12.
8. Avikriyā brahmaniṣṭhā vikāraṁ yāti anekadhā, māyām tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt, māyinaṁ tu mahesvaram. - PD 13.66. Cf. Svet. Up. 4.10.
9. Śaktiḥ śaktāt prthaṇ nāsti... na cābhichā. - PD 13.11.
10. Na śūnyam... nāpi sat. - PD 2.49.
11. PD 7.216-217.
12. PD 7.5, 2.16, 6.50.
13. PD 13.9.
14. PD 13.8.
15. Kṣīrādau pariṇāmo 'stu puṁsas tadbnāvavarjanāt, etāvatā mṛdādinām [ed. note: vivartasya] oṣṭāntatvaṁ na hīyate. - PD 13.51.
16. In MKB 3.7 Śaṅkara contrasts the limitationist analogy of a jar-space to the pariṇāma analogies of gold ornaments and bubbling water. Only in the former instance, he says, is there no change in the substratum.
17. Vāgāraṁbhanam vikāro nāmadheyam - BSB 2.1.14. See also BSB 2.1.27, 2.1.31, 2.3.46.
18. Supra, pp.34-41.

19. Parameśvaras tathātathābhāvasvānūpaiḥ svayam eva prakalpate. - SD 4.47 comm.
20. Ekātmano vibhedaś ca kriyā kālakramānugā,
tathā syāt kartṛtaivaivaṁ tathā pariṇamattayā.
- IPK 2.4.18.
21. Maulipariṇāmakṣaṇasya ... anabhivyaktimātrasya nāśatvāt. - SD 4.56-57 comm.
22. Tao evoktam indriyāṅgām asāmarthyam tathāsāv evānabhivyaktiḥ sa ghāṭādiḥ śivatayā pracchannas tadā sthita iti.
- SD 4.57-58 comm.
23. Supra, p.40.
24. Kaw, p.334.
25. A great deal of the difficulty in determining Bhartṛhari's views lies in the uncertainty as to whether he was not only the author of the kārikā-s of the Vākyapadīya, but of the text's vṛtti as well. Much of the language and meaning of VP is obscure. In VP 1.120, for example, pariṇāma and vivarta are used interchangeably: Śaboasya pariṇāma... etad viśvam vyavartata. In VP 1.47 and 1.117 vi-vṛt means manifestation of the word at the organs of articulation. In VP 1.18, vi-vṛt simply means "appears" or "manifests" - though it is unclear in what sense. Also, in VP 1.142 only the three levels of speech are mentioned - paśyantī, etc. In the vṛtti on 1.142 a fourth stage of speech, turiyā, is introduced. The vṛtti as a whole demonstrates a much greater precision in the use of technical terms and a much more explicit vivarta approach to world manifestation than do the kārikā-s. Considering the philosophical discrepancies between the kārikā-s and the vṛtti, M. Biardeau has concluded that the vṛtti is the work of a later hand who has made Bhartṛhari into a vivartavādīn, which he was not; see the introduction to Vākyapadīya: Brahmakāṇḍa avec la vṛtti de Harivṛṣabha, Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation (Paris: De Boccard, 1964). The literary evidence which points to an identity of authorship may be found in the introduction to K. A. Subrahmanya Iyer's The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Vṛtti: Chapter One (Poona: Deccan College, 1965).
26. SD 2.26,44-45 and comm.
27. SD 2.11 and comm.
28. SD 2.27,31 and comm.

29. Much of Somānanda's depiction of Bhartṛhari's position is drawn from the vṛtti on VP 1.142, which by Somānanda's time was regarded as authored by Bhartṛhari. See also IPVV II, p.189, which attributes a citation from the same vṛtti passage to Bhartṛhari.

30. SD 2.50-51 and comm.

31. SD 2.55-56 and comm.

32. SD 2.62-64 and comm.

33. SD 2.66-69 and comm.

34. SD 2.86-87 and comm.

35. The concept of parā as higher than paśyantī is developed in IPK 1.5. The most complete Pratyabhijñā description of the Grammarian system is found in Abhinava's Parātrīśikā-vivaraṇa, which presents the idea of parā as the most central and essential aspect of the Supreme: Uttarāṅ paśyantyādyāṅ śaktayaḥ... tā [parā] yatra na syuḥ. - PTV, p.29.

36. BSB 1.3.28.

37. Gaurinath Shastri, The Philosophy of Word and Meaning: Some Indian Approaches with Special Reference to the Philosophy of Bhartṛhari, Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series No.V (Calcutta: Śree Sarasvaty Press, 1959).

38. G. Shastri, p.64.

39. G. Shastri, p.77.

40. G. Shastri, p.63.

41. G. Shastri, p.77.

42. See supra, pp.96-97.

43. G. Shastri, pp.24-25.

44. G. Shastri, p.63.

45. G. Shastri, p.16.

46. See supra, pp.48, 57.

47. "Pour comprendre le vivartavāda, il faut avoir passé par l'étape du pariṇāmavāda." - O. Lacombe, L'Absolu Selon le Vedānta (Paris: Geuthner, 1937), p.237.

Ch.9 Notes

1. Timaeus, cited by Radhakrishnan (II, p.656) in conjunction with his assertion that Śaṅkara "gives us a logical theism which does not slight the intellect, does not scorn the wisdom of the ages, and is at the same time the highest intellectual account of the truth."
2. E.g., Prakāśānanda (ca.1550-1600). See Potter, pp.244-247, and Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, II, pp.220-224.
3. Deutsch, p.54. Throughout the work Deutsch uses "subra-tion" in place of the more common term, sublation. Śaṅkara does not always treat the sublation of the māyā-world and jīva-self in two different ways; see BSB 2.3.50, cited supra, p.85.
4. Gnoli, introduction to "Śivaprīti by Somānanda: Chapter I," op.cit., p.16.
5. See P. T. Raju, Idealistic Thought of India (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953), pp.292 ff.
6. Radhakrishnan's own beliefs are most clearly shown in his An Idealist View of Life, 2nd ed. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1937), p.334: "Spirit is the reality of the cosmic process. Nothing of what comes in our personal experience can be predicated with complete truth of the ultimate reality, though no element of this experience is without meaning or value. No element of an experience is illusory, though every element of it has a degree of reality according to the extent to which it succeeds in expressing the nature of the real." That he interprets Śaṅkara along similar lines is evident in his Indian Philosophy, vol.II, where it is said that Śaṅkara "supports the phenomenal as against the illusory nature of the world" (p.581), and that in Śaṅkara's system "the world is not so much negated as reinterpreted" (p.583), "the real accepts the phenomenal... appearance belongs to reality" (p.585), and sublation consists of "sinking the world into Brahman and not its denial" (p.639).

Appendix C Notes

1. L. D. Barnett, "The Paramārthasāra of Abhinava Gupta," in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain (London, 1910), pp.707-747.
2. On the date of Yogarāja, see Pandey, Abhinava Gupta, p.261.
3. Lillian Silburn, Le Paramārthasāra, Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, No.5 (Paris, 1910).
4. Ādi Śeṣa and Ādhāra are both names of the cosmic serpent upon which Viṣṇu rests. This fits quite well with the Vaiṣṇava elements of the work. The treatise is also sometimes attributed to the only slightly less mythological Patañjali, who is reputed to be an incarnation of Śeṣa.
5. Chatterji, p.12.
6. Pandey, Abhinava Gupta, p.67.
7. Ādhāra-kārikābhiḥ taṁ gurur abhibhāṣati sma tatsāram,
kathayaty abhinavaguptaḥ śivaśāsanadṛṣṭiyogena. - PS 3.
8. There are two editions of AK. One has been published in Pandit (Vol.V, 1870), ed. Bala Shastri; the other has been published in the Trivendrum Skt. Series (ed. with Skt. notes by T. Ganapati Shastri, No.XII, 1911). The Pandit edition in its concluding line states the total number of its verses to be 85, even though it itself consists of only 79 verses. The Trivendrum edition does have 85 verses and will be the one referred to below. The six extra verses constitute a sort of introduction, and the two editions seem not to differ at all apart from that. See Pandey, Abhinava Gupta, p.65.
9. Pandey, Abhinava Gupta, p.67.
10. Silburn, intro., pp.19-20.
11. Chatterji, p.14.
12. Kaw, pp.9, 277-279.
13. T. M. P. Mahadevan, Gaugapāda: A Study in Early Advaita, 3rd ed. (Madras: Univ. of Madras, 1960).
14. Mahadevan, p.17.
15. Mahadevan, p.22.

16. S. S. Suryanarayan Śāstri, "The Paramārthasāra of Ācārya Śeṣa: Transliterated Text, Translation and Notes," in New Indian Antiquary, Extra Series IV (Bombay, 1941), Intro.
17. _____, "Paramārthasāra and Śrī Bhāgavata," in Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol.22 (Calcutta, 1946), pp.105-111.
18. Ibid., p.111.
19. Mahadevan (p.30) states that it is quite likely that the Bhāgavata presupposes MK. Śāstri contends that the Bhāgavata borrowed from both AK and MK. Śāstri's hypothesis, however, is not a very convincing one. Although Śāstri presents AK as a Vedānta text, most of the similarities noted deal with the Sāṅkhya theories expounded in the Kapila-Devabhūti section of the Bhāgavata's third skandha and with the two works' common doctrines concerning "jīvan-mukti in the light of Sāṅkhya-yoga reconciled to bhakti."
20. Mahadevan, pp.9-16.
21. Thomas J. Hopkins, "The Social Teaching of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa," in Krishna: Myth, Rites and Attitudes, ed. Milton Singer (Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1968) pp.4-6.
22. Pandey, Abhinava Gupta, p.63. Pandey makes no distinction between the philosophy of Pratyabhijñā and the theories of Kashmir Saivism as a whole; see supra, p.25.
23. Pandey, Abhinava Gupta, pp.66-68.
24. My own translation of PS, often aided by Silburn's French rendition of the text, will be sometimes used instead of Barnett's. All AK translations will be my own. Śāstri's translation of AK is unsatisfactory, since it is based on Rāghavānanda's commentary, which is included in the Triven-drum edition. Rāghavānanda is a post-Śāṅkara Advaitin of uncertain date whose views often conflict with the most sensible reading of the text itself; see infra., p.158, n.38.
25. Kuśalatamasīlpikalpitavimalābhāvaḥ samuogakopāśneḥ,
malino 'pi maṅgīrupādher vicchede svacchaparamārthaḥ.
- PS 87.
26. Evaṁ saṅguruśāsanavimalasthitivedanaṁ tanūpāśneḥ,
muktam apy upādhyantaraśūnyam ivābhāti śivarūpam. - PS 88.
27. Cf. BSB 2.3.40, cited supra, p.84.
28. Yogarāja explains in his commentary that the five powers are consciousness, bliss, will, knowledge and action.

29. Guṇapuruṣavibhāṅgaḥ dharmādharmau na bandhakau bhavataḥ,
iti gaditaḥ pūrvavākyaḥ prakṛtiṃ puruṣaṃ ca me brūhi.
- AK 7.
30. Guṇapuruṣajñāḥ - AK 63. Evaṃ prakṛtiṃ puruṣaṃ vijñāya...
kevalī bhavati. - AK 70. On the notion of kaivalya in
Sāṃkhya, see Larson, pp.97-99.
31. Prakṛtiḥ guṇebhas tadvat pṛthakkṛtaḥ - AK 44.
32. Upāhīnām tatsāmsargād bandhaḥ - AK 52.
Dehaguṇakāraṇagocarasāṅgāt puruṣasya... sāmsāre baddha
iva bhāti. - AK 53.
33. Prakṛtāḥ heyāḥ - AK 20.
34. Mūlaprakṛter idam kṛtam yena - AK 9.
35. AK 19.
36. Rasapnānītaśarkarīkṛtāḥ vikṛtayo yathāivekṣaṇ,
tadvad avastnābhedaḥ paramātmāny eva bahurūpāḥ.
Vijñānāntaryamiprāṇavirāḡuehajātīpīṇḍāntāḥ,
vyavahārās tasyātmāny ete vasthāviśeṣāḥ syuh. - AK 26-27.
37. Monayatīvatmānaṃ svamāyayā dvaitarūpayā devaḥ. - AK 32.
38. Yadvad ohaḥ 'vayavā mīd eva tasyā vikārajātāni,
tadvat sthāvarajaṅgamam dvaitam dvaitavad bhāti. - AK 46.
Rāghavānanda's Vedānta biases are particularly evident in
his commentary on this verse. Sāstri's translation includes
Rāghavānanda's remarks in parentheses: "Just as the limbs
are (not other than) the body (yet the body is different from
them, being the whole), just (again) as its various products
are (not other than) clay (yet clay is different from them
as their cause), even so the (world) immovable and movable,
being (not other than) the non-dual (Brahman), appears as if
different (therefrom); (yet that Brahman is certainly dif-
ferent from the world, being the primal cause of the world.)"
39. Trigūḥ... kurute sṛṣṭim avidyā. - AK 49.
40. Nārāyaṇam ātmānaṃ jñātvā sargasthitipralaya hetum.
- AK 67.
41. See supra, pp.93-94.
42. PS 43, 51, 52, 104.
43. PS 4, 23, 41, 92.

44. Tatra ca yadi brahmanāḥ sā parāmarśāsaktir nāsti jīvasya
kuta āgacchet. - Ehāskarī I, p.12. See also IPV II, p.52.
45. Mohānandhakāragahanāt - AK 6. Guṇamayamāyāgahanam - AK 45.
46. Barnett's translation of bhedatyāgena, "without regard
for their various differences," is misleading. Silburn's
translation is better: "Si l'abstraction est faite de leurs
différences en forms variées."
47. Supra, pp.45-46.
48. Supra, pp.61-62.
49. Supra, p.73.
50. Supra, p.72.
51. Silburn comments on these verses: "Les conditions
variées des âmes individuelles n'appartiennent pas au
Seigneur suprême."

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